

**REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
CONCERNING
THE MISSING U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL
DESK LOGS**



**OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

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SUMMARY

On March 3, 1997, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that the Inspector General (IG), Department of Defense (DoD), assume responsibility for an investigation begun in January 1997 by the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses (OSAGWI) to locate missing U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) desk logs maintained in the Joint Operations Center (JOC), Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, during the Persian Gulf War.¹ Specifically, the Deputy Secretary asked that we follow all leads that could be developed on the location of the original logs or copies in electronic or hard copy versions; gather all originals and copies that could be located; and, if a full copy of the logs could not be located, explain why (*Exhibit 1*).²

The NBC desk logs (hereafter, logs) were created and maintained by U.S. Army (USA) Chemical Corps officers assigned to the NBC watch desk in the JOC during the period of about August 1990 to March 1991. The logs were maintained in the "normal course of business," first in handwritten form, then in computer disk form. They were prepared on Department of the Army (DA) Form 1594, Daily Staff Journal, or in a similar format, and they were classified Secret. The purpose of these logs was to provide a chronological record of any NBC-related key events that occurred each day and to serve as memory aids for the six NBC officers. Four of the officers primarily served as NBC desk officers on two member teams during revolving 12-hour shifts; one served as a NBC staff assistant and the other was the senior NBC officer in charge.

Although it is not known with certainty how many log pages were generated, it has been estimated that approximately 180 to 210 pages of logs may have been created by the NBC desk officers during Desert Shield/Desert Storm.^{3 4} Currently, 37 pages of logs are known to exist, all of which are in hard copy form, and are copies of the

¹ CENTCOM refers to the U.S. Central Command at MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL. CENTCOM (Forward) refers to the deployed forward headquarters, established in the Ministry of Defense and Aviation building in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The CENTCOM JOC consisted of crisis action watch teams that responded to actions and taskers relative to the conduct of the Gulf War.

² Many veterans of the Gulf War have been experiencing a variety of physical symptoms, collectively called Gulf War Syndrome and later, Gulf War Illnesses. In response to veterans' concerns, the DoD established a task force in June 1995 to investigate all possible causes. On November 12, 1996, DoD responsibility for these investigations was assumed by the OSAGWI.

³ Desert Shield/Desert Storm are the DoD operational names describing the defensive build-up period (Desert Shield - August 7, 1990 to January 16, 1991) and offensive operations against Iraq (Desert Storm - January 17, 1991 to February 28, 1991, and cease-fire negotiations with the Government of Iraq, March 1-4, 1991).

⁴ OSAGWI based this estimate on the assumption that one page of log was written for each day in theater, and with interviews of the NBC officers who indicated that the logs were kept with less frequency in August 1990 when the NBC desk was being established and in late March 1991 when they were preparing for re-deployment.

original documents. These 37 pages cover 26 nonconsecutive days during the period of January 17 through March 12, 1991. They were assembled from pages that were in the custody of CENTCOM and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OSD(PA)), Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Office prior to our investigation. All 37 pages of logs have been released to the public by the DoD.

This investigation was conducted by the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), the criminal investigative arm of the DoD IG. Significant investigative actions included: conducting approximately 185 interviews and a number of polygraph examinations; execution of 3 search warrants; execution of 2 command directed searches at CENTCOM and Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), MD; document searches by DoD and non-DoD Agencies and organizations; forensic examination of 4 computers and approximately 100 computer disks; the review of more than 700 boxes containing approximately 700,000 pages of archived records at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA); and the review of more than 22,000 pages of CENTCOM FOIA files.

During the course of our investigation, we developed information that supported the issuance and execution of two Federal search warrants and a Military Magistrate's Authorization to Search. A 20-page document, entitled "Log Extracts - Biological Defense," was recovered during one of these searches. This document (*Exhibit 2*) contains 223 entries, which we believe to be excerpts from the original log pages.⁵

A detailed comparison of the "Log Extracts - Biological Defense" at *Exhibit 2* and the existing log pages at *Exhibit 3* revealed that, of the 223 entries in *Exhibit 2*, 58 are identical to entries found on the logs at *Exhibit 3*; however, 165 entries relate to information not contained in the existing 37 pages of the log. Further, many of these entries fall within unaccounted for time and date gaps in the existing log pages. This includes new entries on 23 of 29 dates, where there are no existing log pages, and which fall within the January 17, 1991 to March 12, 1991 time period. Since approximately 75 percent of the entries on the 20 pages of "Log Extracts" contain new information, this equates to approximately 15 pages of new log entries.⁶ *Exhibit 4* contains an analysis comparing known log gaps with the new entries found on the "Log Extracts - Biological Defense" document.⁷

⁵ Interviews of former NBC officers confirmed the subject document contained entries they made or recognized as being contained in the original logs.

⁶ DCIS released copies of the "Log Extracts" to OSAGWI and CENTCOM officials for their review. Both organizations confirmed that they had not seen the "Log Extracts" document, and that it contained new information. OSAGWI is evaluating the information contained in the new log entries.

⁷ A table of the CENTCOM NBC Desk Logs Span and Gaps currently exists on the website GulfLINK.

Aside from these entries, we did not recover any additional pages of the logs and could not establish a definitive explanation of what happened to them.⁸ However, our investigation determined that after the Gulf War, the logs, in both hard copy and computer form, were returned to CENTCOM, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL, in about April 1991. The most probable explanation is that these logs, in both hard copy and computer disk form, were destroyed at CENTCOM with other related NBC documents in October 1994, or later, as part of an internal office relocation, personnel changes and movement of the NBC records.

Our investigation also determined that after the Gulf War, in March 1991, one of the NBC desk officers sent a computer disk, believed to contain a copy of the logs to the Chemical Research and Engineering Development Center (CRDEC), Edgewood area, APG, MD. After returning to APG in May 1991, this officer was unsuccessful in an attempt to open and review this computer disk. Investigative efforts to locate the missing computer disk have been unsuccessful.

Additionally, some of the NBC officers recalled a "computer virus" incident in the JOC which they thought might have caused a loss of some logs. Our investigation revealed that a suspected computer virus incident was in fact reported to the National Security Agency (NSA) headquarters by JOC communications specialists. The incident, which occurred on December 13, 1990, was investigated by NSA specialists and determined not to have been a virus, but rather, a software and computer equipment problem. It appears that the suspected computer virus did not cause the loss of the missing logs.

We determined that appropriate directives, regulations and other written guidance were in effect that mandated the preservation and archiving of all Gulf War documents, including the logs, as permanent records, however, these requirements were not met by CENTCOM.

As a result of this investigation, an Army officer is currently under criminal investigation for wrongfully taking and possessing the NBC desk "Log Extracts" and other classified documents. The facts surrounding the activities of this officer have been referred to the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) and U.S. Army Military Intelligence (MI) for further investigation. We are monitoring this separate investigation to ensure that any new leads concerning the missing logs are pursued.

⁸ One of the recurring difficulties in this investigation was locating and interviewing individuals regarding their recollection of events, which may have been insignificant at the time of occurrence--in some cases 6 to 7 years ago. Further, most military witnesses had been reassigned or had retired from active duty, and there had been a complete changeover of personnel in most organizations.

Finally, during the course of this investigation, we did not receive nor did we develop any evidence or credible information to support the theory that any individuals or organizations participated in a conspiracy to destroy or conceal the logs. All key witnesses, known to have had possession of the logs, denied any involvement and/or knowledge concerning deliberate acts of destruction or wrongful disposition of the missing logs. Further no witnesses provided information that they had been directed or pressured to destroy or wrongfully dispose of the logs.

BACKGROUND

When we assumed control of this investigation from OSAGWI, we learned that investigators from the OSAGWI had compiled an extensive investigative record on the issue of the missing logs. This included interviews of approximately 40 individuals. In-depth interviews of the six NBC officers had been conducted in the January-February 1997 timeframe. Also, in late February 1997, OSAGWI investigators visited CENTCOM and conducted interviews of current and former CENTCOM personnel who may have been in possession and/or control of the logs. During that visit, they conducted an office-to-office search of desks and cabinets within CENTCOM, and examined computers and computer disks that may have contained the logs.

The Department of the Army Office of Inspector General (DAIG), while conducting a separate investigation on a related matter, had also conducted detailed interviews with the six NBC officers. These interviews included questions about the creation, content and maintenance of the logs. These interviews, like OSAGWI's, had been recently conducted.

Prior to the initiation of our investigation, only 36 pages of logs were known to exist. These pages had been previously released to the public by OSD(PA) FOIA office and CENTCOM. An additional log page, previously declassified and thought to have been released in June 1994 by the OSD(PA) FOIA office, was discovered during an internal review of the log pages in March 1997. It was released to the public by the OSD(PA) FOIA office in April 1997 during our investigation.⁹

These 37 pages of logs, assembled from two sources, were a portion of the logs, originally classified Secret, that had been generated during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Eleven pages had been in the custody of the J3 (Operations)¹⁰ Ground Operations Branch at CENTCOM, Tampa, FL, and 32 pages had been in the custody of the

⁹ The 37 pages of CENTCOM logs previously released to the public can be found at *Exhibit 3*. In conjunction with its investigation of certain Gulf War events, the OSAGWI determined that only 37 nonconsecutive pages of the CENTCOM logs were known to exist. Two pages exist for segments of each of 4 days: January 19, 20, 21 and 23, 1991. These four additional, partial pages are included for completeness, making a total of 41 pages found at *Exhibit 3*.

¹⁰ J codes are used to identify standard segments of joint staffs; i.e., J1 is Administration, J2 is Intelligence, J3 is Operations, J4 is Logistics, J5 is Plans, and J6 is Communications.

OSD(PA) FOIA office. The 32 pages at the OSD(PA) FOIA office came from the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy (ATSD(AE))¹¹ which had that portion of the logs declassified in June 1994 in preparation for a press conference held by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The 11 pages at CENTCOM were found in J-3 (Operations) and declassified in response to a FOIA request in late 1994, and released in January 1995. Five pages were identified as duplicates between the two sets, and there is one duplicate page in the OSD(PA) set bringing the total, minus duplicates, to 37 pages.

SCOPE OF THE DoD IG INVESTIGATION

The Deputy Secretary's letter of March 3, 1997, defined the scope of our investigation. We maintained a cooperative working relationship with the OSAGWI and, although we were not investigating the causes of the Gulf War Illnesses, all information developed that might assist the OSAGWI in its investigative mission was provided to OSAGWI in a timely manner. All agencies and organizations contacted, internal and external to the DoD, were fully cooperative and assisted in this investigation by making their records available for review.

Our investigation began by closely coordinating with both OSAGWI and the DAIG for the purpose of assessing their previous investigative efforts, evaluating the results of their interviews, and ascertaining investigative leads to be pursued. When our investigation commenced, both the OSAGWI and DAIG discontinued their investigations on the disposition of the missing logs.

Based upon this review, we prepared and implemented a comprehensive investigative plan that included the reinterviewing of the NBC officers previously interviewed by the OSAGWI and DAIG investigators, and locating and interviewing all individuals known to have had or who may have had access to, control or custody of the logs.

An effort was initiated to determine what happened to the logs through these interviews, and to pursue all investigative leads developed during this investigation in an attempt to recover the missing logs, in either hard copy or computer form, and to explain what happened to them.

During our investigation, we utilized all appropriate investigative techniques legally at our disposal, including the conduct of interviews, polygraph examinations, searches, records reviews and forensic evaluation of computers and computer disks.

¹¹ In January 1997, the ATSD (AE) became the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ATSD(NCB))

We noted discrepancies and conflicting statements by some of the individuals who created or subsequently had access to, or control of, the logs, regarding the format of the logs, their composition, length and ultimate disposition. We attempted to resolve inconsistencies and discrepancies but could not do so in all instances.

INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES UTILIZED

Witness Interviews

Of the approximately 185 interviews conducted by DCIS, about 40 persons interviewed by OSAGWI were reinterviewed during this investigation. This included every CENTCOM NBC officer who served in the JOC and who was responsible for making original entries in the logs, as well as other individuals known to have had access to, custody or control of the logs.¹²

Witness interviews were conducted with individuals from a variety of organizations, internal and external to the DoD, to which copies of the logs might have been sent. This included, but was not limited to, the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, the U.S. Army Center for Military History, the Army Staff, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Defense Science Board (DSB), the Defense Special Weapons Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the NARA.

During these interviews, it was determined that various individuals and organizations legitimately maintained copies of the existing, incomplete logs. When applicable, witnesses who had possession of the logs, in either hard copy or computer disk form, were questioned about their potential involvement and/or knowledge of deliberate acts of destruction and/or wrongful disposition of the missing logs. None of these individuals admitted to any deliberate acts of destruction or wrongful disposition and no witnesses provided any information suggesting they had been directed or pressured to destroy or wrongfully dispose of the logs.

Our interviews traced the existence of the logs to the CENTCOM J3 (Operations) area at MacDill Air Force Base as late as October 1994, which appears to be the last time a folder and computer disks believed to contain the logs were seen by a witness. We also traced a computer disk, reportedly containing a copy of the logs, to the Studies and Analysis Branch, Edgewood area, APG, where the disk was last accounted for in May 1991.

¹² Unless noted otherwise, the rank and title of witnesses, are those that applied during the time in question. Some military witnesses have retired from active duty or have changed assignments.

Searches and Seizures

During our investigation, information was developed that supported the issuance and execution of two Federal search warrants. The warrants were directed at storage facilities containing the personal effects of an active duty Army officer who had access to the logs. Classified documents, including CENTCOM NBC desk-related documents were seized.¹³ These included the "Log Extracts - Biological Defense" pages, which have since been declassified and are at *Exhibit 2*.

Additionally, a Military Magistrate's Authorization for Search and Seizure was obtained and served at the officer's residence and military office, in cooperation with the USACIDC.

Inasmuch as a criminal investigation of this officer is ongoing, specific details concerning this matter are not included in this report.

Use of the Polygraph

Polygraph examinations were offered to evaluate the truthfulness of several key witnesses who were considered most likely to have been involved in, or aware of, the potential destruction or disposition of missing logs. Those individuals who voluntarily submitted to a polygraph examination were tested on issues of deliberately destroying the logs and knowing what happened to them. All examinations were favorably concluded with "no deception indicated."¹⁴

Document Searches and Reviews

Documents and records from the NARA and CENTCOM were examined. Document searches and reviews were also conducted at other DoD organizations and non-DoD Agencies believed to have had access to, or interest in, the logs. Additionally, the optical scanning and document storage system (Excalibur) at CENTCOM headquarters, Tampa, FL, and the U.S. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) Chemical Branch Office optical scanning and storage system

¹³ Based upon a review of records, these items were packed for shipment in June 1996 in conjunction with the officer's change of duty assignment and were subsequently placed in storage in September 1996.

¹⁴ DoD Directive/Regulation 5210.48, "Polygraph Program," prohibits or restricts the dissemination of polygraph results and refusals. Polygraph results may be made available within the DoD to officials responsible for personnel security, intelligence, counterintelligence, law enforcement, and administration of justice. Polygraph results may be released outside of DoD only to appropriate law enforcement officials. Refusals, in criminal cases, may not be communicated to a person's supervisor, but may be released to officials directly involved in the administration, control or conduct of criminal investigations.

were reviewed. Aside from the log extracts mentioned above, no missing logs were found during any of the searches and reviews conducted during this investigation.

CENTCOM Documents

During the 6 years before our investigation, CENTCOM conducted several separate and distinct calls for documents related to Gulf War documents. Additionally, in February 1997, the OSAGWI staff undertook a thorough search of safes and file cabinets at CENTCOM headquarters in an effort to locate the logs.

Selected "keyword" searches of the Excalibur archiving system, which should duplicate what is archived at NARA, were conducted to determine whether CENTCOM still had some information related to the Gulf War that had not been archived. No logs were found.

During our investigation, CENTCOM discovered Gulf War documents that were subsequently reviewed and archived. This included documents on approximately 200 computer disks. However, no additional log pages were found among these computer disks and documents. CENTCOM J1 (Administration) officials continue to advise us and the OSAGWI of the results of their ongoing efforts to locate and archive newly discovered Gulf War documents. DCIS is monitoring CENTCOM archiving efforts, in coordination with NARA and OSAGWI, to determine whether these records contain any missing logs.

NARA Documents

All CENTCOM Gulf War related documents at NARA were examined to ensure that the logs were not inadvertently sent to the NARA without first being scanned into the CENTCOM optical storage system. Approximately 700 records boxes, each containing approximately 1,000 pages, were reviewed. Additionally, NARA Gulf War documents that are classified and stored with the DIA were reviewed. No additional logs were located within the custody of the NARA or the DIA.

DIA Documents

The DIA was formally asked to review its files to determine whether copies of the CENTCOM logs may exist in agency records. The DIA responded that a search of its files was conducted that revealed the DIA possessed pages of the previously declassified and released logs attached to a coordination copy of a FOIA request received by CENTCOM in September 1994. No additional log pages were located within the custody of the DIA.

CIA Documents

The CIA was formally asked to review its files to determine whether copies of the CENTCOM logs may exist in agency records. The CIA responded that a search of its files was conducted and no copies of the logs were located.

Other Agencies

The following DoD organizations and non-DoD Agencies and organizations were formally asked to review their files and records repositories to determine whether copies of the missing CENTCOM logs may exist in historical, research, operational or correspondence files:

- National Defense University, Washington, DC
- Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
- Army Center for Military History, Washington, DC
- Center for Army Lessons Learned, Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Leavenworth, KS
- Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL
- U.S. Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, AL
- Chemical Branch Office, DCSOPS, the Pentagon
- Office of the Chief of Army Public Affairs, the Pentagon
- Office of Legislative Liaison, Army Staff, the Pentagon
- Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs), the Pentagon
- Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), the Pentagon
- Mitre Corporation (project on the Gulf War)¹⁵

Although several organizations possessed copies of the pages of the logs released previously to the public, the copies were obtained during the normal course of business after public release had been made. All organizations responded that they do not possess any portion of the missing logs in their records repositories and files.

¹⁵ In December 1996, Mitre Corporation was awarded a contract, under the auspices of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) to organize, review and analyze millions of Gulf War related documents at all security classification levels from several Government sources. This included the DIA; NSA; Department of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; CIA; DoD's Gulf War Declassification Project; and CENTCOM. It was determined that Mitre only has copies of some of the existing pages of logs in their files.

Forensic Computer Recovery and Computer Disk Reviews

Our investigation led to the recovery and forensic examination of approximately 100 computer disks. Forensic examinations were conducted with the assistance of forensic computer specialists from the NSA and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. Seventy of the computer disks were recovered from the CENTCOM J2 (Intelligence) Directorate, which OSAGWI investigators identified as possibly containing NBC records or logs, some of which could not be opened and read.¹⁶ Approximately 30 computer disks were recovered during the previously mentioned search of an Army officer's personal effects. The forensic examination of the disks included attempts to reconstruct potentially damaged and/or erased computer disk files. Examination of these computer disks disclosed no information identifiable as logs.

We also recovered two desktop CompuAdd computers and one laptop computer previously used in the CENTCOM headquarters J3 (Operations) Ground Operations Branch. The laptop and the desktop computers were recovered from temporary storage at MacDill AFB, and may have been the computers used by the NBC desk officers in the JOC during the Gulf War to create and store the logs.¹⁷ Witnesses recalled that a utility program approved for "swiping" or obliterating all data from hard drives was or should have been used on these computers for the purpose of safeguarding sensitive information. Each computer should have been "swiped" before shipment to Florida from Saudi Arabia at the conclusion of the Gulf War and "swiped" again prior to being removed from the J3 (Operations) Ground Operations Branch, which was located in a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). Additionally, a computer belonging to the Army officer, who is currently under investigation, was seized and analyzed. No records identifiable as logs were recovered from the hard drives of these computers.

Differences in the NBC Desk Logs Format

A review of the previously released logs revealed a difference in the appearance of some pages of the logs. Specifically, some log pages are smaller in size than others, and the font size/style appears to be different in some instances. The senior NBC officer in charge, when reviewing and comparing the existing logs with the "Log Extracts" that we recovered, speculated that if someone "cut" instead of "copied" entries from the log page on the computer, it could have shortened the original log page by removing the particular log entry. The deputy to the senior NBC officer in charge,

¹⁶ Although the computer disks containing the logs were traced to the J3 (Operations) Directorate, some of the labels on the computer disks in the J2 (Intelligence) Directorate indicated that they may have contained NBC related information. The disks were evaluated with negative results.

¹⁷ Although we could not identify any of these computers by serial number as being used in the JOC at the time the logs were created, witness interviews indicated that the computers recovered for evaluation may have been those used. The laptop computer contained two removable hard disk drives that were also evaluated.

who set up the software and electronic format for the logs, recalled that the software allowed the user to elect options in both font size and style. One of the NBC desk officers recalled, after reviewing the logs, being able to select "more attractive" type (font) when making log entries.

INVESTIGATIVE RESULTS

The CENTCOM NBC Watch Desk

The CENTCOM J3 (Operations) NBC Division, Chemical Branch Chief, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, USA, and his deputy, Major (MAJ) xxxxxxxx, related they were among the first CENTCOM headquarters personnel deployed to Saudi Arabia in August 1990. They established an NBC watch desk in the basement of the Ministry of Defense and Aviation building and began keeping hand-written desk logs of significant events, actions, and operational issues on yellow, lined notebook paper. An additional CENTCOM Chemical Branch officer, Captain (CPT) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, USA, was deployed to Saudi Arabia in mid-August 1990 and primarily worked with LTC xxxxxxxxxxxx.

We learned through interviews that three Army Chemical Corps officers, MAJ xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx and CPTs xx, detailed from the CRDEC, Edgewood area, APG, MD, arrived in Saudi Arabia toward the end of August 1990 to augment the NBC desk.

Our investigation revealed that shortly after the arrival of all the NBC officers, the CENTCOM NBC desk began operating on a continuous, 24-hour watch shift. The officers were assigned to a two-person, 12-hour shift, each. The two watch shifts were primarily staffed by MAJ xxxxxxxx and CPT xxxxxx on the a.m. (midnight to noon) shift and MAJ xxxxxx and CPT xxxxxxxx on the p.m. (noon to midnight) shift. After hostilities, toward the end of March 1991, they ended the 12-hour shifts and began preparations for redeployment back to the United States.

LTC xxxxxxxxxxxx supervised MAJs xxxxxxxx and xxxxxx and CPTs xxxxxx and xxxxxxxx, and coordinated NBC defense training. CPT xxxxxxxx supported LTC xxxxxxxxxxxx with NBC defense training requirements through October 1990 when he redeployed to the CENTCOM (Rear) headquarters in Tampa, FL. CPT xxxxxxxx staffed the CENTCOM (Rear) NBC desk during the remainder of the Gulf War and provided direct support to the CENTCOM JOC NBC desk.

How the CENTCOM NBC Desk Logs Were Created and Maintained

Extensive interviews conducted with MAJs xxxxxxxx and xxxxxx, CPTs xxxxxx, xxxxxxxxx, xxxxxxx, and with LTC xxxxxxxxx, revealed that the logs were classified Secret and probably maintained from late August 1990 to late March 1991. According to LTC xxxxxxxxx, there was no requirement to maintain the logs as part of his mission, but he wanted the logs maintained so they could be used as memory aids when changing the watch. Initially, the logs existed on yellow, lined notebook paper. Later, they were handwritten on DA Form 1594, U.S. Army Daily Staff Journal.

Sometime during late fall 1990, the NBC desk officers began maintaining the logs on a computer and generally followed the Daily Staff Journal format. The logs were generated in hard copy and computer disk format and were reviewed during each shift turnover by the oncoming watch officers, and routinely by LTC xxxxxxxxx. The logs were then placed in file folders and stored in a file cabinet adjacent to the NBC desk in the JOC. LTC xxxxxxxxx, MAJ xxxxxxx and CPTs xxxxxx and xxxxxxxxx generally recalled a continuous log was maintained by each watch section from the inception of the NBC desk in August 1990 through late March 1991 when the JOC ceased full-time operations. These NBC officers generally recall that the logs were a continuous record of events, actions and activities that they deemed significant for follow-up action, notification and briefing of the follow-on watch shift. LTC xxxxxxxxx stated that the logs were for internal use only within the JOC, and no logs were ever disseminated, during the Gulf War, to other organizations or agencies outside of CENTCOM.

MAJ xxxxxxx and CPTs xxxxxx and xxxxxxxxx recalled logs were first maintained by hand and later, during the fall 1990, were maintained by computer. LTC xxxxxxxxx also recalled bringing a laptop computer with him when he initially deployed to Saudi Arabia. He could not recall, however, whether the computer was ever used for keeping the logs. MAJ xxxxxxx believed a laptop computer arrived in the JOC during the fall 1990 and was, in fact, used temporarily to maintain the logs. MAJ xxxxxx stated that no laptop computer was used to generate logs, and CPTs xxxxxx and xxxxxxxxx did not recall using a laptop computer.

LTC xxxxxxxxx, MAJs xxxxxxx and xxxxxx, and CPT xxxxxx recalled receiving a desktop computer sometime during late November 1990. They believed the desktop computer was in place by Thanksgiving 1990. The computers, known to the NBC desk officers as "CompuAdds," were donated by the Government of Japan as part of its contribution to the war effort. MAJ xxxxxxxxx stated that the computers reportedly had been hastily assembled in the United States and shipped to Saudi Arabia. He recalled that a computer disk recorded on one CompuAdd computer frequently could not be read on another computer. MAJ xxxxxxxxx believes the 3.5 inch disk

drives on the computer were out of alignment. Other NBC desk officers did not recall having problems with the computers in the JOC.

MAJ xxxxxxxx related that they downloaded all computer files from the laptop computer onto 3.5 inch computer disks. He created a duplicate set of disks and all disks were stored in the NBC desk file cabinet. Desk logs and other NBC related files were also created and kept in the same manner on the CompuAdd computers as on the laptop. MAJ xxxxxxxx also recalled that computer disk files of the logs were periodically copied from the computer hard disk to 3.5 inch computer disks and maintained as backup files.

In late March and April 1991, after the end of hostilities, the logs, in hard copy and computer disk format, and other related NBC documents, were packed by MAJ xxxxxxxx and prepared for shipment to CENTCOM headquarters, Tampa, FL. MAJ xxxxxxxx remembers the electronic files, from both the laptop and desktop computers, that were shipped back to CENTCOM consisted of two sets of 10 disks each. The original electronic files were on one set of 10 floppy disks and a duplicate set of files was placed on another set of 10 disks. MAJ xxxxxxxx stated that the NBC documents, the desktop computer and related equipment were shipped back to CENTCOM by air in about May 1991.

MAJ xxxxxx recalled copying the logs from the hard disk of the computer onto two floppy disks. She told us that each disk contained all the logs; one disk was placed in the shipment back to CENTCOM, Tampa, FL, and the other disk was sent back to CRDEC, APG, MD. MAJ xxxxxx recalled printing out a hard copy of all the logs and including the hard copy with the floppy disk in the papers being shipped back to CENTCOM headquarters. MAJ xxxxxx stated that she did not send a hard copy of the logs to APG.

A Suspected Computer Virus and its Effect on the NBC Desk Logs

MAJ xxxxxxxx recalled a computer virus incident in the JOC during late 1990, referred to as the "Jerusalem" virus, which caused the J-6 (Communications) specialists to check all computers. He believed the specialist ran a utility program, called "Norton Antivirus" on all the computers. It was MAJ xxxxxxxxxx understanding that this "virus checker" eliminates data and files from the computer that have been affected by the virus.

Our investigation did not identify or locate any witnesses who possessed firsthand knowledge about the reported computer virus in the JOC and its actual effect on the logs. Further, no official CENTCOM record of such a virus could be located. Also, no members of the J6 (Communications) staff currently at CENTCOM

headquarters, who were interviewed, had any recollection or record of a virus occurring at the CENTCOM JOC during Desert Shield/Storm.

During a subsequent document search and review of DCSOPS documents in the Pentagon, a record was found that referred to a suspected computer virus incident at the CENTCOM JOC. Although the document contained a date-time group indicating the day and time the document was created, it did not include the month and year. The document suggested follow-up action might have been taken by the NSA.

Our investigation confirmed the NSA received a report from the CENTCOM JOC on December 13, 1990, indicating JOC specialists believed a virus had attacked some computers within the JOC. The NSA documents disclosed that, after the initial report, steps were taken to isolate specialized communications links to the JOC and to investigate the matter. Computer experts from NSA determined that there had, in fact, been no virus. The NSA identified the computer problem as being a data recognition problem caused when new software was loaded onto CENTCOM computers.¹⁸

NBC Desk Log Issues at CENTCOM

CPT xxxxxxx and other CENTCOM (Tampa) headquarters J3 (Operations) NBC personnel recalled receiving the NBC desk material sent from Saudi Arabia in the April - May 1991 timeframe. CPT xxxxxxx recalled receiving and unpacking "palletized" boxes containing documents, files, computer disks and computers. The files, documents and computer disks, still classified Secret, were placed in safes within the CENTCOM J3 (Operations) NBC Division Chemical Branch office. CPT xxxxxxx also recalled setting up a CompuAdd computer returned from the JOC NBC desk on LTC xxxxxxxxxxxx desk.

CPT xxxxxxx recalled seeing the logs in hard copy form and seeing computer disks labeled as containing the logs after their return from the Gulf War. MAJ xxxxxxx and Sergeant First Class (SFC) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, USA, Noncommissioned officer (NCO), NBC Branch, recalled attempting unsuccessfully to view the files on a computer disk containing the logs.

Following the 1991 return of the logs to the J3 (Operations) NBC Division, the office underwent a major downsizing commencing in about September 1992 and ending in about April 1993. In about April 1993, the Chemical Branch office of the NBC

¹⁸ Since NSA computer experts determined that the alleged computer virus penetration of the CENTCOM JOC computers did not occur and was, in reality, a computer data recognition problem, it appears the gaps and missing days on the logs did not result from a computer virus as some suspected. Additionally, any log entries and data lost would have been lost prior to December 13, 1990, when the alleged computer virus was suspected in some JOC computers. Thus, the computer virus theory would not explain missing log pages, dates and gaps occurring during and after Coalition Forces offensive operations which began January 17, 1991.

Division was moved into a small office space in the J3 (Operations) Ground Operations Branch of the Current Operations Division, which was located within the SCIF. According to witnesses who worked in this area of J3 (Operations), this office was very small and was commonly referred to as the "NBC closet." In this approximate 6-month period, the NBC Division, with approximately 20 billets, was disbanded as an entity, and only two chemical personnel billets remained. These two individuals included a U.S. Army Chemical Corps officer, MAJ xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, who was subsequently replaced by Colonel (COL) xxxxxxxxxxxxxx and LTC xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, respectively, and a U.S. Army Chemical Corps NCO, SFC xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. All other NBC Division members were transferred out of the command or reassigned within CENTCOM. The remaining officers who had created the logs, and others who had been personally aware of their existence, were among those reassigned.

SFC xxxxxxxx, who arrived in December 1992, was the last NCO assigned to the NBC Branch; he left in October 1994. SFC xxxxxxxx related that while still in the NBC Division office, in about April 1993, he observed NBC desk related Gulf War documents in three office safes. He recalled seeing logs that "went from day one until they came home from Saudi Arabia." SFC xxxxxxxx also recalled seeing some handwritten pages of logs. He guessed that there were a "couple hundred pages" of logs. SFC xxxxxxxx said that he also recalled seeing six to nine small, cardboard boxes of 3.5 inch computer disks. He said that at least 5 boxes were full with 10 disks each. He stated that the disks were marked "Persian Gulf" and were marked with the dates the files were created.

SFC xxxxxxxx recalled moving two safes and two computers into the NBC closet, inside the SCIF of the J-3 (Operations) Directorate, which occurred in about April 1993. He said he consolidated all Gulf War files into five drawers of one safe and 1 1/2 drawers of the other safe; the remaining drawers of the second safe contained other NBC files.

MAJ xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx related she was assigned to the NBC Division in October 1992, and that within 6 months, she and SFC xxxxxxxx were the only individuals remaining in the entire NBC Division. She said that she was aware that Gulf War material was in the safes, and recalled seeing a file marked "Logs," but she did not recall seeing any logs. She also recalled seeing a box of computer disks, however, she never had occasion to open and review their contents. MAJ xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx was assigned to a different division in the J3 (Operations) Directorate in July 1993, leaving SFC xxxxxxxx by himself as the NBC expert.

COL xxxxx recalled arriving at CENTCOM in the summer of 1993, and that COL xxxxxxxxx,¹⁹ his predecessor, had left in January 1993. The only person in the Chemical Branch when he arrived was SFC xxxxxxxx. COL xxxxx went on terminal leave in April 1994, and was subsequently replaced by LTC xxxxx. COL xxxxx initially recalled looking at some of the CENTCOM logs, which he recalls were handwritten, in conjunction with a FOIA request, concerning reports of chemical detections of chemical exposure made by the Czechoslovakian military during the war.²⁰ In a subsequent interview, after refreshing his memory, COL xxxxx said that this may not have been a FOIA action, but a response to a congressional inquiry from Senator Donald Riegle. He could not recall additional details of the action. He also recalled the Gulf War files being in drawers in several file cabinets. He relied on SFC xxxxxxxx to do the staffing work for him.

In November 1993, SFC xxxxxxxx was assigned to collect relevant portions of the logs from the Gulf War for specific times and dates and to telefax them to the CENTCOM Liaison Office in the Pentagon. These logs were to be used by COL xxxxxxxxx in preparation for his November 18, 1993, testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, House Armed Services Committee (HASC)²¹. Although stationed with another command in 1993, COL xxxxxxxxx testified before the HASC because he had been determined to be the most knowledgeable individual relative to issues surrounding alleged detections of chemical and/or biological weapons agents during the war. Portions of the logs pertaining to suspected chemical and/or biological agent detections were used by COL xxxxxxxxx to refresh his memory prior to his congressional testimony.

SFC xxxxxxxx related that when he was tasked to locate logs to support COL xxxxxxxxx congressional testimony, he retrieved the file folder containing an unknown number of pages of logs and, over the course of about three evenings, telefaxed approximately 25 to 40 pages of logs, some of which he marked with an asterisk (*) in the left-hand margin to note relevant information requested by COL xxxxxxxxx.²² He said during the first night he faxed between 9 and 12 pages, that were retained by LTC xxxxxxxxx, Chief, Ground Operations Branch, in his

¹⁹ By November 1993, LTC xxxxxxxx had been promoted to colonel (06) and reassigned to Fort Lewis, WA.

²⁰ DCIS checked the FOIA files at CENTCOM, both hard copy files and the Excalibur scanning system looking for logs, both printed and handwritten, with negative results.

²¹ The hearing was before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee on Armed Services and is discussed in HASC report 103-27.

²² During his first interview with OSAGWI investigators, SFC xxxxxxxx estimated that he telefaxed 35 to 40 pages of logs.

(xxxxxxx) desk drawer in J-3 (Operations) and therefore separated from the main folder that was returned to the safe in the NBC Closet.²³

SFC xxxxxxx did not recall who he spoke with on the telephone in the Pentagon during this action, but the name "xxxxxxx" sounded familiar.²⁴ He also recalled speaking with COL xxxxxxx who gave him specific kinds of entries to look for in the logs. COL xxxxxxx also asked him to fax those pages to the Pentagon, to make a paper copy of all the pages faxed, to package the pages, and to give the package to one of two CENTCOM officers who happened to be going to Washington so it could be delivered to him. SFC xxxxxxx recalled giving copies of the telefaxed log pages to an unidentified officer from CENTCOM who was possibly a courier from the CENTCOM Liaison Office, or someone traveling to the Pentagon from CENTCOM.²⁵ He identified the asterisks (*) on the left-hand margin of the logs at *Exhibit 3*, as being his handwriting.²⁶

The last known time the logs were identified as being in existence at CENTCOM headquarters was in October 1994 after LTC xxxxxxx directed SFC xxxxxxx to remove all documents and files from the NBC Closet so that a new Ground Operations section could take over the space. According to LTC xxxxxxx, LTC xxxxx, SFC xxxxxxx and other witnesses in the Ground Operations Branch, there were large volumes of documents and files in the NBC Closet, and the office appeared cluttered due to its small size.

LTC xxxxx related that he was assigned to the Ground Operations Branch, Current Operations Division, J3 in July 1994. LTC xxxxx filled the vacancy created by COL xxxxx. LTC xxxxx supervised SFC xxxxxxx, and shared the small NBC

²³ SFC xxxxxxx identified the 11 pages of logs that were discovered during a FOIA request in late 1994 as probably the ones he faxed to the Pentagon during the first night in November 1993 and which he claims were retained by LTC xxxxxxx.

²⁴ LTC xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, USA, was detailed to the ATSD(AE), the Pentagon, in late 1993, and served on the DSB in 1993 - 1994, where she later reviewed existing logs and made annotations on the right side margin. LTC xxxxxxx was the action officer who released the 32 pages of the logs to OSD(PA) for declassification and public release in June 1994. She and another witness, assigned to the ATSD (AE) and the DSB believe that the log pages originally came from COL xxxxxxx during preparation for his congressional testimony or from the Army DCSOPS, Chemical Branch office, which was involved in the action.

²⁵ The CENTCOM liaison officers were identified and interviewed as were other CENTCOM officers who may have transported these log pages. No one could recall carrying these copies of the logs to the Pentagon. Further, a search for the logs in the CENTCOM Liaison Office, the Pentagon, was negative.

²⁶ A review of the existing logs located at *Exhibit 3* revealed that 22 pages have asterisk (*) marking(s) on the left-hand margins. This investigation could not verify the actual number of pages telefaxed by SFC xxxxxxx, since the file reviewed by COL xxxxxxx could not be located; however, it is believed that they may have been the 32 pages ultimately received and declassified in June 1994 by the OSD(PA) FOIA office.

office until he xxxxx was moved into the Ground Operations area just outside the office. They both came under the supervision of LTC xxxxxxx.

LTC xxxxx recalled instructing SFC xxxxxxxx to go through the files and to get rid of anything not related to the Gulf War. He specifically recalled telling SFC xxxxxxxx not to get rid of Gulf War records and to set aside those requiring additional review by him (xxxxx). LTC xxxxx recalled SFC xxxxxxxx leaving him two "Xerox sized" boxes to go through; he thinks the other boxes of material were discarded. LTC xxxxx estimated that the disposed records would have taken up about 20 "Xerox size" boxes. LTC xxxxx estimated that this process took place over a few months while he was also performing duties as a staff officer within the Ground Operations Branch. LTC xxxxx speculated that it was "absolutely" possible that SFC xxxxxxxx may have accidentally discarded the logs. LTC xxxxx told us that he did not recall seeing the logs when he reviewed the material SFC xxxxxxxx had left for him. LTC xxxxx stated that he kept a few NBC related documents pertaining to training and research issues, and had the rest discarded. He stated that the discarded documents were neither Gulf War documents nor the logs. LTC xxxxx denied deliberately destroying the logs or knowing what happened to them.

SFC xxxxxxxx related that in about September to October 1994, while preparing to move to a new position outside the building, he emptied all NBC office documents from the two remaining office safes, which included NBC Gulf War records. SFC xxxxxxxx recalled that he placed about six boxes containing various NBC files outside the closet. He also recalled placing security classification markings and handwritten "inventory" sheets on the boxes. SFC xxxxxxxx maintained he wrote "TS/SCI" (Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information) on the boxes. SFC xxxxxxxx explained that he marked them this way because he recalled seeing some Top Secret documents in the safes in the prior NBC office, and wanted to mark the boxes at their highest classification level. According to SFC xxxxxxxx, LTC xxxxxxx instructed him to move the boxes out of the way, and questioned why he (xxxxxxxxx) marked the boxes "Top Secret/SCI," stating that J-3 didn't have "TS/SCI" documents in its possession, and to change the label. SFC xxxxxxxx stated he crossed out the markings, leaving "Secret," and moved the boxes a short distance away alongside a row of cabinets. According to SFC xxxxxxxx, LTC xxxxxxx stated that he would have Staff Sergeant (SSGT) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx., USMC, NCO, in Ground Operations, take care of the disposition of the boxes.

SFC xxxxxxxx described the "inventory" sheets as plain paper containing a short (one sentence), handwritten description of the boxes' contents. SFC xxxxxxxx further related that he placed each "inventory" sheet in a manila folder and stapled it to the top of each box.

SFC xxxxxxxx told us that he is "positive" that the folder containing the hard copy logs was placed in one of the boxes along with a small cardboard box containing several 3.5 inch computer disks. Some of these computer disks were labeled as containing NBC logs. He is positive that the folder containing the logs was placed in the boxes because he had previously seen it in the NBC office safe, and recognized it. He recalled using this file in November 1993 when he telefaxed copies of the logs to an office in the Pentagon for COL xxxxxxxxxxxx congressional hearing. SFC xxxxxxxx boxed up the NBC Closet records approximately a week prior to his reassignment, which he recalled as being October 17, 1994. About 1 to 2 weeks later, when he visited LTC xxxxx at the Ground Operations Branch Office, he was surprised to see the boxes still alongside the cabinets. SFC xxxxxxxx told us that he does not know what happened to the boxes, but maintains the boxes were labeled and affixed with the "inventory" sheets, which should have caused them to be processed for archiving.

Finally, SFC xxxxxxxx stated that he thought the logs were important and he did what he was required to do to safeguard them. He denied destroying the logs or any NBC files either as a "cover up" or to avoid his duties. He denied that anyone told him to destroy the logs or any other NBC files.

LTC xxxxxxxx was questioned about these specific points, as reported by SFC xxxxxxxx, and stated that he did not recall seeing any boxes marked "TS/SCI," nor telling SFC xxxxxxxx to relabel them, or to move them. LTC xxxxxxxx also did not recall any boxes with inventory sheets, as described by SFC xxxxxxxx, nor did he recall ordering anybody to dispose of any such boxes. LTC xxxxxxxx also did not recall retaining the folder containing the logs faxed to the Pentagon in November 1993 by SFC xxxxxxxx. LTC xxxxxxxx denied deliberately destroying the logs or knowing what happened to them.

During our investigation at CENTCOM headquarters, it was noted that, within 10 feet of where the boxes were allegedly placed, there was a large plastic collection barrel, about 4 feet high by 3 feet wide at the opening. The barrel was used for material/documents intended to be delivered for shredding or pulverizing. The barrel was routinely emptied by NCOs assigned these duties. Classified documents were supposed to be placed in burn bags before being placed in the barrel. Computer disks were to be broken apart with the magnetic media going into a burn bag, and the plastic portion going into regular trash.

SSGT xxxxx related that he was assigned to the Ground Operations Branch in August 1994, and worked immediately outside the NBC Closet. He told us that he recalled assisting LTC xxxxx in destroying documents removed from the NBC Closet and no longer deemed necessary by LTC xxxxx. SSGT xxxxx did not recall seeing any logs while he was assisting in this project. SSGT xxxxx related this process occurred

over about a 3-month period shortly after he arrived. SSGT xxxxx is certain that none of these discarded documents ever left the SCIF area for archiving purposes.

SSGT xxxxx stated, "if xxxxx did not want it, it went to the shredder." According to SSGT xxxxx the quantity of material to be destroyed was large enough to justify "special shreds," which consisted of two individuals taking the boxes of documents to the pulverizer for destruction. This shredding duty was in addition to the routine shredding procedure that was in place for emptying the barrel. SSGT xxxxx recalled personally participating in several "special shreds" to dispose of the records coming out of the NBC Closet. SSGT xxxxx also recalled breaking up computer disks with his hands and discarding the magnetic media into burn bags for destruction.

SSGT xxxxx told us he did not see the six boxes SFC xxxxxxxx maintained he placed in front of the row of cabinets. SSGT xxxxx said that it was unlikely these boxes would have gone unnoticed because the boxes would have been placed directly in front of his desk which was located in a confined area and where assigned personnel had to walk to get to their individual desks. However, SSGT xxxxx said that, if SFC xxxxxxxx had placed boxes in that area outside the NBC Closet, it would have been interpreted that they were meant to be shredded. This was where Ground Operations Branch stored their burn bags of classified material to be shredded and he (xxxxx) may have shredded them. SSGT xxxxx related that SFC xxxxxxxx did not ask him to dispose of any of the records being moved out of the NBC Closet. SSGT xxxxx denied deliberately destroying the logs or knowing what happened to them.

SSGT xxxxx recalled the two CompuAdd computers being moved out of the NBC Closet and eventually processed for disposition by the J6 (Communications) Directorate. He also recalled a laptop computer being removed from the NBC Closet. SSGT xxxxx provided us with copies of turn-in documents for these computers which led to their recovery and subsequent evaluation.

During our investigation, any person known to have worked in the area of the Ground Operations Branch in 1994, when the logs were last sighted, was interviewed. None recalled seeing the boxes in question. Additionally, administrative personnel within J3 (Operations), who may have been involved in processing records for archiving did not recall the boxes described by SFC xxxxxxxx. All denied deliberately destroying the logs, or having any knowledge as to what happened to them.

We made numerous attempts to re-interview xxxxxxxxxxxx in an effort to clarify and resolve the aforementioned issues, however, our attempts were unsuccessful.²⁷

²⁷ It is noted that OSAGWI investigators conducted a transcribed interview of xxxxxxxxxxxx in February 1997. DCIS conducted a preliminary interview of xxxxxxxxxxxx on April 8, 1997. At that time, xxx xxxxxxxx agreed to a follow-up interview on the next day, but subsequently canceled it advising that he intended to consult with an attorney. Efforts to re-interview xxx xxxxxxxx through his attorneys were unsuccessful. xxx xxxxxxxx retired from active duty in 1995.

Copy of NBC Desk Logs Sent to APG, MD

The U.S. Army Chemical, Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM), formerly the CRDEC, Edgewood area, APG, MD, was the parent command of MAJ xxxxxx and CPTs xxxxxx and xxxxxxxxx, while they were temporarily deployed to the NBC desk in the JOC, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. CPT xxxxxx returned to APG in March 1991 and MAJ xxxxxx and CPT xxxxxxxxx returned to APG in late May 1991.

According to MAJ xxxxxx, while at the JOC in Saudi Arabia in March 1991, she made a computer disk copy of the logs and mailed it, together with other documents, to APG via registered mail because they were classified Secret. Upon returning to APG, in about May 1991, MAJ xxxxxx attempted to open the computer disk containing the logs, but was unable to do so. She sought assistance from an individual who was knowledgeable with computers; however, he was unsuccessful in getting the information from the disk. MAJ xxxxxx related she was unsure of what became of the computer disk; it may have been left in a safe within the Studies and Analysis Office, CRDEC, APG or could have been destroyed. The Studies and Analysis Office, APG, is the last known location of this particular computer disk copy of the logs. MAJ xxxxxx was only at APG a few weeks before departing on a new assignment. She denied deliberately disposing of any computer disks or paper files containing any of the missing pages of logs.

Interviews of MAJ xxxxxxxx former coworkers, program managers, and supervisors were unsuccessful in locating or determining what became of the missing computer disk containing the logs. The witness identified by MAJ xxxxxx as the person who assisted her could not recall the event; however, we located another witness who recalled MAJ xxxxxx attempting to open the disk, and recalled assisting her. This witness recalled that his computer acted as though the disk was damaged. He also attempted to use a utility program to review the disk but was unsuccessful in that effort.

An APG Command directed search conducted at our request also failed to locate the missing disk.

Requirement to Archive Gulf War Documents

Our investigation revealed that CENTCOM was required by DoD Directive 5015.2 "Records Management Program Within the Department of Defense," dated March 22, 1991, and DoD Directive 5100.3, "Responsibility for Administration and Logistic Support of the Unified and Specified Commands," dated November 1, 1988,

to conduct its records disposition program under authorities approved for the records of the Air Force. The Air Force is the appointed CENTCOM administrative executive agent. Thus, CENTCOM, supported by the Air Force, was required to conduct its records management program as specified by Air Force Regulation 4-20, "Disposition of Air Force Records, Records Disposition Schedule." Additionally, we determined that the Department of Air Force provided written guidance to CENTCOM in April 1991 on the procedures for collecting and archiving Gulf War documents.

By letter dated March 2, 1991 (*Exhibit 5*), the Secretary of Defense directed all DoD organizations and components to save and archive all Gulf War related documents and records. The Secretary's letter was applicable to CENTCOM as a unified command under the provisions of DoD Directive 5015.2.

On July 2, 1991, the CENTCOM headquarters J1 (Administration) published a memorandum setting forth the requirement to save, maintain and archive all Gulf War related documents (*Exhibit 6*).

In 1991, the CENTCOM headquarters had a single Command Historian, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, who was assigned the task of collecting and archiving all Gulf War documents. xxxxxxxxxxxx told us he requested all "J" Staff Directorates to collect their Gulf War related documents, inventory and box the documents and deliver them to the history office. xxxxxxxxxxxx told us he was well aware of the requirement to preserve and archive Gulf War records and documents and made this requirement known to CENTCOM Command element officials. Our interviews of xxxxxxxxxxxx and members of the J1 (Administration) and J3 (Operations) staffs and others at CENTCOM revealed that xxxxxxxxxxxx was persistent in his efforts to locate, collect and preserve Gulf War documents. Nonetheless, the archiving task was overwhelming due to the large volume of documents and lack of resources necessary for cataloging and archiving the documents. The collection and archiving effort was further complicated by the fact that no formal inventory/check-in process existed to account for all of the boxes of documents. Further, xxxxxxxxxxxx office moved several times, within and outside of the headquarters building.

The Gulf War document collection and archiving effort was further complicated by the fact that, by necessity, CENTCOM was focused on their current operational missions; e.g., deployments to Somalia, Operation Provide Comfort and enforcing the "no fly zones" within Iraq.

According to witnesses, sporadic efforts to collect and archive Gulf War documents occurred at CENTCOM between 1991 and 1994. Witnesses interviewed stated that (1) there were times the archiving effort was in hiatus awaiting the arrival of

an optical scanning system;²⁸ (2) there was disagreement among the "J" Staff officials as to whether the historian or the J1 (Administration) Directorate should be responsible for the collection, inventory and maintenance of Gulf War documents prior to archiving; (3) many lower levels of the CENTCOM chain of command never received direction or guidance from their supervisors regarding archiving Gulf War documents; and (4) archiving Gulf War documents had a low priority within the Command.

xxxxxxxxxxx stated that he never saw any logs during the archiving process. The NARA archivist who was detailed to CENTCOM to assist in the effort from July 1992 until March 1993 was interviewed. He is certain he never saw any logs as part of the records he organized and catalogued for archiving. Additionally, a records specialist who was hired in October 1993 to scan the Gulf War records into the Excalibur system stated that to the best of her knowledge she never saw any logs.

Congressional Testimony

By the fall 1993, the Congress and many Gulf War veterans groups were questioning DoD officials about suspected chemical agent detections that occurred during the Gulf War and whether U.S. Forces had been exposed to chemical and/or biological agents. Several congressional committees began holding hearings on causes of Gulf War Illnesses suffered by many veterans.

Our investigation determined that COL xxxxxxxxxxx used portions of the existing logs in preparation for his testimony of November 18, 1993, before the HASC. Based on our investigation, we believe that COL xxxxxxxxxxx probably had only 32 pages of the existing logs that were telefaxed from CENTCOM by SFC xxxxxxxx. COL xxxxxxxxxxx told us that he did not take the logs with him when he appeared before the HASC, nor did he take them back to Fort Lewis when he returned there. His recollection was vague as to what became of the log pages in his custody in November 1993. COL xxxxxxxxxxx told us he might have left the log pages in an office in the Pentagon, possibly the Army DCSOPS Chemical Branch Office or he might have provided them to either COL xxxxxxxxxxx, USA, or to LTC xxxxxxxx, members of the DSB Secretariat, for use by the DSB during its study of suspected chemical agent detections. COL xxx, LTC xxxxxxxx and the DCSOPS action officers who provided support to COL xxxxxxxxxxx during his November 1993 congressional testimony advised us that they have a vague recollection of seeing the logs during that time period; however, no one clearly recalled receiving the logs from COL xxxxxxxxxxx. All of these officers denied having any knowledge about the disposition of the missing logs.

²⁸ The Command Historian was able to secure archiving support from the NARA. A temporary archivist was assigned and Commander in Chief (CINC) Initiative funds from the Joint Chiefs of Staff were obtained to purchase an optical scanning system (Excalibur) for use in copying and archiving the Gulf War documents.

The 1993-94 DSB

The DSB began its study of Gulf War Illnesses in the latter part of 1993. Support for the study, in part, was provided by the Office for Chemical and Biological Matters, ATSD(AE).

We believe that 32 pages of the logs that exist today are probably those used during the 1993-94 DSB study of suspected detections of chemical and/or biological agents during the Gulf War, and their potential impact on the causes of Gulf War Illnesses.

COL xxx, LTC xxxxxxxx and CPT xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, USA, were assigned to the DSB and provided technical, administrative and research support during its deliberations. LTC xxxxxxxx stated she undertook extensive efforts to gather logs, reports and operational records from the Gulf War that addressed issues of chemical agent detections. A portion of the logs was used by LTC xxxxxxxx during the DSB study. COL xxx, LTC xxxxxxxx and CPT xxxxx told us they believed the pages of logs used during this study were the same pages faxed to COL xxxxxxxxxxxx in November 1993.

Our interviews with DSB staff members, particularly LTC xxxxxxxx, led to the identification of certain notes on the right side margin on many of the existing log pages. These notes, described as both numbers and letters corresponding to a graph chart published in the 1994 DSB Report, signify LTC xxxxxxxx efforts to track and identify all alleged chemical and/or biological agent detections mentioned on logs kept during the Gulf War, including the NBC desk logs.²⁹

Requests for Release of the CENTCOM NBC Desk Logs by the Congress and the Public

By mid-1993 several congressional committees were examining reports of suspected detections of chemical agents on the battlefield; chemical and/or biological agent exposure of U.S. Forces resulting from the destruction of Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological production, storage and research sites; and the destruction of Iraqi munitions storage sites after the war. Veterans groups, members of the media and the public made numerous FOIA requests to the DoD and CENTCOM for Gulf War documents, records and logs that they believed would provide answers to questions concerning whether U.S. Forces were exposed to chemical and/or biological warfare agents during the Gulf War.

²⁹ The markings described by LTC xxxxxxxx are noted on 18 of the existing NBC pages at Exhibit 3. Further, the 32 pages of logs in the files of the OSD (PA) FOIA office were released by LTC xxxxxxxx for security classification review prior to their public release in June 1994. It is noted that LTC xxxxxxxx markings on the log pages in the files of the ATSD(AE) office were in pencil.

Congressional Requests for the CENTCOM NBC Desk Logs

Senator Donald Riegle, Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense, dated March 16, 1994, wherein he requested certain categories of records on behalf of the Committee.³⁰ Senator Riegle expressed interest in determining the extent of the diversion of certain NBC materials to Iraq that may have occurred prior to the Gulf War to develop weapons. Specifically, Senator Riegle requested copies of "all U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) logs prepared between August 2, 1990 and September 1, 1991." On April 15, 1994, the DoD Office of General Counsel (OGC), on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, advised Senator Riegle, "CENTCOM conducted a search [for CENTCOM logs] and has identified no documents that meet this description." The OGC response to Senator Riegle was based on written input from CENTCOM, dated April 12, 1994, that reflects a documents search had been conducted by CENTCOM for the requested documents, and they had a negative response.

Our investigation revealed that at the time of Senator Riegle's request, copies of the logs, in both hard copy and on computer disk, were reportedly at CENTCOM headquarters, and 32 pages were in the files of the DSB or the office of the ATSD(AE), in the Pentagon. CENTCOM logs, including the NBC desk logs, were not located and provided to the Senator.³¹

A review of correspondence between CENTCOM and the Joint Staff, however, revealed a good faith effort was apparently made by the CENTCOM officials to locate the logs in response to Senator Riegle's request. Specifically, a copy of the internal CENTCOM Summary Sheet, Form 14, dated April 8, 1994, was obtained and reviewed. It reflected that all CENTCOM Joint Staff Directors and Chiefs of Special Staffs were required to conduct a thorough search of their files in accordance with instructions that had been received from the Joint Staff, the Pentagon, and respond by close of business April 11, 1994. This included the requirement to list the name of each individual conducting the search and how long it took to perform it. A review of the internal CENTCOM staffing records reflected that SFC xxxxxxxx expended 1.5 hours searching J3 Current Operations Division records. No documents were found.³²

³⁰ This Senate committee had oversight jurisdiction relative to the Export Administration Act.

³¹ During this timeframe, LTC xxxxxxxx used portions of the logs during the DSB study while detailed to the office of the ATSD(AE), the Pentagon. The OGC letter tasking DoD components to search for the records requested by Senator Riegle did not reflect the DSB or the ATSD(AE) as an addressee.

³² SFC xxxxxxxx stated that he had possession of the folder containing the logs in November 1993 when he faxed copies of several pages to the Pentagon for COL xxxxxxxxxxxx testimony and that he saw the logs again in October 1994 when he placed the same folder containing the hard copy of the logs in a box of records intended for records disposition. The CENTCOM search for Senator Riegle fell within these two dates. This issue was developed during this investigation after xxx xxxxxxxx made himself unavailable for an additional interview and represents a significant inconsistency with regard to the disposition of the logs.

COL xxxxx, who was SFC xxxxxxxxxx supervisor in April 1994, does not recall the action stating he was preparing for retirement, which would have left SFC xxxxxxxx alone as the NBC subject matter expert in J3 during that timeframe.

FOIA Requests for the CENTCOM NBC Desk Logs

On June 22, 1994, LTC xxxxxxxx released the 32 pages of the logs to the OSD(PA) FOIA/Security Review Office for a declassification review in response to congressional and public interest. Mr. Henry J. McIntire, Deputy Director, FOIA/Security Review Office, conducted a security review of the classified documents that included the pages of the logs, and approved them for public release that same date. The public release was in conjunction with a June 23, 1994, press conference scheduled by Dr. John Deutch, then Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Subsequently, in August 1994, the Gulf War Veterans of Georgia submitted a FOIA request to the OSD(PA). The request was forwarded to CENTCOM where it was received on September 20, 1994, and answered on January 27, 1995.³³ CENTCOM approved an initial FOIA release, which contained 11 declassified pages of logs; however, it included some redactions for privacy concerns. Upon appeal of the FOIA action, the matter was referred to the OSD(PA) FOIA office, the appeal authority for CENTCOM FOIA appeals, whereupon it was discovered that both CENTCOM and OSD(PA) FOIA office had possession of logs. According to J1 (Administration) FOIA officials they had not been aware of the previous release of log pages by OSD(PA) FOIA/Security Review office in June 1994.

Based upon the review of correspondence, interviews and the chronology of events, it appears that both CENTCOM and OSD(PA) FOIA/security review officials acted in good faith when making these FOIA releases, and were not initially aware that each had possession of a portion of the logs.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on our investigative effort, we reached the following conclusions:

1. We did not recover any additional pages of the missing logs, in either hard copy or computer form. However, we recovered a significant number of log entries some of which we believe were copied from the still missing pages of the logs. These

³³ In late 1994, while coordinating this FOIA request, a folder containing the 11 pages of logs was discovered in the Ground Operations Branch, J-3 (Operations), CENTCOM, by either LTC xxxxxxxx or LTC xxxxx. Both thought the other individual had found the folder. SFC xxxxxxxx maintains that LTC xxxxxxxx originally retained this folder in November 1993 in his desk on the first night after he (SFC xxxxxxxx) telefaxed copies of the logs to the Pentagon. These issues were never resolved.

log entries are contained in the "Log Extracts," which we recovered during a search of personal effects belonging to an Army officer who previously had access to the logs and who is currently under criminal investigation in connection with this matter.

2. The most probable explanation for the missing logs, which were returned to CENTCOM, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, in April 1991, is that they were destroyed. This probably occurred in October 1994 or later, after the downsizing and relocation of the CENTCOM J3 NBC office, and after a complete rotation of personnel including original NBC officers who served in the JOC in Saudi Arabia.³⁴

3. Despite considerable effort, the computer disk purportedly containing a copy of the logs returned to APG, MD, in March 1991, could not be located.

4. The suspected computer virus that reportedly occurred in the CENTCOM JOC during December 1990 was determined by NSA not to be a computer virus, but a software recognition problem. Even if a computer virus had occurred at that time, as reported, it should not have had an effect on logs created and maintained after the offensive operations commenced on January 17, 1991, and when chemical and biological exposure incidents most likely would have occurred. Therefore, no missing log entries or pages appear to be attributable to a computer virus.

5. Although directives, regulations and internal CENTCOM J1 (Administration) memoranda required that Gulf War records be retained, safeguarded and archived as permanent records, the logs, in their entirety, were not safeguarded and archived by CENTCOM.

6. Our investigation found no credible evidence to support a conspiracy to willfully and wrongfully destroy or dispose of the logs in violation of either the Uniform Code of Military Justice or Title 18, United States Code.

Although we have completed our formal investigation into the circumstances surrounding the missing logs, we will continue to maintain liaison with CENTCOM and the OSAGWI in the event either of them provides any leads requiring additional investigative effort to locate the missing logs. Further, the DCIS will continue to monitor the USACIDC and MI investigation of the U.S. Army officer we discovered to

³⁴ The October 1994 time period is based on SFC xxxxxxxxxx contention that the logs, in both hard copy and computer disk form, were placed in one of the six boxes of records that came from the NBC Closet. We could not corroborate this assertion through witness interviews of personnel in the office area. xxx xxxxxxxx, now retired, would not make himself available for further interview, thus we were unable to resolve inconsistencies or address new issues that were developed during this investigation, to include his search for records in April 1994 in response to Senator Riegle's request.

log entries are contained in the "Log Extracts", which were recovered during a search of personal effects belonging to an Army officer who previously had access to the logs. The officer is currently under criminal investigation in connection with this matter.

3. The most probable explanation for the missing logs, which were returned to the CENTCOM, is that they were destroyed. This probably occurred in October 1994, after the downing and relocation of the CENTCOM 13 JRC office and other personnel. Any significant developments resulting in the recovery of missing logs will be provided in a supplemental report.

4. Despite considerable effort, the computer disk purportedly containing a copy of the logs found in A.P.G. MD, in March 1994, could not be located.

5. The suspected computer virus that reportedly occurred in the CENTCOM JOC during December 1990 was determined by MSZ not to be a computer virus, but a software reformatting problem. Even if a computer virus had occurred at that time, as reported, it should not have had an effect on logs stored and maintained after the offensive operations commenced on January 17, 1991, and when operations and biological response incidents most likely would have occurred. Therefore, no missing log entries or pages appear to be attributable to a computer virus.

6. Although directives, regulations and internal CENTCOM (Administration) memoranda required that Gulf War records be retained, established and archived as management records, the logs, in their entirety, were not established and archived by CENTCOM.

7. Our investigation found no credible evidence to support a claim that military units were generally desirous or disposed of the logs in violation of either the Uniform Code of Military Justice or Title 18, United States Code.

8. Although we have completed our formal investigation into the current situation surrounding the missing logs, we will continue to maintain liaison with CENTCOM and the OASD (W) in the event either of them provides any leads regarding additional investigation effort to locate the missing logs. The OASD (W) will continue to monitor the NSA/CSS and MI investigation of the logs. A copy of the report was delivered to

9. The October 1991 time period is based on SPC xxxxxxxx information that the logs, in both hard copy and computer disk format, were placed in one of the six boxes of records removed from the NDC. We could not corroborate this assertion through witness interviews of personnel in the office. xxxxxxxx new return would not make himself available for further interviews. Thus we were unable to resolve the discrepancies of address new return was developed during this investigation. This search for records in April 1994 in response to Senator Riegle's request.

Exhibits

1. **Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, dated March 3, 1997**
2. **“Log Extracts - Biological Defense,” recovered during DCIS search**
3. **NBC desk logs**
4. **NBC desk logs - analysis of the gaps and the “Log Extracts - Biological Defense” document**
5. **Secretary of Defense memorandum, dated March 2, 1991**
6. **CENTCOM J1 staff memorandum, dated July 2, 1991**




EXHIBIT 1

**Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum,
dated March 3, 1997**



3 MAR 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: CENTCOM Log

The office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses has compiled an investigative status report on its efforts to reconstruct what happened to a certain CENTCOM Nuclear Biological and Chemical log, maintained on computer disk, that was generated by CENTCOM during the Gulf War. I direct you to take over that inquiry and carry it to conclusion. In particular, I would ask that your investigation:

- 1) follow all leads that can be developed on the location of the original log or copies, in electronic or hard copy versions;
- 2) gather all originals and copies that can be located; and
- 3) if a full copy of the log cannot be located, explain why.

In carrying out this investigation, you should gather information from all available sources, including the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; the Inspector General of the Army; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight); CENTCOM and its component commands; Federal Archives & Records Administration; and any other agency within or outside of the Department of Defense that can be of assistance.

By this memorandum, I also direct that all elements of this Department provide the Inspector General full access and support in the effort to retrieve the CENTCOM log at issue.

Please keep me regularly apprised of your progress.

cc: Secretaries of the Military Departments
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Under Secretaries of Defense
Director, Defense Research and Engineering

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**Assistant Secretaries of Defense
General Counsel of the Department of Defense
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
Assistants to the Secretary of Defense
Director, Administration and Management
Directors of the Defense Agencies**

EXHIBIT 2

**“Log Extracts - Biological Defense,”
recovered during DCIS search**

LOG EXTRACTS -- BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

JANUARY

- 170649 LTC MERRYMAN CALLED ADVISED MG MOORE WILL RECEIVE A CALL FROM MG DEL ROSSO SUBJECT BIO DEF INITIATIVES. HEADS UP CALL ONLY.
- 170747 CONTACTED CPT MARSHALL IN AN ATTEMPT TO BRING PLUME AND MINOR UNDER CONTROL. ONCE LOCATED THEY SHOULD BE SENT TO 513TH CPT JONES.
- 170758 CALLED LTC LIDDLE IN REFERENCE TO MINOR AND PLUME HE IS NOT IN HIS OFFICE WILL CALL BACK.
- 170936 CENTAF REPORTED A PILOT STATED HE "FLEW THROUGH A CLOUD OF BIO MATERIAL (ANTHRAX) WHILE RETURNING FROM A RAID. THEY DON'T FEEL IT IS CONTAMINATED, WILL TREAT IT THAT WAY ANYWAY.
- 171026 CENTAF ADVISED INFO ON "BIO CONTAMINATED" AIRCRAFT CAME OUT OF TAIF AND HAD NO BASIS IN FACT.
- 171130 LTC ROONEY (USAF STAFF, 703-695-6382/2586) IS POC FOR ABN BIO DETECTOR. HE IS GETTING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE AERIAL SENSOR SYSTEM IS STILL ON. LTC S. TOLD HIM THAT OUR POSITION HASN'T CHANGED -- WE STILL DON'T WANT IT. APPARENT THAT DA HAS DIFFERENT IDEAS. HIS POSITION IS THAT HE'LL SUPPORT WHATEVER, JUST NEEDS THE FOLLOWING: 2.5 DAYS TO MODIFY AC, TIME (UNDETERMINED) TO TEST, BEDDOWN LOCATION (RECOMMENDS BATEEN BECAUSE OF C130 ACFT SPT IN PLACE). NO SCAN CAPABILITY FOR SYS AND EVEN FINDING A CLOUD IN A GIVEN 10 KM SQUARE WOULD BE DIFFICULT. C130 CAN FLY 8.5 HRS/DAY IF AT 25K FT, BUT DETECTION MUST BE AT 5K FT. THERE IS AN EYE SAFETY ISSUE UP TO 8-10KM, SO THE AREA MAY HAVE TO BE CLEARED PRIOR TO AREA SEARCH. ANOTHER INDICATOR WOULD BE REQUIRED TO CAUSE THE C130 TO LAUNCH.
- 171415 COORDINATED W/ CENTAF ON THEIR BW RESPONSE ACTIONS, MAY STILL NEED TO GET BIO SAMPLING INFO PACKET TO THEIR INTELL AND MEDICAL PEOPLE.
- 180135 REAR ADVISED THERE WILL BE 10 TEU PERSONNEL TRANSFERRED TO 513 MI WITH IN 10 DAYS TO DO CHEM/BIO TECH INTEL SAMPLING SHOULD CW BEGIN.
- 181400 MEETING BETWEEN MAJOR JANSEN AND UK REPRESENTATIVES DEPLOYING CDE (PORTON DOWN) DEVELOPMENTAL BW DETECTION SYSTEMS. THE OFFICER CHARGED WITH EMPLOYMENT WAS ABRUPT, IMPATIENT AND DIDN'T FEEL COORDINATION WAS NECESSARY IN THE CONDUCT OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES. PRESSED FOR ASSISTANCE TO SPOT HIS STUFF. TOLD THEM I WOULD NOT UNTIL 1) TALKED WITH CRDEC/BC DET ABOUT CAPABILITIES -- AS THEY WERE UNWILLING TO TELL ME 2) COORDINATED NBCWRS INTERFACE WITH SQDN CDR STOKES AND 3) BRIEFED MY CHAIN ON MY RECOMMENDATION. WILL GET AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEE THE SYSTEM AT 1000 HOURS ON SUN 20 JAN AT RIYADH AB
- 181630 CPT PLUME CALLED FROM RAS SAFANIYAH SITE TO GET POC AT AL JUBAYL. PASSED HIM FROM CW3 JAMES TO CW3 LEE/MSG JENNINGS.
- 191039 MAJ F CONTACTED CPT JONES REFERENCE ARCENT MSG 190100Z JAN 91. HE UNDERSTOOD HE HAD THE AUTHORITY THROUGH GEN LEIDE J2 AS THE SOLE BIOLOGICAL COLLECTION AND TRANSPORTATION AGENT FOR THE AOR. HE WILL BE IN TODAY TO TALK TO LTC S AS TO WHAT HE CAN AND CAN NOT DO. BRIEFED LTC S

191130 SHIFT CHANGE. ACTIONS BROUGHT FORWARD:
 -- ATROPINE LOT #S (CCSG)
 -- FMIB (CPT JONES) UNAUTHORIZED SAMPLING DIRECTIVE, WILL COME
 HERE LATER TO DISCUS THIS AND CHEM UNIT ATTACHMENT.
 -- CPT PLUME DIDN'T CHECK IN LAST NIGHT.

191200 SMSGT CLINE, CENTAF CALLED, CONCERNED ABOUT HIS RESPONSIBILITY TO
 TAKE CHEM/BIO SAMPLES AS CONTAINED IN THE MATERIAL WE SENT HIM.
 ASSURED HIM THE SAMPLING WILL BE CONDUCTED BY THOSE UNITS AND
 TEAMS SO DESIGNATED, THE PACKET WAS FORWARDED TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE
 FOR MEDICAL SAMPLES AND INTELL CHANNEL PROCESSING (WHEN HANDED A
 SAMPLE FROM DESIGNATED TEAMS).

191330 SOCCENT (MAJ BOBBY HARRIS) HIS FOLKS AT BORDER REPORT THAT THE
 SAUDIS THEY ARE WITH ARE MASKING BECAUSE THEY SAY A CLOUD OF SMOKE
 IS COMING THAT WAY FROM CB TARGETS BOMBED EARLIER TODAY. BASED
 ON TARGET LOCATIONS, SURFACE WINDS AND THOSE ALOFT -- NOT A LIKELY
 HAZARD. KILLED STORY THRU SOCCENT/CENTCOM J2

191610 TALKED WITH PETE STOPA, CRDEC ABOUT TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF UK BIO
 DETECTION ASSETS. HE WAS SHOWN/BRIEFED ON IT IN NOV AND UK WAS
 VERY CLOAK & DAGGER ABOUT IT THEN -- HE FEELS IT'S JUST THE
 COUNTRY'S SENSITIVITY TO BW RESEARCH THAT IS CAUSING THIS. IS
 FAXING FACT SHEET ON THE UK EQUIP.

191755 CPT PLUME CALLED. WILL BE IN RIYADH TOMORROW, MAY NOT MAKE IT BY
 1000HR UK EQUIP DEMO, BUT THAT'S OKAY.

192120 MAJ WAGNER, ARCENT, SAID CPT JONES OF FMIB IS STILL IN ESKAN BUT
 IS DUE TO MOVE TO DHRAN. CPT JONES WAS TO COME HERE TODAY (TOLD
 MAJ WAGNER HE WAS ON HIS WAY) BUT NEVER SHOWED. CPT JONES HAD
 MENTIONED HE WAS HAVING PROBLEMS GETTING THE TEU DET'S EQUIP OUT
 OF DOVER (MAY HAVE GOT DIVERTED TRYING TO GET THAT RESOLVED).

201051 CPT JONES ARRIVED TO DISCUSS HIS MISSION. HE HAS BEGUN TO
 COORDINATE WITH COMPONENTS TO INSURE THEY ARE AWARE OF
 REQUIREMENTS AND WILL INSURE THEY HAVE WHAT THEY NEED. ADVISED HE
 SHOULD GET BG LEIDE TO SEND OUT TASKERS TO COMPONENTS. HE WILL DO
 THIS AND COORDINATE THROUGH US. HE IS ALSO POC FOR THE TECH
 ESCORT SUPPORT IN AOR. LEFT A COPY OF HIS MISSION DOCUMENTATION.

201250 DR. ANDY (UK) CALLED TO SEE WHAT HAD HAPPENED -- IT WAS OBVIOUS WE
 WERE AT TWO DIFFERENT GATES AT RIYADH AB THIS MORNING AND HAD
 MISSED EACH OTHER. TOLD HIM WE WERE SATISFIED WITH TECHNICAL
 DETAILS, NOW WE NEED TO TALK WITH SGN LDR STOKES. STOKES WILL
 COME HERE TODAY ABOUT 1500.

201500 SFC WELCH CALLED. HAD RECEIVED CB SAMPLING MSG FROM FMIB, AND
 WONDERED WHAT TEU ASSETS WERE IN AOR. EXPLAINED THERE WAS A DET,
 ATTACHED TO THE FMIB, TO OPERATE UNDER THEIR DIRECTION. ALSO TOLD
 HIM WE WERE PENDING COORDINATION WITH THE UNIT AND THAT ONE OF THE
 KEY POINTS WE WANTED TO TIE-IN WERE HIS RECON DETS WITH THE
 G2/FMIB SAMPLE HANDLING.

201505 SGN LDR STOKES CALLED -- CAN'T FIND TRANSPORTATION TO GET HERE
 TODAY, WILL DEFINITELY ENSURE HE CAN GET HERE TOMORROW AFTERNOON.

201700 CPT PLUME CALLED. HAVING TROUBLE WITH PROCESSING SAMPLES. NEEDS
 TO GET WITH FMIB AND CPT FRENCH AND GET THE DETAILS WORKED OUT.
 PLANS ON BEING HERE TOMORROW MORNING (LEAVING DHRAN ABOUT
 0430).

201815 CALLED CPT JONES, S-3 FMIB AND ARRANGED FOR A 1600 MEETING WITH
 HIM (HERE) TOMORROW TO NAIL DOWN:

-- CHEM UNIT ATTACHMENT
-- SAMPLE FLOW

- 211245 MAJ NEWING, HQDA, CALLED REF: DEPLOYMENT OF BIO DET TEAMS, DNA ANBACIS II FIELDING TEAM. THEY ARE WORKING ON PROVIDING US EVERYTHING WE WANT THE WAY WE WANT IT.
- 211600 MEETING WITH CPT JONES, S-3 FMIB...CPTS PLUME AND MINOR. COORDINATED DETAILS OF THE CHEM CO (BIO DETECTION) ATTACHMENT TO FMIB AND CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT. [SEE MFR]
- 212011 CPT URBAN, FORSCOM CALLED. CAN'T MARRY UP MISSION EQUIP AT APG WITH TROOPS COMING FROM FT LEWIS. MISSION EQUIP WILL ARRIVE 1 DAY BEFORE UNIT. TOLD HIM THAT'S OKAY, AS IS CDR'S DESIRE TO BRING 12 EMMVS (ALTHOUGH HE MAY ONLY HAVE AIRLIFT FOR EIGHT).
- 212330 SHIFT CHANGE. ACTIONS BROUGHT FORWARD:
-- BRIEF CPTS PLUME/MINOR ON SAMPLING ROAD TRIP TOMORROW
-- ENGLISH/ARABIC LETTER
- 221230 CPTS PLUME AND MINOR DEPART FOR NAC
- 221630 MAJ JANSEN MET WITH CPT JONES (S3 FMIB) AND MAJ HUDSON (513TH BRIGADE CHEM OFFICER) TO FINALIZE INITIAL COORDINATION FOR CHEM UNIT ATTACHMENT, EMPLOYMENT, CENTCOM/FMIB STAFF RELATIONSHIP. SEE MFR IN BIO DEFENSE DETECT, WARN AND ID FOLDER
- 222018 COL BELIHAR CAME BY TO PROVIDE AN UPDATE ON MEDICAL ASPECTS OF THE BIO DEFENSE PROGRAM. AGREED THAT MAJ JANSEN AND COL BALES NEEDED TO MEET SOON TO TIE THE TWO TOGETHER (DETECTION/NOTIFICATION/TREATMENT) AND WRITE AN OVERVIEW FOR SG AND NBC FOLKS IN THE FIELD SO THEY UNDERSTAND HOW TO ACTIVATE SYSTEM AND FROM WHERE INFO/DIRECTION FOR ACTION WILL COME.
- 222038 CPT WAGDALT CALLED TO SAY THAT CPTS PLUME AND MINOR ARRIVED AT KKMC, WILL RON.
- 231414 COL BALES CALLED. WILL BE BY AT 1845 TO DISCUSS BIO DEFENSE INTERFACE (MEDICAL & NON-MEDICAL)
- 231805 CPT URBAN, FORSCOM, RELAYED A PROBLEM WITH AIRLIFT OF DETECTION UNIT AND EQUIP. CAP ON THE SHORT TONS (S/T) WILL ONLY PERMIT 4 TO 5 TEAMS IN THE 1ST INCREMENT. THEY ARE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE -- JUST TOO MANY COMPETING HIGH PRIORITY DEMANDS. SEE NOTE IN BIO FOLDER.
- 240845 LTC MERRYMAN CALLED, SUBJ: XM-21. SHE INDICATED THAT CPT URBAN/FORSCOM WAS UPSET BECAUSE THE XM-21S ARE READY FOR AIRLIFT, AND ARCENT DOESN'T WANT THEM. LTC M. ASKS IF IT'S OK TO GIVE THE XM-21S TO THE MARINES? LTC S. SHOULD CALL HER ASAP.
- 241120 513TH MI BRIGADE NEEDS TO BE DIRECTED THROUGH ARCENT THAT THE 9TH CHEM CO WILL BE ATTACHED AND THE XM21s WILL BE PART OF THE PACKAGE. BRIGADE CDR DOESN'T INTEND TO SUPPORT UNTIL ORDERS ARE CUT AND DIRECTION IS GIVEN.
- 241415 TALKED WITH LTC MERRYMAN REF: BIO DETECTION UNIT AND XM21s -- WE OWE ARCENT MESSAGE TRAFFIC ON THE WHO, WHAT WHERE WHEN AND HOW.
- 241510 CPT MINOR CALLED. BACKGROUNDS HAVE BEEN PASSED TO EOD. CONCERNED ABOUT INABILITY TO ARRANGE BILLETING, ETC. WITHOUT ATTACHMENT ORDERS. TOLD HIM I'M WAITING TO GET BACK WITH FORSCOM POC TO ENSURE THE ORDERS ARE FORTHCOMING.

241810 CPT URBAN, FORSCOM, RETURNED CALL. EQUIPMENT LEAVING CRDEC (5 XM2, 5 XM21, 1 COMM ORP) IN A COUPLE HOURS. HE WILL PROVIDE TAIL #, MANIFEST, ARR TIME ETC AS SOON AS HE'S GOT IT. WILL ALSO SORT THE FORMAL ATTACHMENT ORDER BUSINESS OUT.

241845 TALKED WITH CDR NELSON, NAVAL FORWARD LABORATORY [03-341-0912] ON XM2 (AND OTHER) SUSPECT SAMPLE HANDLING AND DIAGNOSIS PROCEDURES.

241950 TRIED TO CONTACT CPTS [REDACTED] AT THE NUMBER THEY GAVE ME [7899-470]. THE FOLKS THERE SAID THEY COME TO USE THE PHONE BUT THEY DON'T KNOW HOW TO GET A HOLD OF THEM. IF THEY CALL, NEED TO PASS THE FOLLOWING:
 -- ARE THE BACKGROUND SAMPLES (PASSED TO EOD) GOING TO THE NAVAL FWD LAB?
 -- PLEASE CONTACT CDR NELSON OF THE NFL [03-341-0912] TO ANSWER QUESTION. ALSO, IF POSSIBLE
 -- GO TO THE NFL AT AL JUBAYL TO SHOW CDR NELSON THE XM2/ELISA TICKETS, ETC. SO HE IS BETTER PREPARED FOR SAMPLES.
 -- EQUIPMENT DUE TO ARRIVE TOMORROW EVENING (FROM CRDEC) THAT THEY NEED TO BE PREPARED TO SECURE

242145 LTC DAVE POTTS, CENTAF SURGEON OFFICE (KY 8281-412) ADVISED THAT HE HAS SOME BIO DETECTION EQUIPMENT THAT HAS JUST LANDED AT RIYADH AFB. HE IS UNSURE OF THE TYPE EQUIPMENT INVOLVED AND WILL CALL BACK AFTER HAVING CHECKED THE EQUIPMENT.

250005 CALL FROM SGM EATHAN/CINCPOR-NBC, SUBJ: 5 INBOUND AIRCRAFT WITH BIOLOGICAL DETECTION EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL:
 1. DEPARTS ANDREWS AFB 242030ZJAN WITH 1 PALLET TO DHAHRAN. MSN# AMRA13610024. ETA251445Z.
 2. DEPARTS ANDREWS AFB 250530ZJAN WITH 3 PALLETS TO DHAHRAN. MSN # AMRA13613024. ETA252345Z.
 AIRCRAFT 1 AND 2 HAVE 6 EA. XM-2 WITH SUPPORT KITS AND 5 EA. XM-21 WITH SUPPORT KITS.
 3-5. 3 MISSIONS WITH 23 PAX, 4 PALLETS, 6 EMMVVS AND 5 EACH 3/4 TON TRAILERS. FIRST AIRCRAFT DEPARTS MCCORD AFB (FORT LEWIS) 261245ZJAN MSN#A14538 WITH 1 PALLET TO DHAHRAN. ETA271415Z.
 SECOND DEPARTS FORT LEWIS 261845ZJAN MSN#A14536 WITH CARGO AND PAX TO DHAHRAN. ETA272015Z. THIRD DEPARTS FORT LEWIS 262145ZJAN MSN#A14539 WITH CARGO AND PAX TO DHAHRAN. ETA271845Z. SGM EATHAN WILL CALL BACK WITH DESTINATIONS FOR AIRCRAFT 3-5.

250836 COL BELIHAR BROUGHT OTSG DOCUMENT (BW DEFENSE DOCTRINE) FOR MAJ JANSEN

251445 CPT URBAN, FORSCOM, CALLED TO ENSURE FLIGHT INFO ON DETECTION EQUIPMENT/UNIT WAS PASSED. WITH RESPECT TO ATTACHMENT ORDERS, FORSCOM DIRECTS I CORPS (WHICH DIRECTS 9TH ID) TO CHOP CO TO ARCENT. ARCENT THEN MUST CUT ATTACHMENT ORDERS TO FMIB, 513TH MI. ARCENT WILL NOT CUT ORDERS UNTIL THEY GET ORDERS ATTACHING UNIT TO ARCENT.

251605 CPT REASON, CDR 9TH CHEM CO, (AVN 357-7030/3925/4839) CALLED TO DISCUSS IN-COUNTRY SUPPLY SPT (CLASS I,III, ETC.), MAIL, AND C2.

251830 CDR NELSON, NAVAL FORWARD LAB, CALLED. RECEIVED A (WIDELY DISTRIBUTED) MSG FROM OTSG THAT WILL CAUSE MORE TROUBLE/ CONFUSION THAN IT'S WORTH. WILL PASS DETAILS BACK (DTG, ETC.) BUT NEEDS HELP IN RETRACTING IT.

260930 COL BALES ADVISED THAT THE ARMY NOW HAS TWO BIO LABS CAPABLE OF SAME LEVEL OF EFFORT AS NAVY FORWARD LAB. WILL PROVIDE INFO FOR INCLUSION IN OUR PROCEDURES/CONCEPT DOCUMENT. COL BALES WILL BRING ARMY POC TO JOC AFTER 1130 TODAY.

- 261250 LEFT MSG AT FMIB (7803-419) FOR CPT JONES TO CALL WHEN HE ARRIVES AND [REDACTED] IF THEY SHOW UP. S3 NCO SAID THEY WERE THERE YESTERDAY, ARRANGED STORAGE AREA FOR SOME OF THEIR GEAR AND TOOK OFF.
- 261301 PASSED MAILING ADDRESS TO 9TH CHEM CO. ANSWERED LAST MINUTE QUESTIONS FROM CO CDR. HIS 1ST GROUP OF SOLDIERS ARE SCHEDULED TO DEPART IN A COUPLE OF HOURS.
- 261430 LTC POTTS/MAJ CATHCART (8281-839) CAME BY TO DISCUSS BIO SAMPLING/ASSAY ASSETS THAT HE INTENDS TO POSITION AT A NUMBER OF AF BASES IN THE AOR. SEE RECORD IN BIO DETECTION FOLDER
- 271200 PASSED DET UNIT FAX/EQUIP ARRIVAL INFO TO CPT JONES, FMIB S3. HE PASSED ALONG INFO THAT WILL HELP GET THEM A DEDICATED FAX LINE.
- 271205 MAJ CATHCART, CENTAF SG CALLED. DECISION BRIEF W/ LTC HORNER TODAY AT 1600. NEEDS SPORE SETTLING/DECAY RATE NUMBERS. PROVIDED REQUESTED ESTIMATES
- 281030 LT DRUSHEL DET CDR, 9TH CML CO(-) ADVISED HE IS IN THE AOR AND WILL GO TO THE AIRPORT TODAY TO PICK UP HIS EQUIPMENT AND WILL CALL ON 29 JAN TO ADVISE ON UNIT STRENGTH AND EQUIP IN AOR. TEMP PH COMM 03-899-1199 X 7472
- 281045 SMSGT CLINE CALLED TO FIND OUT IF BIO-DETECTION CAPABILITY INFO IS RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN. IF NOT HE WILL CHANGE METHOD OF MSG DISSEMINATION THAT HAS BEEN DIRECTED BY HIS BOS. ADVISED HIM THAT WE WOULD CHECK WITH J2 AND THEN ADVISE HIM.
- 281105 MAJ BAUM (XO FMIB) CALLED FOR MAJ JANSEN WANTS HER TO CALL REF ATTACHMENT ORDERS FOR 9TH CHEM. ALSO STATUS OF CPTs MINOR AND FLUZE. KY 7803-419
- 281400 COL BALES STOPPED BY TO INTRODUCE MAJ DRIER (996TH MED LAB, 244 MED GROUP, LOCATED IN A TRAILER NEAR BLDG A111 AT ESKAN). DRIER HAS SOME IN-THEATER DIAGNOSTIC CAPABILITY, AS DOES A FIELD LAB AT KKMC [SEE MED ASPECTS OF BIO PROGRAM FOLDER FOR DETAILS]. INSTRUCTED DRIER TO COORDINATE W/ TECH INTELL AT ARCENT G2, AND ENSURE FIELD FACILITIES PROVIDING HIM SAMPLES KNOW HOW HE NEEDS THEM PREPARED/PACKAGED. NEED TO DETERMINE IF THIS LAB CAN PERFORM SAME FUNCTION AS NFL AND WHETHER OR NOT WE WANT TO INCLUDE THEM IN CHAIN.
- 281515 CALLED CPT JONES, FMIB. DISCUSSED ATTACHMENT ORDERS (WILL CALL FORSCOM), [REDACTED] (DIDN'T LEAVE FAVORABLE IMPRESSION ON REST OF STAFF -- HE FEELS HE CAN WORK WITH THEM AND HANDLE SITUATION). DISCUSSED ANBACIS LINE AND J6 RESPONSE -- HE WILL WORK FROM HIS END AND KEEP ME INFORMED. HE NEEDS POC LIST TO BEGIN COORDINATION FOR DETECTION TEAM PLACEMENT. WILL CALL BACK W/ LIST LATER TODAY (AFTER COORD W/ ARCENT)
- 281540 CALLED FORSCOM. THEY ARE TRACKING THE CHOP ORDERS (HQDA AND 9TH ID INVOLVED)
- 281558 CALLED COL COLLINS (CRDEC, COL FUZY'S REPLACEMENT ON IM2 PROJECT, 584-5705/ 2974). INFORMED HIM THAT [REDACTED] HAVE NOT BEEN HEARD FROM SINCE 24TH -- NOT HEARD OF SINCE 25TH. EQUIPMENT AND FAX HAVE ARRIVED WITHOUT THEIR BEING PRESENT TO RECEIVE IT AND GET IT SMOOTHLY TO FMIB -- A MISSION I (JANSEN) PERSONALLY GAVE THEM AS THEIR #1 PRIORITY AFTER THE BACKGROUND SAMPLES WERE DONE. LET HIM KNOW THAT THEY DID NOT MAKE A FAVORABLE IMPRESSION ON XO, FMIB -- AND ALTHOUGH WE HAD ORIGINALLY EXPECTED THEM TO STAY IN THEATER TO DO THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR THESE SYSTEMS, WE MAY NEED TO FIND

ANOTHER WAY (AND SEND THEM HOME).

- 281740 CPT [REDACTED] FINALLY CALLED. THEY HAVE BEEN "OUT AND ABOUT" FOR THE LAST FEW DAYS AND HAVE "NO EXCUSE" FOR NOT CHECKING IN DAILY. SAID THEY HAD STOPPED BY FMIB YESTERDAY AND TODAY (I TOLD HIM I HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH FMIB FOR THE LAST THREE DAYS AND NO ONE THERE HAD SEEN THEM NOR HEARD FROM THEM AS THEY KNEW WE WERE FRANTICALLY LOOKING FOR THEM) SENT THEM TO DHAHRAN AB TO SECURE EQUIPMENT (THEY BETTER HOPE NOTHING HAS BEEN RIPPED OFF) AND REPORT BACK ASAP. ENSURED THEY KNEW THEY WERE EYEBROW DEEP IN HOT WATER AND STILL OWED US AN ACCOUNT OF WHERE THEY HAVE BEEN AND WHAT THEY HAVE BEEN DOING.
- 281755 CDR NELSON CALLED. STILL HASN'T SEEN BACKGROUND SAMPLES. HE HAS TALKED WITH MAJ CATHCART AND MAJ DRIER -- KNOWS THEIR CAPABILITIES. HE IS IN FAVOR OF SPLITTING THE AOR WITH THE 996TH MED LAB. WILL SEND LIST OF HIS LAB'S CAPABILITIES, AND IS ANXIOUS FOR SAMPLE DISPOSITION INSTRUCTION CLARIFICATION MSG TO GO OUT.
- 281800 CALLED COL COLLINS TO LET HIM KNOW [REDACTED] HAVE BEEN FOUND AND ARE ON THEIR WAY TO SECURE THE EQUIPMENT. TOLD HIM WE MAY WANT THEM OUT OF THEATER, AND ASKED HIM TO THINK ABOUT A LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PLAN W/OUT [REDACTED] IN THE LOOP. CALL COL COLLINS BACK AS SOON AS EQUIP HAS BEEN SECURED. (NO MATTER WHAT TIME OF DAY/NIGHT)
- 281830 PASSED CPT JONES LIST OF DETECTION SITES, BY PRIORITY, WITH POCs AND PHONE #s. TOLD HIM I HAD HEARD FROM MINOR/PLUME AND THEY WERE ON THEIR WAY TO AIRBASE TO ENSURE CRDEC MISSION EQUIP WAS SECURED. SEE SITE LIST IN BIO FOLDER. OWE HIM FINAL POC LIST TOMORROW.
- 281840 DISCUSSED 9TH CHEM CO (-) AND BIO DETECTION TEAMS W/LTC MERRYMAN. APPARENTLY THE ONLY PROBLEM SO FAR IS THAT 513TH DOESN'T WANT THE 9TH. [IRRELEVANT ... BUT THE REASON WHY ATTACHMENT ORDERS ARE NEEDED]. GAVE HER DETECTION TEAM LOCATIONS IN ARCENT AO SO SHE COULD NOTIFY THOSE POCs (AND PASS THE NAME/PHONE # ON FOR FMIB DIRECT COORDINATION.
- 281945 CPT [REDACTED] CALLED. EQUIPMENT ARRIVED AT DHAHRAN BUT THEY HAVE NO IDEA WHAT IT LOOKS LIKE SO THEY SAID THEY WOULD HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL MORNING. TOLD HIM TO CALL COL COLLINS, GET A DESCRIPTION OF THE PALLETS AND FIND IT. HE ALSO SAID ALL BACKGROUND SAMPLES WERE SENT BACK TO CRDEC. TOLD HIM THEY NEEDED TO PROVIDE SOME BACKGROUND SAMPLES TO NFL -- BUT AFTER THEY GET CONTROL OF THE CRDEC EQUIPMENT.
- HE SAID [REDACTED] WERE IN THEIR ROOM FOR THE LAST 4 DAYS WAITING FOR A PHONE CALL. 100% OF SAMPLE TO CRDEC ISN'T CORRECT (AOR LAB LEFT OUT)
- 282108 SGM RATHAN, FORSCOM HAS A COPY OF THE DEPLOYMENT ORDER IN HIS HAND AND WILL FAX IT TO ARCENT AND US (ASKED HIM TO TRY FAXING IT OVER 8961-391 IN ADDITION TO X282). HOPEFULLY IT'S WHAT WE NEED. IF ORDER DOESN'T DIRECT ATTACHMENT WE ARE BACK TO SQUARE ONE.
- 282200 CPT SCHIELE CALLED TO CHECK STATUS OF ATTACHMENT ORDER. HE WILL CALL FORSCOM BACK AND GET THEM TO SPELL OUT THE COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIP IF THE IN-BOUND DEPLOYMENT ORDER DOESN'T ADDRESS IT.
- 290717 ATTACHMENT ORDERS FOR 9TH IN. ARCENT LNO HAS A COPY. J3 PLANS HAS A COPY.

291415 CPT MINOR CALLED. EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN FOUND, BASED ON DESCRIPTION FROM CRDEC OF WHAT WAS IN THE SHIPMENT -- EVERYTHING IS THERE. THEY HAVE BEEN HELPING 9TH CHEM BREAK DOWN LOADS AND GET OUT-FITTED. THE GOAL IS TO GET TEAMS TO SITES BY 2 FEB. PLAN ON SEEING CDR NELSON LATTER TODAY (PROVIDE HIM BACKGROUND SAMPLES AND ENVIRONMENTAL SMART KITS TO ENSURE GOOD POS/NEG CONTROL AGREEMENT. ALSO -- WILL FAX DRAFT PAPER OUTLINING SAMPLE COLLECTION AND TRANSPORT PROCEDURES. THEY ARE MOVING TO FMIB AREA, AND WILL ENSURE THEY CHECK IN HERE OFTEN. TOLD THEM THAT THEY NOW WILL TAKE DIRECTION FROM FMIB S3/S4.

291510 CPT URBAN WILL SEE ABOUT GETTING MSG DIRECTING ARCENT TO ATTACH 9TH CHEM TO FMIB. (UIC WH60AA)

NEXT INCREMENT WILL HAVE 3 HUMWVS & TRLRS, 3 XM2 AND 3 COMM SAMPLERS.

291525 DISCUSSED XM2/XM21 LOG SPT WITH MAJ CHRISTEN, FMIB S4. HE CALLED BACK TO SAY THE BN (XO ?) WANTS PLUME AND MINOR FORMALLY ATTACHED IF THEY ARE TO BE THERE. PASSED TO CPT OBERHOLTZER, CRDEC TO IN-TURN PASS TO THE COMMAND GROUP.

300045 SGM WILLIAMS/PORSCOM-NBC CALLED, SUBJ: INBOUND ACFT. TWO C-141 MISSIONS WILL BE CARRYING 6 HMWVS, 6 3/4-TON TRAILERS, 6 COMMERCIAL SAMPLERS, AND 20 PAX. 1ST MISSION, A14953, DEPARTS FT LEWIS ON 021645Z FEB91. THE 2D MISSION, A14954, DEPARTS FT LEWIS ON 021945Z FEB91. AWAITING ETA AND ARRIVAL LOCATION FROM PORSCOM. AT THIS TIME 11 SAMPLING TEAMS ARE PROGRAMMED (VS 13 REQUESTED). ALSO, 4 MORE XM-2 AND 5 MORE COMMERCIAL SAMPLERS ARE INBOUND TO THE AOR.

301645 LTC POTTS, CENTAF SG CALLED. HE HAD SOME CONCERNS ABOUT AUTHORIZATION TO FIELD HIS BIO DETECTION SYSTEMS. APPARENTLY COL BALES HAS PUT SOME HARD QUESTIONS TO POTT'S BOSS. ASSURED HIM HE HAD J3 NBC APPROVAL TO POSITION HIS EQUIPMENT (AS I WAS SATISFIED HE'D RUN APPROPRIATE BACKGROUND CONTROLS AND TIE INTO THE NBCWRS. HE IS FORWARDING HIS DECISION BRIEF PACKET WITH FINAL LOCATIONS, AND EXPECTS ALL SITES TO BE OPERATIONAL (AND BEGIN BACKGROUND ASSESSMENTS) BY 1 FEB.

302130 CPT REASON, 9TH CHEM CO, CALLED TO REPORT HIS SECOND GROUP WAS READY TO DEPART THIS WEEKEND AND HE WOULD BE JOINING THEM.

311440 CW3 LEE CALLED WITH QUESTIONS ON BIO DETECTION TEAM THAT IS BEING POSITIONED AT MARCENT REAR. EXPLAINED PROGRAM AND THAT THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT IS FORTHCOMING.

311510 CPT MINOR CALLED. PROVIDED BACKGROUNDS AND XM2 DEMO TO NAVAL FORWARD LAB. DRAFT "OPORD" ON SAMPLING ALMOST READY TO SEND FOR OUR CHOP AND HQ CENTCOM COORD (J2 AND SG).

LOG EXTRACTS -- BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

FEBRUARY

021020 COL BALES CALLED TO ADVISE HE WILL COME TO JOC AT 1300 WITH PERSONNEL WHO ARE GOING TO RUN ARMY LABS.
MAJ JANSEN ACTION

021345 BIO SYSTEM DESCRIPTION MSG TAKEN TO SJS FOR CCCS RELEASE.

030435 1LT O'REGAN CALLED, SUBJ: CHEM/BIO SAMPLING. HE SAID HE WAS DRAFTING A SOP, AND WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT CENTCOM GUIDANCE. I TOLD

HIM THAT A MESSAGE ON BIO DETECTION AND WARNING WAS FORTHCOMING, AND THAT IT WILL ANSWER HIS KEY CONCERNS. HE SEEMED SATISFIED, AND WILL CALL MAJ J. FOR SUPPLEMENTAL INFO.

- 031055 CPT WAGDALT WANTS MAJ J TO CALL REF BIO TEAMS.
- 031430 CALLED CPT WAGDALT, WAS ABLE TO ANSWER SOME OF HIS QUESTIONS. TOUGHEST ONE WAS WHETHER OR NOT DET TEAM IS MOVING FORWARD WITH TAC CP. ANSWER: NO, AND HE WILL HELP GET THEM LINKED UP WITH ARCENT SUPCOM AT KJMC.
- 031450 MAJ JONES, FMIB CALLED. CONFIRMED THAT TEAM WILL REMAIN AT KJMC (AND NOT MOVE WITH ARCENT TAC CP).
- 031600 MAJ WAGNER, ARCENT, IS WORKING THE NEXT FOUR BIO DETECTION TEAM PLACEMENTS.
- 040851 9TH CHEM CALLED THEY WILL HAVE 2 ADDITIONAL XM2s & 5-10 PM-10 SAMPLERS IN COUNTRY BETWEEN WED-FRI. HAVE REPLACED GENERATORS WITH CML HOMELITES. FORMULATING A PLAN TO COVER AREAS IN SOUTH WHILE MOVING XM21 TEAMS FURTHER NORTH. HOPE THIS FITS GAME PLAN.
- 041630 MAJ WAGNER, ARCENT, CALLED WITH POCs FOR TWO ADDITIONAL BIO DETECTION TEAM LOCATIONS. ALSO DECIDED THAT NEXT FOUR TEAMS FIELDIED WILL COVER AN NU'RIYAH, AND LOG BASES E, A, AND C. DETAILS IN BIO FOLDER
- 050530 MAJ MATHIS CALLED WITH SAMPLING TEAM POCs. REC OF PHONCON PLACED IN FOLDER
- 051050 ARCENT CALLED THEY HAVE A POSITIVE FIELD TEST FOR ANTHRAX AT DHAHRAN. THE AREA WAS DOWNWIND OF SHEEP PENS. MEDICS BELIEVE THIS IS A FALSE POS. SAMPLES TAKEN TO LAB FOR TESTING.
- 051405 MAJ JONES, FMIB CALLED WITH FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFO ON POS SAMPLES. LAST NIGHT (041900), THE TEAM AT AL KHOBAR CAME UP WITH A POS SAMPLE FOR ANTHRAX. 2ND SAMPLE SAME LOCATION WAS ALSO POS. SAMPLES TAKEN WEST OF THE SITE AND UPWIND (NORTH) OF THE SITE WERE NEGATIVE. 3RD SAMPLE AT SITE WAS POSITIVE. ALL SAMPLES WERE TAKEN TO THE NFL -- WILL CALL WITH RESULTS. AGAIN, USE CAUTION DUE TO PROXIMITY TO THE SHEEP PEN. CONTINUOUS MONITORING AT THE SITE SINCE 0800 HAS RESULTED IN NEGATIVE SAMPLES. ALSO DISCUSSED PRIORITY FOR ADDITIONAL LINES GOING IN TO FMIB (HE STILL NEEDS TO MSG REQUEST PRIORITY TO ARCENT G6 B4 WE CAN GET INVOLVED). ALSO, 18 SOLDIERS AND 6 HUMMVs HAVE ARRIVED IN 2ND INCREMENT. LOOKING FOR SAMPLERS AND REST OF MISSION EQUIP PALLETS. WILL DISCUSS NEXT TEAM LOCATIONS LATER.
- 052010 CPT PLUME TOLD MARCENT FWD (CWO JAMES) TO STOP MONITORING W/XM2. DO WE KNOW WHAT THIS IS ALL ABOUT? IF SO, PLS CALL.
- 052016 MAJ MATHIS PROVIDED POC FOR BIO DETECTION TEAM AT THE 4TH (LOG BASE ALPHA) SITE. SEE BIO FOLDER
- 052100 MAJ JONES, FMIB, EXPLAINED WHY HE DIRECTED CONSERVATION OF XM2 SAMPLING ASSETS UNTIL NOTIFIED (WAITING UNTIL JAKE AND ELWOOD VISIT AND THEN GOING TO DIRECT CONTINUOUS MONITORING). CONCURRED. WE ARE GETTING A FAX RPT OF DETAILS OF ANTHRAX-POS SAMPLE SITUATION. MISSION EQUIP FOR 2ND INCREMENT IS DUE-IN ON THURS (2 MORE XM2s AND 4 COMM SAMPLERS -- WE WILL BE ABLE TO FIELD ANOTHER 6 TEAMS). EXPLAINED XM2 SAMPLING HOLD TO CWO JAMES
- 060315 CALL FROM LT O'REGAN, SUBJ: BIO TEAM AT KING FAHD AIR BASE. SOCCENT J-3 WANTS THE TEAM TO BE ATTACHED TO THE 354TH FIGHTER

WING. THE TEAM HAS NO ORDERS - SO THERE'S NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPPORT (SOCCENT IS SUPPORTING IN THE INTERIM). SINCE THE TEAM IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WHOLE AIR BASE, THE SOCCENT J-3 BELIEVES THAT THE AIR FORCE SHOULD SUPPORT THEM.

- 061300 MAJ JONES, FMIB, CALLED. 1. LAB REPORT PROVED POS DETECTION FOR BIO AT AD DAMMAM WAS FALSE. TESTING IS SHOWING ABOUT 50% FALSE POS RATE. ALL PROBS HAVE BEEN WITH "SMART" KIT 2. PROBLEMS REPORTED WITH SUPPORT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BIO DET TEAMS AND HOSTS. NEEDS TO DOCUMENT SUPPORT RQMTS/RESP (ATT/OPCON/?) FOR PROPER AUDIT TRAIL. FMIB WILL TRY TO SOLVE IN-HOUSE, WILL CALL BACK IF OUR HELP IS NEEDED.
- 061435 SMSGT CLINE CALLED WITH PROBLEM AT KING FAHD. AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, SOCCENT HQ WAS TO SUPPORT THE BIO DET TEAM AND NOW LT O'REGAN (W/ APPARENT CONCURRENCE FROM HERE) IS ATTEMPTING TO TRANSFER TEAM RESPONSIBILITY TO THE AF BASE OPS AT FAHD. TOLD CLINE HE WASN'T MISTAKEN, THE TEAM WAS TO COME UNDER O'REGAN.
- 061445 SFC WELCH STATED THAT THEY (HE AND LT O'REGAN) HAD TRIED TO EXECUTE THE BIO DETECTION SPT MISSION ACCORDING TO PLAN BUT THAT HIS G3 WAS OPPOSED TO DOING ANYTHING HE WASN'T FORMALLY DIRECTED TO DO.
- [NOTE: NO PROBLEM. THIS IS A CRITICAL ASSET. SINCE 101ST HAS MOVED OUT OF FAHD IT IS NO LONGER THE HIGH THREAT TARGET IT ONCE WAS. WE'RE GOING TO IMMEDIATELY DIRECT RELOCATION TO A MORE APPROPRIATE STRATEGIC SITE]
- 061530 COORDINATED WITH ARCENT (MAJ WAGNER) FOR REPOSITIONING THE TEAM AT VII CORPS LOCATION NEAR THE MAJOR FORCE ASSEMBLY AREA. NEW SITE, FOR IMMEDIATE RELOCATION OF THE KING FAHD TM IS AL QAYSUMAH, POC LTC LOMBARDI (9707-7711-732)
- 062045 GOT THROUGH TO MAJ JONES, FMIB, AND DISCUSSED RELOCATION OF BIO DETECTION TEAM AT KING FAHD AB TO VII CORPS AREA. WILL FAX HIM MEMO WITH COMPLETE LIST OF LOCATIONS AND POCs.
- 062050 INFORMED LT O'REGAN THE BIO TEAM WAS TO RETURN TO THEIR BN HQ TOMORROW MORNING AND REPORT TO THE MAJ JONES FOR RELOCATION INSTRUCTIONS.
- 081520 BG NYDAM CALLED. REQUESTED WHATEVER INFO WE HAVE ON IN-COUNTRY EMPLOYMENT OF BIO DETECTION ASSETS AS HE IS BEING ASKED NUMEROUS QUESTIONS ON THE PROGRAM. APPARENTLY THE ARMY LEADERSHIP WAS MIFTED AT THE AIR FORCE'S INDEPENDANT FIELDING OF THEIR DETECTION SYSTEMS (AS THEY WEREN'T PART OF THE PLANNING GROUP, ETC.)
- 081555 MAJ DREIER, 996TH MED LAB, CALLED WITH QUESTIONS/CONCERNS ABOUT FIELD BW TESTS (APs AND SPORE SMART KIT), TIE-IN WITH NBCWRS (HIS RESPONSIBILITY TO QUICKLY CONFIRM/REFUTE POS TEST RESULTS AT ESKAN), SPECIFICITIES/SENSITIVITIES OF THE ASSAY (HIS FRIENDS AT USAMRIID DON'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT IT). HE WAS QUITE HYPER (PROBABLY BECAUSE PEOPLE WERE ASKING HIM QUESTIONS THAT HE DIDN'T READILY HAVE ANSWERS FOR). ANSWERED AS MUCH AS I COULD, TOLD HIM I APPRECIATED HIS CONCERN FOR A FIELD TEST THAT CAN FALSE POSITIVES, BUT QUITE FRANKLY -- NOT GOING TO GO WITH NOTHING UNTIL SOMETHING PERFECT COMES ALONG.
- 081800 CPT PLUME CALLED WITH A EDAWS UPDATE -- SAMPLER AT RAS SAFANIYA IS AT HALF CAPABILITY (STILL MISSION CAPABLE). ASKED HIM TO HAVE PETER STOPA GATHER THE DATA I NEED TO ANSWER TECH QUESTIONS AND GIVE ME A CALL. CPT MINOR IS STILL DUE HERE SOMETIME TODAY.

091600 CPT MINOR, 1LT CORBET (9TH CH CO) VISIT: THEY HAD A GREAT DEAL OF QUESTIONS, MOST OF WHICH WERE ANSWERED IN MESSAGES SENT TO COMPONENTS (FMIB INCL) OR MRFS, OTHER WRITTEN DIRECTION GIVEN TO MAJ JONES ON 22 JAN. PROBLEM WITH FMIB GIVING INFO TO 9TH CHEM CO AND PROBLEM WITH COMPONENTS (ESPECIALLY ARCENT) PASSING MESSAGES TO SUBORDINATE COMMANDS. STILL NO ATTACHMENT ORDERS. WHERE DO TEAMS GET THEIR SECOND INOCULATION (BOTH A AND B)? BN DOESN'T HAVE ANYMORE CANA (APPARENTLY WIDESPREAD PROBLEM).

091930 CALLED MAJ WAGNER, ARCENT. PROBLEM WITH RETRANSMITTING MSGS. THEY HAVE TO RETYPE THEM AND GET COL TO RELEASE RETRANS. DOESN'T HAVE A PROBLEM WITH US INFO-ING THE 2 CORPS, SUPCOM AND ARCENT MCP (FWD) -- IN FACT, WISHES WE WOULD TO SAVE VALUABLE TIME IN GETTING INFO OUT. HE IS GOING TO HAVE SOMEONE PROVIDE THE PLADS TO US LATER TONIGHT. WITH RESPECT TO THE ATTACHMENT ORDERS, THE PERM ORDERS ATTACHING 9TH TO ARCENT FWD IS A PROBLEM THAT ARCENT G1 SAYS WILL TAKE 3-6 MONTHS TO STRAIGHTEN OUT (THEY ARE SWAMPED), THE EASIEST/FASTEST WAY TO FIX IS TO GET THE ISSUING HQ TO AMEND THE PERMANENT ORDERS. WILL HAVE FORSCOM SEE ABOUT GETTING I CORPS TO AMEND THE PERMANENT ORDERS.

092040 CDR NELSON/LCDR BURANS FROM NFL CALLED. DISCUSSED SPORE SMART KIT AND POSSIBLE CAUSES OF FALSE NEGATIVES. DETAILED REPORT OF FINDINGS IS SUPPOSED TO BE ON ITS WAY (THROUGH CPT NICHOLS).

092130 LT O'REGAN CALLED. NEEDED A POC AND PHONE NUMBER FOR CAM REPAIR. WAS GIVEN CPT CHINOWSKY'S NUMBER.

092215 PETER STOPA CALLED TO DISCUSS TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE DETECTOR TICKETS. MY VERY ROUGH NOTES ARE IN SAMPLING FILE, AND HE'S TO FAX SOME ADDITIONAL INFO.

1000345 LT O'REGAN WOULD LIKE MAJ JANSEN TO CALL TOMORROW PM REF BIO

101610 SFC WELCH CALLED W/ QUESTIONS ABOUT SAMPLING MISSIONS (TO COMPLETE THEIR PLANNING). WANTED TO KNOW HOW THE MISSIONS WOULD COME (ANS: TELEPHONICALLY) AND HOW LONG THEY WOULD HAVE TO RESPOND (ANS: ASAP, BUT NLT 24 HRS TO PLAN, EXECUTE AND HAND OVER SAMPLE TO TECH INTELL TEAM. [NOTE: THEY DEFINATELY WANT TO BE PREPARED TO DO THE MISSIONS, KNOWING THAT WE'LL GO ELSEWHERE IN A HEARTBEAT IF SOCCENT CAN'T DELIVER. THEY KNOW WE WON'T HESITATE TO EXCLUDE THEM AND GO WHERE WE CAN GET STUFF DONE FAST BASED ON HOW QUICKLY THE BIO DETECTION TEAM WAS RELOCATED.

102130 LT O'REGAN CALLED. TRYING TO COMPILE BIO SAMPLING REF MSGS (WILL CALL BACK WHEN HE DETERMINES WHAT HE'S MISSING)

111541 LEFT WORD AT CENTAF FOR LTC POTTS TO RETURN MY CALL WHEN HE ARRIVES THIS EVENING (ABOUT 1900). HE OWES ME LOCATIONS, BRIEFING PKT, AND OPERATIONAL STATUS (POS/NEG CONTROL TEST RESULTS) ON BIO DETECTORS HE & MAJ CATECART ARE EMPLOYING.

112050 LCR BURANS, NFL, CALLED TO EXCHANGE DETECTOR TICKET TECHNICAL INFO. HE'S GOT SOME DISPOSABLE VOLUMETRIC SUPPLIES TO HELP TEAMS W/ DILUTIONS AND WILL BE RECEIVING SOME OF THE SUPPLIES FOR TEAMS IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

121520 CALLED SGM EATMAN, FORSCOM, REF FURTHER ATTACHMENT OF 9TH CHEM CO (-) TO FMIB. HE WILL SEE HOW FAR CPT URBAN GOT ON THE ACTION AND THEN CALL BACK LATER TODAY.

122110 CW3 JAMES. WANTED TO KNOW IF XM21s (WITH THE BIO TEAMS) WERE GOING TO MOVE. ANS: YES -- THEY ARE TO COVER THE ARCENT FORWARD

DETECTION SITES (AS MARCENT HAS THEIR 5 ALREADY).

- 131200 SGM EATMAN, FORSCOM, CALLED (122345) TO PASS ON THAT FORSCOM AND I CORPS HAVE DONE EVERYTHING IN THEIR POWER/PURVIEW TO AFFECT THE ATTACHMENT OF THE 9TH CHEM TO FMIB. THE REST IS UP TO ARCENT. HE INFORMED ARCENT G3 NBC AND G1.
- 131730 CPT MINOR CALLED. SAID ATTACHMENT ORDERS CAME DOWN TO BN YESTERDAY, HE HAD SUFFICIENT VOLUMETRICS TO DO DILUTIONS (LET HIM KNOW NFL MAY HAVE MORE PLUS SHOULD BE IN RECEIPT OF SOME 400 DETECTOR TICKET TESTS TOMORROW -- 300 FOR HIM). DON'T BELIEVE HE UNDERSTOOD SWAB SWITCH OUT REQUIREMENT FOR NEXT GENERATION OF BT TICKETS. GOT CUT OFF BEFORE I COULD DISCUSS:
-- SHOT LOCATIONS
-- XM21 POSITIONS
-- TEAM MOVEMENTS FOR NEXT PHASE
-- DEDICATED PHONE LINE
NEED TO GET BT TICKET SWAB CLARIFICATION TO HIM.
DON'T THINK HE UNDERSTANDS IMPORTANCE OF DAILY CALL HERE.
- 131900 CPT MINOR CALLED BACK. LOOKS LIKE 2ND INOCULATION ISSUE WAS RESOLVED. XM21s ARE GOING TO A, C, KMC, AN NU'AYRIYAH AND QAYSUMAH. DISCUSSED TEAM MOVEMENTS FOR NEXT PHASE AND FMIB'S REQUIREMENT TO MSG ARCENT G3 FOR PRIORITY PHONE LINE. HE SAID HE WAS COMING HERE TOMORROW.
- 132200 LTC POTTS, CENTAF SG, BROUGHT BY PACKET ON HIS BIO DETECTION TEAMS (SEE BIO DET & WARNING FOLDER)
- 141114 MAJ HUDSON WANTS MAJ J TO CALL 498-8461
- 141230 CALLED MAJ HUDSON TO DISCUSS PLACEMENT OF SECOND XM2 TEAM HERE AT RIYADH (MODA). SHOULD BE HERE BY FRI. HE WILL GET THEM SETTLED (QTRS) AT ESKAN AND THEN COME WITH THEM HERE. ORDERS & SHOTS ARE SOLVED.
- 141610 MSG BLUE CALLED. LTC JONES ASKED HIM IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY "FALSE ALARMS" FROM XM21s OR XM2s. I EXPLAINED THE 1 (OUT OF 46) FALSE POSITIVE FOR PARTICLE (SILT) LOADING AND NO FALSE XM21s THAT WE ARE AWARE OF. HE IS ALSO REQUIRED TO BRIEF NBC (TO CENTCOM REAR STAFF) ON 19 FEB AND REQUESTED OUR HELP IN GIVING HIM UPDATED NUMBERS, ETC. ON SLIDES THAT LTC SILVERNAIL USED FOR JOINT CML CONF BRIEF.
- 141700 CPT WAGDALT CALLED. WANTED TO KNOW IF ANY BIO TEAMS WERE DIRECTED TO SURVEY EXPLOSION SITE(S), [IMPLIED ... IF NOT, WHY]. TOLD HIM 1) NO REASON TO SUSPECT BW IN TODAY'S VOLLEY 2) TEAM'S SOP DIRECTS SAMPLING AFTER JUST SUCH AN EVENT AND THEY DON'T NOTIFY NBCWRS FOR NEG REPORTS. QAYSUMAH & THE OTHER SITES NORTH WON'T BE IN PLACE UNTIL TOMORROW. KMC TEAM GOT A NEG AFTER SCUD ATTACK.
- 141735 CPTS MINOR AND PLUME STOPPED BY TO BRING RIYADH (MODA) TEAM IN AND FINALIZE TEAM MOVEMENTS FOR THE GROUND CAMPAIGN. SECOND INCREMENT TEAMS ARE BEING REPLACED TODAY AND TOMORROW. WILL MOVE 2ND KHOBAR TEAM TO 1ST/2ND MARDIV ATTACK ASSEMBLY AREA (COORD DIRECTLY WITH CG I MEF) AND WILL DISCUSS VII CORPS PLAN WITH LTC LOMARDI TOMORROW.
- THE DETECTION TEAM FOR MODA WILL RETURN TOMORROW AT 1630. WE'LL MEET THEM OUTSIDE AND TAKE THEM TO THE SPOT WHERE THEY'LL CONDUCT PERIODIC MONITORING. COORD W/ JCSC OIC FOR PARK PLACE AND USE OF PHONE (JANSEN)

150145 MAJ NEWING CALLED. JOINT STAFF IS SENDING ANOTHER MSG INSISTING WE NEED AIRBORNE BIO SYSTEM. DIR LTC CARNES IS THE PUSHER ON THIS ONE. "SOMETHING BETTER THAN NOTHING". NEWING SAID HE TRIED, BUT NO JOY THEY ARE SENDING IT REGARDLESS.

150943 BUCKSLIP ON AIRBORNE BIO DETECTOR TO CCJ3-0

151315 LTC LOMBARDI, VII CORPS, CALLED TO SEEK ASSISTANCE IN EMPLOYING THE XM21 STANDOFF DETECTOR IN A MORE MEANINGFUL ROLE. HE FORESEES A NEED FOR IT NEAR HOSPITALS, FAARPs AND TO SCAN FUTURE AREAS OF OPERATIONS. I EXPLAINED THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL PEOPLE AND VEHICLE SUPPORT. HE IS WILLING TO PROVIDE THE SUPPORT FOR THE TWO SYSTEMS IN VII CORPS SECTOR AND ASKED IF OUR TEAMS COULD TRAIN HIS PERSONNEL. TOLD HIM WE WOULD RELOOK THE ISSUE. NEED TO CONTACT FORSCOM TO SEE IF THEY WILL DEPLOY 15 MORE PEOPLE AS ONE OPTION. 2D OPTION IS TO SEE IF BIO TEAM CAN TRAIN VII CORPS FOLKS AND IF THE CORPS WILL/CAN PROVIDE REQUIRED VEHICLES SPT.

151405 LTC LOMBARDI CALLED TO DISCUSS A PROBLEM WITH MOVING BIO DET TEAMS UP INTO DIVISION ATTACK POSITION ASSEMBLY AREAS. UNLESS THERE'S A FRAGO THAT COMES FROM ON HIGH THERE IS NO WAY UNITS WILL PERMIT THINGS INTO THEIR AREA. FWD POSITIONS ARE CLOSE ENOUGH TO RESPOND TO "EVENTS" THAT WOULD TRIGGER THE NEED TO SAMPLE. HE CAN DISPATCH THEM IT INVESTIGATE EVENTS IN HIS AO WITHOUT WAITING FOR HIGHER TO RESPOND/GET THROUGH AS LONG AS HE REPORTS WHAT HE'S DOING AND WHY THROUGH THE NBCWRS CHAIN (NBC REPORT FORMAT NOT NECESSARY -- JUST EVENT DETAILS). IF WE WANT TEAMS TO MOVE FWD WITH LOGBASES AS THEY ARE SHIFTED -- PLAN NOW TO ISSUE THE FRAGO.

151445 COORDINATED WITH LTC HICKS, JCSE, TO SPOT THE BIO DETECTION TEAM IN THEIR PARKING AREA, USE COMMS AND BREAK SITE.

151645 LTC ROONEY (AIR STAFF, AFXOOTA AIRLIFT OPNS PH AV 227-8407) CALLED WITH HEADS-UP REGARDING AIRBORNE BIO SAMPLER. DR. JOSEPH, LOS ALAMOS NAT'L LAB, IS PUSHING THE SYSTEM THRU NAT'L SECURITY COUNCIL. LTC ROONEY STATED TEST RESULTS SHOW MIXED RESULTS WITH HAZE, DOESN'T BELIEVE SYSTEM WAS EVER TESTED AGAINST A PROTEIN STIMULANT AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF GOOD DISTINCTION BETWEEN A BIO CLOUD AND DUST. HE SAID A MSG IS COMING BUT SUGGESTS WE ASK FOR DETECTION CAPABILITY AT TIME INTERVALS FROM 1/2 HR TO 3 HRS WHICH WOULD SHOW ABILITY TO DETECT AT NORMAL RESPONSE TIMES, I.E., TIME BETWEEN DISPERSAL AND DETECTION. PER COL GAIN, WE ARE TO STAND ON NON DEPLOYMENT OF THIS SYSTEM.

151640 LTC S/MAJ J BRIEF AIR SAMPLER/BIO DETECTOR CREW ON DUTIES AND RESP AT MODA. TEAM WAS POSITIONED AND TIED-IN TO JCSE HOSTS (TSGT CLAYTON AND CHIEF PETTY OFFICER CAMPBELL).

151915 OBSERVED FIRST ON-SITE OPERATIONAL TEST/ BACK-GROUND SAMPLE OF BIO DETECTION TEAM AND COMPLETED PROCEDURAL INSTRUCTIONS AND COORDINATION W/ TEAM AND JCSE.

160915 MAJ HUDSON CALLED SAID THEY WOULD NOT BE SENDING THE BIO DETECTION TEAM IN BY HUMV ANY MORE AS THEY FELT IT MADE THEM A TARGET FOR TERRORISTS. THEY FELT IT WOULD TAKE THEM 2 WEEKS TO GET ALTERNATE TRANSPORTATION, AND THAT IF WE REQUIRED THEM HERE WE'D NEED TO PROVIDE IT. I EXPLAINED WE ARE NOT IN THE TRANS BUSINESS, THEY HAVE THE REQUIREMENT TO GET THEM HERE AND ON TIME, THERE ARE BUSES RUNNING TO/FROM MODA ALL DAY LONG.

161705 CALLED CWO LEE, MARCENT, TOLD HIM IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO GET AN ADDITIONAL BIO DETECTION TEAM INTO 1ST MARDIV/2ND MARDIV AREA FOR THE TIME THEY ARE MASSED IN THEIR PRE-ATTACK ASSEMBLY AREAS. CPTs

MINOR AND PLUME WERE GOING TO STOP BY ON THEIR WAY BACK FROM VII CORPS AREA AND COORDINATE THE DETAILS. LEE WAS GOING TO PASS THIS ON TO STEVENS TONIGHT.

- 161910 NFL HAS RECEIVED SMARTS (AND HAS SOME 350 TO PASS TO CPTs MINOR/PLUME).
- 161945 BIO DETECTION TEAM DID NOT SHOW UP. LTC SENFT CALLED MAJ WOOLSEY, XO 513TH MI BDE TO FIND OUT WHY. WOOLSEY STATED THAT THEY DIDN'T FEEL THE TEAM NEEDED TO BE AT MODA, AND THAT SINCE THEY HAD OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THEM, THEY DECIDED THEY WEREN'T GOING TO SEND THEM. HE DIRECTED LTC SENFT TO ARCENT G3-NBC FOR RESOLUTION. CALLED MAJ MATHIS AT ARCENT AND HE SAID HE FELT THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT WAS CLEAR -- CENTCOM J3 DIRECTED THE WHERE AND WHEN OF THE TEAMS. HE WOULD CALL 513TH AND THEN CALL US BACK.
- 162245 CALLED MAJ MATHIS BACK. HE HASN'T HAD A CHANCE TO TALK TO 513TH MI, BUT WILL CALL BACK WHEN HE HAS.
- 170009 CALLED MAJ MATHIS HE CAN NOT GET 513TH AND HIS COMM PHONES ARE OUT. CALLED 513TH ASKED THEM TO CALL ARCENT
- 170855 MAJ JONES FMIB CALLED WANTS MAJ J TO CALL REF BIO KITS REPORTED 30% FALSE POS RATE.
- 171115 RETURNED MAJ JONES CALL. HE SAID IT WAS A LCDR GARDNER AT THE NAVY FORWARD LAB THAT SAID THE KITS ARE GIVING A 30% FALSE POSITIVE RATE. TOLD HIM TO DISREGARD THIS, THE MAN (WHOEVER HE IS) IS MISTAKEN AS WE'VE HAD 2 FALSE POSITIVES IN OVER 60 SAMPLES AND THE FALSE POSITIVES HAVE HELPED DETERMINE DILUTION/WASH PROCEDURES TO CUT DOWN ON THIS IN THE FUTURE. HE SAID HIS BN CDR WAS ON HIM ABOUT THIS ISSUE AND THAT'S WHY HE WAS PASSING IT UP -- THE GUY WAS THREATENING CALLING AFMC (SIC -- PERHAPS HE MEANT USAMRIID) TO PUT A STOP TO USING THE TESTS. REASSURED THAT HE DIDN'T NEED TO BE CONCERNED. TOLD HIM ABOUT THE 350 OR SO KITS AT NFL FOR PICK-UP BY PLUME AND MINOR WHEN THEY CAN GET TO IT. ALSO DISCUSSED PROBLEM WITH 513TH -- HE SAID MAJ HUDSON HAD TOLD HIM HE HAD TALKED WITH US AND TOLD US WE'D HAVE TO PROVIDE THE TRANSPORTATION FOR THEM.
- 171240 CALLED NAVAL FORWARD LAB, TALKED WITH CDR ESCAMILLA. THEY DON'T HAVE A LCDR GARDNER, AND WOULDN'T HAVE SAID SUCH A THING AS THEY KNOW IT NOT TO BE TRUE. WE DISCUSSED THE USE OF THE WORD "CONFIRMED" IN THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT MESSAGE (DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRESUMPTIVE/DETERMINATIVE CONNOTATION AND WHO THE MESSAGE TARGET AUDIENCE WAS). ALSO TALKED ABOUT THE OTHER TAMLs AND AFB ATHs -- THEIR CAPABILITIES AND ROLE IN THE WARNING AND REPORTING SYSTEM. ALSO DISCUSSED POSSIBLE INCLUSION OF THE CANADIAN SYSTEM IN BARRAIN INTO THE THEATER ED&WS.
- 171445 CALLED ARCENT. SGM GROSEVNOR RELAYED THAT LTC MERRYMAN DID NOT INTEND ON GETTING INVOLVED WITH THE 513TH PROBLEM, CLAIMING THAT ARCENT HAS BEEN LEFT OUT OF THE PROGRAM DECISIONS, ETC. -- SO THEY ARE NOT GOING TO GET INVOLVED NOW.
- 171450 LTC SILVERNAIL CALLED LTC WOOLSEY, 513TH TO DETERMINE WHAT THE ISSUES WERE REGARDING BIO TEAM FOR MODA. HE STATED THAT THEY HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANYTHING BUT THE ATTACHMENT ORDERS AND ARE IN THE DARK. TOLD HIM WE WOULD FAX ALL MSGS TO HIM BUT DIDN'T UNDERSTAND WHY MSG WERE NOT REC'D OR PASSED BY ARCENT. HE SAID COL BETTINGFIELD SAID THAT ARCENT NEVER WANTED THE ASSETS AND THAT THEY WERE 513TH'S TO WORRY ABOUT. TOLD HIM THEY WERE A JCS DIRECTED ASSET RETAINED BY THE CINC AS A THEATER ASSET AND THE DECISION TO USE THEM WAS BEYOND THEIR DECISION LEVEL. TOLD HIM

HIS FEARS FOR SAFETY OF TEAM DRIVING BACK AND FORTH WERE UNJUSTIFIED AND THAT THE TEAM COULD LEAVE THE VEHICLE HERE AND RIDE THE BUS LIKE EVERY ONE ELSE. HE SAID ARCENT HAS A POLICY OF NO MIL VEH FOR ROUTINE TRAVEL DUE TO THE TARGET THEY PRESENT. HE SAID THE TEAM WILL BE HERE TONIGHT BUT WE NEED TO TAKE CARE OF THEM. DON'T KNOW IF THE TM IS CAUSING ANY OR ALL OF THIS. WE TOOK CARE OF THEM BUT WE ARE NOT GOING TO PROVIDE A SEDAN FOR THEIR USE. IF THEY HAVE A SAMPLE TO TRANSPORT, USE THEIR VEH.

171530

CPT MINOR CALLED. HE AND FLUME WERE AT THE NAVAL FORWARD LAB. THEY HAD GOTTEN TO THE BOTTOM OF THE 33% FALSE POSITIVE STORY. IT WAS THE RESULT OF BAD WORDING IN A MSG THAT WAS TO REFLECT RECALL OF THE BIOMEDICAL SMARTS ONLY. TOLD HIM I WANTED THE MSG THAT WAS PUT OUT SAYING THE SMART KITS WERE BAD, AND PASSED ALONG LCDR BURANS REQUEST FOR SAMPLE BOTTLES TO CHECK A GROWTH SUSTAINMENT ISSUE. THEY ARE TO CALL BACK LATER.

171625

MAJ HUDSON CALLED. HE HAD QUESTIONS ABOUT DETECTOR KIT FALSE POSITIVES. THE ONE THAT WENT POSITIVE AT ESKAN YESTERDAY WAS DEFINITELY PARTICLE-OVERLOAD (AND THAT PARTICULAR TEAM DIDN'T KNOW TO DILUTE/WASH). I BELIEVE I WAS ABLE TO ANSWER HIS QUESTIONS. HE COMMENTED THAT THE BIO TEAM WOULD BE HERE TONIGHT. HE SAID HE NEVER HAD A PROBLEM WITH THE MISSION, JUST THE SAFETY OF DRIVING TO/FROM MODA. SHARED THE CCJ2-CI'S ASSESSMENT THAT THEIR CONCERN WAS SPECIOUS.

172100

TALKED WITH MAJ JONES (FMIB), AND THEN CDR NELSON & LCDR BURANS (NFL). LAST NIGHT THERE WERE FOUR DIFFERENT FALSE POSITIVES THROUGHOUT THE AOR (3 FOR ANTHRAX -- ONE EACH AT KHOBAR, ECHO, AND RIYADH (ESKAN), AND ONE FOR BOT TOX AT JUBAYL. [PROBLEM #1: WE WERE NOT TOLD OF THESE, AS THEY OCCURED, IAW THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT FOR WARNING AND DETECTION]). ALTHOUGH THIS STILL REPRESENTS LESS THAN 10% (5 OUT OF ABOUT 72) THE INCIDENCE OF INCREASED FALSE POSITIVES IS INCREASING AS THE PERIODIC MONITORING IN NOW IN FULL SWING. PROBLEM #2: THERE IS THE POTENTIAL FOR LACK OF FAITH IN THE SCREENING TEST -- THE MORE FALSE POSITIVES THE MORE CAVALIER ALL INVOLVED WILL BECOME IN A POSITIVE TESTS. AT SOME POINT WE'RE GOING TO HAVE TO ASSESS IF THE BENEFIT OF THIS SYSTEM OUTWEIGHS THE DRAWBACKS, AND BE WILLING TO CUT BAIT IF IT TURNS OUT TO BE A GOOD IDEA WHO'S TIME HAS YET TO COME. I'VE ASKED THE NAVAL FORWARD LAB TO HELP IN FINDING A PROCEDURAL FIX FOR REDUCING THE PARTICLE LOADING PROBLEM THAT IS CAUSING FALSE POSITIVES. THE PROJECT OFFICER AT CRDEC PREDICTED THE POSSIBILITY OF HEAVY SILT IN THE DESERT ENVIRONMENT AND SAID THAT VISIBLY CLOUDY SAMPLES NEEDED TO BE DILUTED 1:10 BEFORE USING THE DETECTOR TICKET. PROBLEM IS -- THE TEAMS DON'T KNOW THIS, AND THE GUYS AT NFL (NELSON AND BURANS FEEL WE'LL RISK DILUTING PAST THE SENSITIVITY OF THE TEST). BOTTOM LINE -- WE'RE GOING TO HAVE TO WATCH THIS SYSTEM CAREFULLY, MAKE FIXES IF WE CAN, CONTINUALLY ASSESS ITS UTILITY, AND NOT BE AFRAID TO KILL IT IF IT TURNS OUT TO BE NOT WORTH THE TROUBLE.

180530

CPT SERINO MADE A CHECK ON BIO TEAM AT 0545. TEAM GONE.

180649

CWO JAMES CALLED. HE WANTS OTHER BIO TEAM MAJ JANSEN OFFERED, WOULD LIKE HER TO CALL AND DISCUSS DETAILS.

180805

MAJ JONES (FMIB) CALLED TO ADVISE THAT THERE WERE TWO FALSE POSITIVES LAST NIGHT AT ESKAN AND ONE AT AL KHOBAR. THEY SENT THE SAMPLES TO NFL TO SEE IF SOME OTHER CAUSE, OTHER THAN THE HUMAN FACTOR, IS CAUSING THE FALSE POSITIVES. BDE CDR AND OTHERS ARE GETTING INVOLVED AND WANT TO KILL THE PROGRAM IF THIS CONTINUES

AND NO SOLUTION IS FOUND. TOLD HIM TO WORK IT.

- 181000 LCDR BURANS (NFL) ADVISED THAT FALSE POSITIVE MAY BE CAUSED BY FILTER FIBER FRAGMENTS FROM PM10 COMMERCIAL SAMPLER. IF SO IT NEEDS TO BE PULLED OFF LINE AND FIXED. HE REQUESTED CLEAN EMPTY SAMPLE BOTTLES, CLEAN FILTER SAMPLES, AND BUFFER SOLUTION FROM AL KHOBAR SO THEY CAN RUN SOME TESTS. HE NEEDS CPT PLUME OR JONES TO BRING THE SAMPLES TODAY (ASAP). TRIED TO CALL CPT JONES. NO LUCK.
- 181015 (LTC S) TALKED TO MAJ WAGNER AND TOLD HIM I WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH ARCENT NBC SUPPORT OF BIO DETECTION SYSTEM. LTC MERRYMAN SEEMS TO BE THE PROBLEM. HE SAID THAT THE 513TH BDE HAS COPIES OF THE BIO DOCUMENTS, BUT MAYBE LTC WOOSLEY DOESN'T HAVE A PERSONAL COPY. HE ADVISED THAT 513TH WAS COMING TODAY ABOUT 1500 HRS.
- 181030 MAJ J CALLED TO ADVISE THAT PHONECON WITH LCDR BURANS REVEALED THAT SAMPLE PROCEDURE FOR PM10 (ADDITION OF A PIECE OF THE FILTER PAPER TO THE SAMPLE TO ENSURE ADEQUATE PARTICLES IN THE SAMPLE) MAY BE THE CAUSE OF FALSE POSITIVE.
- 181400 1SG, 9TH CHEM CO (-) CALLED TO ASK THAT OUR BIO DET TEAM REPORT ON # SAMPLES TAKEN TO DATE, # OF POSITIVES (ANTHRAX/BOT)
- 181405 CALLED MAJ JONES AND TOLD HIM OF THE PROBLEM WITH THE PM-10. THE FILTER IS READILY SOLUBILIZED IN THE SAMPLE SOLUTION AND IS CAUSING THE FALSE POSITIVES. TOLD HIM TO HAVE PLUM/MINOR GET THE WORD TO THOSE TEAMS W/ THE PM-10 TO DISCONTINUE ADDING A PIECE OF FILTER PAPER TO THE COLLECTION BOTTLE SOLUTION.
- 181415 CPT PLUME ASKED IF WE WOULD CONTACT THE TWO RIYADH TEAMS W/UPDATED PROCEDURE (HE'D INFORM THE TWO TEAMS AT KHOBAR).
- 181610 CPT MINOR CALLED FROM NFL TO REPORT ON THE FINDINGS OF THE DAY LONG TESTS. NO PROBLEM WITH PROCEDURES -- IT'S THE FILTER PAPER W/ THE PM-10 AND THE TURBIDITY IN OTHER CASES THAT ARE CAUSING THE PROBLEMS.
- 181700 MAJ WAGNER (ARCENT), MAJ HUDSON (FMIB), AND MAJ DRIER (966 MED LAB) CAME BY TO DISCUSS THE BIO DETECTION FALSE POS PROBLEM. DRIER CAME UP WITH SAME ANALYSIS OF PM-10 PROBLEM (FILTER PAPER). HUDSON EXPLAINED THE CONCERN ON THE PART OF THE 513TH CDR WAS THAT HE AND THE UNIT WOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE IF THE PROGRAM TURNED OUT TO BE A BUST. WE EXPLAINED THAT THERE WAS NO WAY THEY WOULD BE AS THE CONCEPT AND FIELDING WAS DIRECTED AT THE OSD/CJCS LEVEL AND THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR OPERATIONAL CONTROL AND EXECUTION WAS AT CENTCOM LEVEL. HE ALSO CONCEDED THERE WAS NO LONGER A PROBLEM WITH ALLOWING THE SOLDIERS TO USE A MILITARY VEHICLE IN THE CONDUCT OF THEIR MILITARY DUTIES. AGREED TO PROPOSED ACTIONS FOR SYSTEM FIXES, AND THE NEED TO TIGHTEN UP REPORTING.
- 181745 CALLED CRDEC SDO AND REQUESTED HE LOCATE SOMEONE (DETECTION DIRECTORATE -- COL COLLINS OR CPT BOYLE COULD TELL HIM WHO) WHO COULD HELP DETERMINE IF WE CAN DISPENSE WITH THE FILTER PAPER IN SAMPLE SOLUTION PROCEDURE.
- 182240 PETE STOPA FROM CRDEC CALLED. DISREGARD ADDING FILTER TO COLLECTION SOL'N, AND WITH RESPECT TO THE SILT TURBIDITY ISSUE -- 1:10 DILUTION WILL BE OKAY (WE SHOULD STILL BE WELL WITHIN LIMITS OF TEST SENSITIVITY). PASSED MSG TO FMIB.
- 191000 LTC MERRYMAN ADVISED THAT XVIII ABN CORPS IS REQUESTING GUIDANCE AS TO WHETHER THE BIO TEAM WILL DISPLACE FROM LOG BASE C TO LOG BASE R WHEN IT IS EST AT G+ (3T06). WILL BE CONSIDERED AS WILL ALL BIO TM PLACEMENTS.

191530 MAJ HUDSON CALLED. HE WANTED TO RESUME SAMPLING ON A LIMITED BASIS TO CUT DOWN ON FALSE POSITIVES. TOLD HIM THAT TAKING THE FILTER PAPER OUT OF THE PM-10 PROTOCOL, AND DILUTING TURBID SAMPLES 1:10 WOULD DO THAT -- WE'LL DEAL WITH ANY OTHER FIXES AS THE NEED ARISES. HE CLAIMS HIS CDR IS STILL LEARY OF THE WHOLE THING AND WANTS IT STOPPED IF THERE ARE ANY MORE FALSE POS. EVEN THOUGH WE TOLD HIM IT WOULDN'T REFLECT OF THE 513TH HE DOESN'T BELIEVE IT. I ASKED HIM TO FIND OUT WHO HE NEEDS TO HEAR IT FROM AND I'D SEE IF WE CAN GET THAT PERSON TO SAY IT. HE ALSO WAS CONFUSED ABOUT THE REQUIREMENT TO REPORT POSITIVE TEST RESULTS THROUGH THE NBCWRS (THINKING IT MEANT PASSING NBC-1 REPORTS).

191800 MAJ WAGNER CALLED. DISCUSSED BIO TEAMS MOVING FORWARD AS FORWARD LOG BASES WERE ESTABLISHED.

192200 THE BIO DETECTION TEAM AT MODA WILL DO THE FOLLOWING EACH NIGHT:
 -- CALL THE CHEM DESK UPON ARRIVAL (O/A 1830)
 -- TAKE AIR SAMPLES AT 1830, 0130, AND 0400
 -- REPORT POSITIVE SAMPLES TO J3-X IMMEDIATELY (BEFORE TAKING SAMPLE TO 966TH LAB)
 -- CALL THE CHEM DESK EACH MORNING BEFORE THEY DEPART, GIVING DAILY SAMPLING STATUS REPORT (I.E., 3 SAMPLES TAKEN, EACH NEG FOR BOTH A&B). WE IN TURN NEED TO PASS THE DAILY REPORT TO PLUME/MINOR THROUGH FMIB .

FOR POSITIVE SAMPLES -- ADVISE THE TM CHIEF/CAT DIRECTOR THAT ONE OCCURRED, MIGHT BE FALSE/MIGHT BE SOMETHING TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT (BASED ON IRAQI HISTORY OF USE -- HAVE NONE YET -- OR LIKELIHOOD OF COVERT DISSEMINATION. ADVISE THE CENTCOM SURGEON IF ENOUGH INDICATORS WARRANT IT. THE LAB IS TO CALL HERE (IF SAMPLE ORIGINATED FROM HERE) AS SOON AS THEY HAVE COMPLETED THEIR TESTS.

201115 CALLED PLUME/MINOR TO PASS BIO TESTS RESULTS FOR MODA TEAM. [3 SAMPLES, ALL NEG]

201125 CPT MINOR CALLED. TM 9 (JUBAYL) MOVING TO 1ST MAR DIV AT 1000HRS TOMORROW -- TM 10 (KHOBAR) BACK-FILLING AT JUBAYL.

201125 NCOIC OF TM 7 CALLED (BASTONE). HE HAS TAKEN 11 SAMPLES OVER THE COURSE OF THE LAST 3 NIGHTS, AND ONLY HAD THE 1 (FALSE) POSITIVE TWO NIGHTS AGO. NEED TO PASS THIS TO MINOR (7803-419)

201800 BIO TEAM ARRIVED AT MODA.

201820 FAXED CHANGES TO BIO DETECTION PROTOCOL TO CPT MINOR (THROUGH 202 MI BN)

210104 CWO JAMES CALLED REF BIO TEAM. HE NEEDS TO KNOW WHEN TEAM IS NO LONGER UNDER HIS CONTROL. MAJ J PLEASE CALL

210540 PER DISCUSSION WITH SSG COATES, MODA BIO TEAM RESULTS FOLLOW: 201830, 210100, AND 210400 TESTS: A/B - NEG. PASSED TO FMIB LT ROSENCRANCE AT 0645.

211021 SFC MURRY TM 7 AT BASTOGNE REPORTED ALL SYSTEMS GREEN, ONE TEST NEGATIVE. PASS TO MAJ J

211030 MAJ J PLS CALL MAJ WAGNER AT ARCENT REF 3RD INCREMENT OF 9TH CHEM PEOPLE.

211205 RECEIVED CALL FROM CPT MINOR AND CWO JAMES AT MARCENT. NO NEED FOR ADD'L XM2 TM OR TO MOVE TMS. 1ST MAR DIV NEEDS XM21 AND 1 REF HAS ONE.

211600 MAJ WAGNER SAID THE 3D INCREMENT OF 9TH CHEM CO CONSISTS OF 6 PAX, 2 HUMMVS AND "SUSTAINMENT SUPPLIES." TOLD HIM IF HE GOT INTO A BIND CUT THE PAX AND VEHICLES -- REALLY ONLY NEED THE RESUPPLY.

211830 CPT MINOR CALLED TO ADVISE THAT 1 MEF WANTED A BIO TM WITH XM21 OR NONE AT ALL. SO THE TM IS BACK AT ITS ORIGINAL LOC.

220545 PER DISCUSSION WITH SSG COATES/MODA BIO TEAM, DAILY SAMPLE RESULTS FOLLOW: SAMPLES #9, #10 AND #11 (211915, 220145, 220445: A/B NEG). MSG PASSED TO BIO TM THRU SSG WILSON FMIB 220601

221730 CPT MINOR/1LT CORBETT VISITED MAJ J TO DISCUSS BIO DETECTION TEAM OPERATIONS.

221820 MODA BIO TEAM REPORTED FOR DUTY

221855 CALLED MAJ WAGNER, ARCENT, AND TOLD HIM TO CANCEL 3RD INCREMENT OF 9TH CHEM CO -- SIMPLY NOT NEEDED.

222145 CPT DAVIS, ARCENT, CALLED TO SAY THE ARE TRYING TO STOP THE 3D INCREMENT OF THE 9TH CHEM CO BUT THE MAY HAVE ALREADY LEFT. STILL GOING TO TRY THOUGH.

230002 CONTACTED FMIB (SGT MAJORS) AND MODA BIO TEAM TO TRY AND GET THEM TO DO 3 TESTS PER MAJ J'S REQUEST.

230005 FORSCOM CALLED 3RD INCREMENT 9TH CHEM HAS BEEN TURNED OFF PER MAJ J'S REQUEST.

230542 SSG COATES/MODA BIO TM CALLED IN MORNING REPORT: #12 1800-1845, #13 0100-0145, #14 0415-0500 -- ALL A/B NEG ATTEMPTED TO PASS TO FMIB: 0548, 0551

230558 LT CORBETT 9TH CHEM CALLED: PHONES JUST NOW CAME UP AND GOT MSG ABOUT 3 SAMPLES. HE SAID COULDN'T TAKE 3 WOULD DO 2. PASSED BIO REPORT.

231830 BIO DETECTION TM RPT'D FOR DUTY. THEY ARE GOING TO TAKE FOUR SAMPLES EACH NIGHT (1830, 2130, 0130, AND 0430). REQUESTED AN INVENTORY OF TICKET TESTS.

231900 LT CORBERT CALLED. 115TH MP CO REPORTED A NUMBER OF DEAD ANIMALS (30-35 GOATS) NEAR INTERSECTION OF MSRs HUGO AND CADILLAC. TEAM AT BASTOGNE CLOSEST -- THEIR SPONSOR (CPT FRENCH) CALLED IT IN. ACTUALLY 2 SITES: TK425008 vic THAJ AND QR664498 vic QARYAT-AL-ULYA. TRIED TO GET TO SGT MURRAY TO CONFIRM THEY WERE GOING TO CHECK IT OUT (03-512-0249) BUT CAN'T GET THRU ON THE CELLULAR PHONE

240400 G-DAY/H-HOUR LD CROSSED

240638 SSG COATES CALLED IN BIO SAMPLE REPORT: #15 1830 - 1915, NEG #16 2130 - 2215, NEG, #17 0130 - 0215, NEG, #18 0430 - 0515, NEG #19 0515 - 0600, NEG PASSED TO FMIB LT ROSENCRANCE 0642.

240726 LT DRUSHEL 9TH CM CALLED THEY HAVE A HOT ANTHRAX SAMPLE AT LOG BASE ALPHA. CULTURING IT AT KJMC AND EVACING A SAMPLE TO DHAHRAN. 9TH FWD BQ AT KJMC PHONE KY 7805-263.

240736 CWO LEE CALLED BIO TEAMS HIS LOCATION NOTHING TO REPORT.

240925 ARCENT (MAJ WAGNER) CALLED REF HOT ANTHRAX TEST. LAB "QUICK" TEST

GAVE A POS ON THE SAMPLE. HOWEVER, THIS IS A FIELD TYPE TEST ALSO AND THE LAB WILL HAVE TO GROW A CULTURE TO BE SURE OF RESULTS.

- 241230 CPT MINOR CALLED. 513TH MI BDE SENT OUT THE FALSE REPORT OF CONFIRMED ANTHRAX USE AT LOG BASE ALPHA. BIO TEAM AT LOG BASE ALPHA HAD A POSSIBLE POSITIVE FROM THEIR FIELD DETECTOR TICKET TEST OF THEIR 240300C SAMPLE. ALL INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE SAMPLE WILL BE NEGATIVE (TURBID SAMPLE -- SAND PARTICLE INTERFERENCE, AND SUBSEQ. NEG AT THAT SITE). SAMPLE IS BEING CULTURED AT THE LAB TO CONFIRM PRESUMPTIVE NEGATIVE. THE DEAD ANIMAL SIGHTING AT 231900C CONFOUNDED THE FALSE BW USE REPORT. THE NEAREST BIO TEAM AT LOG BASE EASTONE REPORTED NEG FIELD TEST RESULTS FOR BOTH A/B. SUBMITTED A SPOTREP AND CALLED COMPONENTS AND NFL ASKING THEM TO HELP KILL THIS ONE.
- 241740 DR. ANDY SHUTTLEWORTH, UK (CDE--PORTON DOWN), CALLED REQUESTING A TIME HE COULD COME BY AND TALK WITH MAJ J. ARRANGED FOR 2100 THIS EVENING
- 241830 BIO DETECTION TEAM ARRIVED AT MODA.
- 241915 TALKED WITH MAJ BURDICK, TAML AT KPMC. CULTURE IS NOW 12HRS AND DOESN'T SHOW ANYTHING (STILL GOING TO RUN IT THRU TO IT'S 24HR CONCLUSION BUT IF IT HAD BEEN ANTHRAX WE SHOULD HAVE SEEN SOMETHING WITHIN 6-8HRS). ALSO TALKED WITH LCDR BURANS, NFL, WHO HAS BEEN HELPING BURDICK WITH PROCEDURES. BURDICK HAS BEEN DOING ALL SORTS OF DAMAGE CONTROL ON THE STORY -- WANTS US TO GET AHOLD OF A MAJ NEGRO AND A LT CARBONE (RAOC ??) TO GET THEM OUT OF THE RUMOR PROPAGATION BUSINESS.
- 242130 MET WITH DR. SHUTTLEWORTH AND MAJ MIKE DIXON, CDE. THEY HAD QUESTIONS ON THE ANTHRAX REPORT, ASSURED THEM IT WAS NEG AND KILLED (IN US CHANNELS) HOURS AGO. THE WHOLE EVENT REAFFIRMED THE NEED FOR AN NBCWRS TIE-IN AND MAJ DIXON SAID HE'D GET SOMEONE HERE TOMORROW AT 1600 TO MAKE THAT HAPPEN. JUST AS THEY SAID THEY'VE SAT ON THE REPORT (NOT FORWARDED ANYWHERE), DR. BALES CAME OUT OF THE WAR ROOM SAYING IT HAD GOTTEN BACK TO 10 DOWNING STREET AND TO THE CINC THROUGH GEN POWELL. STORY IS COMPLICATED AS 6 UK SOLDIERS WHO SHARE THE SAME TENT CAME DOWN W/ FLU-LIKE SYMPTOMS. WE'VE OFFERED UK A FULL SEROLOGICAL WORK-UP AT 966TH (ESKAN). WAITING ON UK TO CALL SAYING THEY'LL TAKE US UP ON LAB OFFER. IF SO -- THE PLAN IS TO HAVE UK BRING IT HERE AND HAVE BIO TEAM TRANSPORT IT TO 966TH.
- 250025 COL BALES REPORTED 6 UK BLOOD SAMPLES ARE ON THE WAY TO LAB. CCSC WILL REPORT AS SOON AS TESTING COMPLETE.
- 250425 REPORT FROM COL BALES, SUBJ: BRITISH PATIENTS. INITIAL LAB RESULTS ARE NEGATIVE. SEE ITEM 250013.
- 250540 SSG COATES CALLED IN THE MODA BIO REPORT: #20 1840 - 1925 NEG, #21 2130 - 2215 NEG, #22 0100 - 0145 NEG, #23 0430 - 0515 NEG REPORTED AN AIR RAID SIREN GOING OFF. CONTACTED C3I. NO AIR RAID, WILL CHECK TO SEE WHAT SIREN IS. PASSED TO SSG WILSON FMIB, 0548
- 251400 PROVIDED CENTAF (MSGT CLINE) SAMPLING PROCEDURES CONDUCTED ICW FALSE BIO REPORT SO THAT HE COULD ASSIST IN GETTING THE CENTAF REPORT RETRACTED.
- 251800 BIO TM ARRIVED AT MODA.
- 252300 SSG COATES CALLED, HAS SUSPECT SAMPLE FOR "A", SECOND TEST SHOWED NEG, TAKING TO LAB FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS 3 TICKET TESTS ON 2030 SAMPLE: 1 WEAK(+), 2 (-). 2130 SAMPLE (-).

260120 COL BAILES ADVISED THE SIX BLOOD TESTS MAJ J ASKED ABOUT EARLIER (NOT LOGGED) WERE THE SAME SIX BRITS REPORTED YESTERDAY.

260127 LAB CALLED INITIAL TESTS ON BIO SAMPLE NEGATIVE, WILL CALL WITH CULTURE RESULTS. LOG ITEM 252300

260129 SCUD LAUNCH, S. IRAQ AAR RIYADH, DHAHRAN, EAST COAST. PM REP NOT PRESENT, COL KLIMP ADVISED ME THAT PM NOTIFICATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE. EHC (CPT MURPHY) CONFIRMED WARNING SOUNDED AT COMPOUND. PROJ IMPACT OFF COAST OF DOHA. ALL CLEAR RIYADH 0139.

260150 SGT BOGGS (MODA BIO TEAM) CALLED THEY HAVE 2 NEW (A) POSITIVE TESTS, ADVISED THEM TO TAKE THEM TO THE LAB.

260301 SSG COATES CALLED, HE JUST RETURNED FROM THE LAB. HE READ TWO TESTS THAT WERE REPORTED TO BE (A) POS AND SAYS THEY ARE NOT POS READINGS. TEST SAMPLE IS BROWN. SEE ITEM 260150

260600 REPORT FROM SSG COATES ON MODA BIO TESTS. RESULTS FOLLOW:

TEST	TIME	RESULT
24	1840-1925	A/B NEG
25	1935-2220	A/B NEG
26	2045-2130	A POS*/B NEG
*FOLLOW UP SMART AND LAB A WAS NEG		
27	2135-2220	A/B NEG
28	2242-2327	A/B NEG
29	2340-0025	A/B NEG
30	0050-0135	A/B NEG
31	0145-0230	A/B NEG
32	0340-0425	A/B NEG
33	0500-0545	A/B NEG

PASSED TO FMIB (SGT WEISMAN) 0610

261240 MSG FOR MAJ J FROM SSG HALL, TM 9 (JUBAYL). CANNOT CONTACT FMIB/9TH CM CO. REPORTED ALL EQPT UP, WPNS AND PERSONNEL ACCOUNTED FOR. PASSED TO FMIB AT 1535 HRS

261530 MAJ J MET WITH SQDN CDR STOKES, BRITISH ARMY, TO DISCUSS NBCWRS TIE-IN. AT THIS LATE DATE, THE BEST WE CAN DO IS INFORM EACH OTHER AT THE HQ LEVEL THROUGH THE UK LNO. HE ASSURED ME THAT THE 1ST AD (UK) AND UK AIR FORCE UNITS WERE TIED-IN TO VII CORPS AND THE CO-LOCATED US AIR BASE OPS RESPECTIVELY -- SO WE SHOULD GET THE WORD THROUGH THESE.

261835 BIO DETECTION TM ARRIVED AT MODA.

270015 NFL CALLED NO SAMPLES HAVE BEEN SENT TO THEM TODAY.

270629 SGT BOGGS CALLED IN MODA BIO REPORT. THEY DID 11 TESTS. THE FIRST TEST WAS FROM 1845-1930, THEY STOPPED UNTIL 2105, BECAUSE OF RAIN. AT 2105 THEY STARTED AGAIN AND RAN UNTIL 0555. ALL TESTS WERE A/B NEGATIVE. PASSED TO SGT WEISMAN FMIB AT 0637.

271335 CW3 LEE (MARCENT REAR) ADVISED THAT THEY WISH TO DETACH THE BIO TEAM AT JUBAYL ON 28 FEB. REQUEST WE ADVISE WHERE WE WANT IT. LTC S ASKED HIM TO TRY TO VERIFY 2D MARDIV REPORT OF CAPTURED CHEM WEAPONS.

271415 TOLD CW3 LEE THAT HE COULD MOVE THE 2ND TM TO MARCENT MAIN WITH THE 80D TM THAT JUST WENT FORWARD, OR KEEP THEM RIGHT WHERE THEY ARE AT FOR THE NEXT 2-3 DAYS AS THEY'RE PROBABLY GOING TO BE CALLED FORWARD AS SOON AS FOLKS START GOING IN TO DESTROY CAPTURED ENEMY MUNITIONS.

280600 SSG COATES CALLED IN MODA BIO REPORT. THERE WERE 11 TESTS STARTING AT 1915 # (45) AND ENDING AT 0525 # (55). ALL TESTS WERE A/B NEG. PASSED TO FMIB, SGT WEISMAN, AT 0612

280800 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED

281740 CW3 LEE (MARCENT) CALLED TO INFORM US THAT THE BIO TEAM AT HIS LOCATION IS RETURNING TO IT'S CO HQ AT AL KHOBAR TOMORROW.

LOG EXTRACTS -- BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

MARCHE

010200 SSG COATES ADVISED HE WAS TERMINATING MONITORING PER MAJ J'S DIRECTION. THEY DID 3 TESTS STARTING AT 1830 (#56) AND ENDING AT 2345 (#58). ALL TESTS WERE A/B NEG. PASSED TO SGT WILSON FMIB AT 0406

021450 CPT MINOR ADVISED THAT MARCENT RELEASED ALL BIO TEAMS LAST NIGHT AND THEY HAVE RETURNED TO FMIB. ONE TEAM WILL REMAIN WITH VII CORPS AT KPMC AND THIS WILL BE THE ONLY DEPLOYED TEAM. FMIB WILL USE TEAM PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES TO RECOVER CAPTURED ENEMY MATERIEL. ADEQUATE BILLETING HAS BEEN COORDINATED FOR 9TH CML CO PERSONNEL. TOLD HIM THIS IS NOT OVER YET, EVEN IF ARCENT HAS DECLARED CHEM CONDITION GREEN, AND THE TEAMS NEED TO BE PREPARED TO RESPOND TO BUNKER INCIDENTS.

031900 THE IRAQI'S TOLD THE CINC THAT THERE ARE NO CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MUNITIONS IN KUWAIT AND HE BELIEVES THEM (HE FEELS THEY HAVE BEEN HONEST ABOUT EVERYTHING ELSE) THEREFORE ... WE ARE TO CONTINUE TO TREAT THE CHEM CASUALTY AS CLOSE HOLD (I.E., SAY NOTHING ABOUT IT TO PRESS). HE DOESN'T HAVE A PROBLEM W/ THE EVIDENCE, DOESN'T DISPUTE THAT IT HAPPENED (SOME HAVE MISINTERPRETED HIS REMARKS AT THE EVENING BRIEF).

051850 CPT PLUME CALLED. NO CHANGE IN TEAM STATUS STILL HAVE TWO TMs AT KUWAIT INTERNATIONAL, ONE TM ON STANDBY AT AL KHOBAR, REMAINDER OF TMs PACKING UP EQUIP THAT THEY FEEL WON'T BE NEEDED. HE IS WORKING ON COMMENTS FOR AFTER ACTION REPORT. 513TH WILL COORDINATE THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 9TH CHEM COMPANY.

091055 MAJ JONES (FMIB, 513TH MI) CALLED TO ADVISE THEY WANT TO RELEASE 31 OF 45 PEOPLE OF THE 9TH CHEMICAL CO. A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY IS COMING OPEN IN THE NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS. HE WILL RETAIN 14 PEOPLE TO RESPOND TO MSNs, PACK EQUIPMENT AND STAY WITH PRIME MOVERS. HE NEEDS CENTCOM O.K. LTC S: I SEE NO PROBLEM. HE WILL NEED A MSG. I ASKED ARCENT IF THEY AGREE. THEY WILL ADVISE.

091155 CPT BLACK, ARCENT, CALLED TO SAY THEY HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH RELEASING BIO DETECTION ASSETS.

110910 LTC S. CALLED MAJ JONES (FMIB, 513TH MI) AND TOLD HIM MSG IS COMING TO AUTH RELEASE OF 31 BIO TEAM PERSONNEL. FOUR FULL TEAMS (CHEM/BIO) WILL REMAIN READY TO RESPOND, ON PHONE CALL NOTICE, TO SUPPORT POTENTIAL IRAQI USE OF AGENTS IN QUELLING CIVIL UNREST. 14 PERSONNEL TO BE RETAINED. WILCO FROM MAJ JONES.

EXHIBIT 3

NBC desk logs

JAN 91

TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION
170245	DEFCON 1 DECLARED	
170312	REPORT FROM MP DESK 112 MP TO MOPP 1	N/A
170340	QUESTION FROM HHC ABOUT CARRYING MASKS COL GAIN ADVISED STILL IN BAGS	HHC ADVISED
170350	UNCONFIRMED SCUD ALERT	
170355	SECOND UNCONFIRMED LAUNCH	
170356	NBC FEAR NOW IN CAT NEW NUMBER 5345	POSTED
170408	SURGEON AND NBC CONFERRED ON PB NOT TIME FOR ISSUE	ADVISED DIR
170412	SCUD ALERT CANCELED	
170425	INFORMED BY HHC NBC ROOM FULL OPERATION	
170426	DEFCON 1 ACTION LIST CHECKED CN14, CN15 AS REQUIRED, NO ACTION REQUIRED AT THIS TIME.	ADVISED DIRECTOR.
170400	J2 REPORTED A SAUDI REPORT ON POSSIBLE CHEMICAL LAUNCH ALONG BORDER NO CONFIRMATION.	CHECKING WITH J2
170445	RECEIVED MSG 162000Z ARCENT GOING TO MOPP1	NONE
170446	GAVE XO WRITTEN RESPONSE TO DEFCON CHECKLIST	NONE
170500	ROCKET FIRE REPORTED AT BORDER UNCONFIRMED.	
170530	COMPONENT MOPP 0 EXCEPT ARCENT (HQ ONLY) & SOCCENT MOPP 1.	POSTED, XO ADVISED
170636	PEOPLE COMING IN FROM ESCON WILL REPORT MPS ARE DRIVING AROUND ORDERING PEOPLE TO GO TO MOPP2. CONTACTED CENTAF PROPER LEVEL IS 0. THEY WILL TRY TO GET SITUATION UNDER CONTROL.	NOTIFIED PM, DIR
170649	LTC MERRYMAN CALLED ADVISED MG MOORE WILL RECEIVE A CALL FROM MG DELOROSSO SUBJECT BIO DEF INITIATIVES. HEADS UP CALL ONLY.	COL GAIN INFORMED

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94-5-251

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170719	ESCCN AT MOPF1 BY ORDER OF VILL CDR	
170726	NAVCENT REPORTS H3 RADARS STILL IN OPERATION, EXPLOSIONS AT SOME SCUD SITES IN WESTERN IRAQ.	
170747	CONTACTED CPT MARSHALL IN AN ATTEMPT TO BRING PLUME AND MINOR UNDER CONTRL. ONCE LOCATED THEY SHOULD BE SENT TO 513TH CPT JONES 7804-833.	
170758	CALLED LTC LIDDLE IN REFERENCE TO MINOR AND PLUME HE IS NOT IN HIS OFFICE WILL CALL BACK.	
170936	CENTAF REPORTED A PILOT STATED HE "FLEW THROUGH A CLOUD OF BIO MATERIAL (ANTRAX) WHILE RETURNING FROM A RAID. THEY DON'T FEEL IT IS CONTAMINATED, WILL TREAT IT THAT WAY ANYWAY. WILL REPORT AS INFO IS AVAILABLE.	TEAM CHIEF, DIR, AIR DESK NOTIFIED
171004	SOCCENT REQUESTED INFO ON PB WAS CONCERNED THAT AFTER 72 HOURS THEY COULD CAUSE ILLNESS.	ADVISED SG SHOULD REEVAL AFTER 72HRS .
171026	CENTAF ADVISED INFO ON "BIO CONTAMINATED" AIRCRAFT CAME OUT OF TAIF AND HAD NO BASIS IN FACT.	TEAM CHIEF, DIR, AIR DESK NOTIFIED.
171050	MAJ BOTHIN (OIC CAM MTT) CALLED AND STATED THAT VII CORPS HAS REQUESTED CONTINUATION OF CAM TRAINING. TEAM WAS NOT NOTIFIED OF ALERT STATUS AND ONGOING ACTION AND SPENT THE NIGHT IN THE OPEN IN THEIR VEHICLES. TNG WILL CONTINUE AND TIE-IN WITH ALERT SYSTEM WILL BE WORKED WITH THE CORPS UNIT HOSTING THE TEAM.	

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171130	<p>LTC ROONEY (USAF STAFF, 703-695-6382/2586) IS PCC FOR ABN BIO DETECTOR. HE IS GETTING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE AERIAL SENSOR SYSTEM IS STILL ON. LTC S. TOLD HIM THAT OUR POSITION HASN'T CHANGED -- WE STILL DON'T WANT IT. APPARENT THAT DA HAS DIFFERENT IDEAS. HIS POSITION IS THAT HE'LL SUPPORT WHATEVER, JUST NEEDS THE FOLLOWING: 2.5 DAYS TO MODIFY AC, TIME (UNDETERMINED) TO TEST, BEDDOWN LOCATION (RECOMMENDS BATEEN BECAUSE OF C130 ACFT SPT IN PLACE). NO SCAN CAPABILITY FOR SYS AND EVEN FINDING A CLOUD IN A GIVEN 10 KM SQUARE WOULD BE DIFFICULT. C130 CAN FLY 2.5 HRS/DAY IF AT 25K FT, BUT DETECTION MUST BE AT 5K FT. THERE IS AN EYE SAFETY ISSUE UP TO 6-10KM, SO THE AREA MAY HAVE TO BE CLEARED PRIOR TO AREA SEARCH. ANOTHER INDICATOR WOULD BE REQUIRED TO CAUSE THE C130 TO LAUNCH.</p>	
171200	MAJ FOGLESON, CPT SERINO END SHIFT	
171201	MAJ JANSEN, CPT GITCHSLAG ASSUME DUTY	
171415	COORDINATED W/ CENTAF ON THEIR BW RESPONSE ACTIONS, MAY STILL NEED TO GET BIO SAMPLING INFO PACKET TO THEIR INTELL AND MEDICAL PEOPLE.	
172400	MAJ JANSEN, CPT GITCHSLAG END SHIFT	LOG CLOSED

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8 JUN 94
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18 January 1991		
TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION
180001	SHIFT CHANGE MAJ FOGLESON, CPT SERINO ASSUMED DUTY	LOG OPENED
180030	SFC CLARK CALLED FAX ON WAY REQUESTED HE BE SENT TO AOR WILL CONTACT LTC S IN MORNING.	
180135	REAR ADVISED THERE WILL BE 10 TEU PERSONNEL TRANSFERED TO 513 MI WITH IN 10 DAYS TO DO CHEM/BIO TECH INTEL SAMPLING SHOULD CW BEGIN.	
180305C	4 SCUD LAUNCHES REPORTED. AREA AT RISK IS ALPHA. FIRST THREE IMPACTED ALPHA. FOURTH IMPACTED IN ALPHA. FIFTH AND SIXTH LAUNCHED, SAME IMPACT AREA. SEVENTH LAUNCH TO SAME AREA. ALL LAUNCHED FROM WESTERN IRAQ.	
180355C	INITIAL ASSESSMENT REPORTED BY CPT MURPHY FROM J-2 IS THAT WARHEADS WERE HIGH EXPLOSIVE.	
180400	TOTAL 7 LAUNCHES AAR ALPHA & TABUK 2 APPEAR TO HAVE LANDED IN WESTERN IRAQ, 4 IN ISREAL AREA OF TEL AVIV, ONE AREA UNKNOWN. NO CHEMICAL WARHEADS REPORTED.	
180405	INTEL REPORT 3 IMPACTS TEL AVIV, 2 HAIFA, 1 NAZERITH, 1 UNKNOWN. NO CHEM REPORTED.	
180422	SFC CLARK CALLED HAVE PROBLEM WILL DISCUSS ONE ON ONE	HAD IT RETRANSED TO COMPONENTS
180500	ISRAELI POLICE CONFIRMED NERVE GAS PROBABLY (GP). 1	
180525	MAJ RICHARDSON/CENTAF CALLED AND SAID THE NBC-1 FOR DHAHRAN WAS CANCELLED. THIS WAS BASED ON A SCUD THAT WAS REPORTEDLY INTERCEPTED NORTH OF DHAHRAN BY A PATRIOT.	
180530	ARCENT G-2 REPORTS THAT 5 SCUDS ARE INBOUND TO DHAHRAN. (NOT CONFIRMED), ARCENT AT MOPP4 IN THE AREA. ERRONEOUS LAUNCH REPORT.	

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19 JANUARY 1991		NBC DESK LOG	
TIME	INCIDENT		ACTION
190001	MAJ FOGLESON, CPT SERINO ASSUME DUTY		LOG OPENED
190045	SFC CLARK CALLED MED PEOPLE THEY REFUSED TO RESEND DOCUMENT TO REAR SAID LTC COLTER WILL HAVE INFO		WILL GET WITH HIM IN MORNING GET SERG TO PUT OUT MSG
190200C	CPT SERINO RECEIVED 45 MINUTES OF CAM TRAINING FROM PFC SEESE/CSEC. ONE M-256 KIT PLACED AT EACH NBC DESK. CAM PLACED IN THE COMMAND CENTER.		
190430	CW3 JAMES CALLED STATED THERE WAS AN EARLIER REPORT OF CHEMICAL ATTACK AT JUBAYL. BRITISH SM WITH CAM SLIGHT READING FOR MUSTARD. HE SENT A TEAM OUT GOT NO INDICATION OF AGENT. GAVE US AN ALL CLEAR.		CONTACTED BRITISH LNO HE SAID HE HAD SAME MSG.
190440	BRITISH LNO REPORTED HE WAS KNOW GETTING A REPORT THAT M9 PAPER WAS BEING USED GETTING A MUSTARD POSITIVE. HEARD A PROPELLER DRIVEN AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA.		CONTACTED CW3 JAMES WILL SEND A TEAM BACK OUT TO CHECK AGAIN. ADVISED HIM TO TAKE AT LEAST 3 METHODS.
190510	CW3 JAMES REPORTS HIS TEAM IS IN TOUCH WITH THE BRITISH TEAM, THEY ARE NOT IN MOFF AND DIDN'T GET A POSITIVE ON M9 PAPER.		TALKED WITH BRIT LNO NOW HAS TWO UNITS REPORTING POSITIVE E.
190518	CONTACTED CW3 JAMES TOLD HIM TO HURRY TEAM TO EXACT SITE THE BRITS GOT THEIR READINGS AND RECHECK EVERYTHING. HE WILL INSURE TEAM DOUBLE CHECKS ALL READINGS.		BRIEFED BRIT LNO AND TEAM CHIEF. THIRD REPORT IN.
190533	RECEIVED COORDINATES FOR POSSIBLE MD ATTACK. THEY ARE REPORTEDLY UK555945(2705N/04933E) POINT A, AND UK545935(2702N/04932E) POINT B.		CALLED MARGENT TO INSURE THEY ARE WORKING SAME SITUATION ALSO GAVE THEM THE PHONE NUMBER 476-6564/8963-150 AND THE NAME COL GUNNELL OF THE SOURCE OF LNO'S REPORT.
190615	CW3 JAMES ADVISED TEAM IN CONTACT WITH BRITS HAVE BEGUN A ROUTE RECON OF THE AREA BETWEEN POINT A & B. THEY ARE HALF WAY THROUGH NO POSITIVE READINGS. 2ND AND 3RD REPORTS MAY HAVE BEEN SCORS OF THE FIRST.		BRIEFED LNO, TEAM CHIEF

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191057	CONTACTED ARCENT REFERENCE STRIKE SERIAL NUMBER THEY HAVE WING SYSTEM, MAJ WAGNER WILL FIX IT AND RETRANSMIT.	DELETED LTC 8
191115	CAN MOBILE TRAINING TEAM MISSION COMPLETE. WTT IS ORDERED TO DEPART THE ADR.	
191130	SHIFT CHANGE. ACTIONS BROUGHT FORWARD: -- STRIKE LOT 05 (CCEC) -- PHIS (CPT JONES) UNAUTHORIZED SAMPLING DIRECTIVE, WILL COME HERE LATER TO DISCUSS THIS AND GREA UNIT ATTACHMENT. -- CPT PLUMB DIDN'T CHECK IN LAST NIGHT.	
191200	BRECK CLINE, CENTAF CALLED, CONCERNED ABOUT HIS RESPONSIBILITY TO TAKE GREN/BIO SAMPLES AS CONTAINED IN THE MATERIAL HE SENT HIM. ASSURED HIM THE SAMPLING WILL BE CONDUCTED BY THOSE UNITS AND TEAMS SO DESIGNATED, THE PACKET WAS FORWARDED TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR MEDICAL SAMPLES AND INTELL CHANNEL PROCESSING (EVERY BANDER GETS SAMPLE FROM DESIGNATED TEAMS).	
191330	SUCCESS MAJ ROBERT HARRIS) HIS POLICE AT BORDER REPORT THAT THE BALDIS THEY ARE WITH ARE MASKING BECAUSE THEY SAY A CLOUD OF SMOKE IS COMING THAT MAY FROM GS TARGETS BOMBED EARLIER TODAY.	BASED ON TARGET LOCATIONS, SURFACE WINDS AND THOSE ALOUD -- NOT A LIKELY HAZARD. KILLED STORY THRU SUCCESS/CONTINUM J2
191435	TEXT UNIDENTIFIED SOLD ALERT FROM SPACECOM	PAUSE ALARM 1645 HRS
191710	PAUSED REC TO LTC RICE. UORTH REP: ONE FOR ANITE. EQUIPMENT ONE-IN DRAMAR ANAP. LTC RICE CALLED BACK 1740 HRS. COMPLETED THEIR ROLE.	CPT LEWIS, TRY FROM GRES SS POC
191610	TALKED WITH PETE STOPA, ENDED ABOUT TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF UK BIO DETECTION ASSETS. HE WAS SHOWN/BRIEFED ON IT TO HIM AND UK WAS VERY CLOAK & BAGER ABOUT IT THEN -- HE FEELS IT'S JUST THE COUNTRY'S SENSITIVITY TO ON RESEARCH THAT IS CAUSING THIS. IS MAKING FACT SHEET ON THE UK EQUIP.	
191735	CPT PLUMB CALLED. WILL BE IN RITDAH TOMORROW, BUT NOT MAKE IT BY 1000H UK EQUIP SEND, BUT THAT'S OKAY.	
192120	MAJ WAGNER, ARCENT, SAID CPT JONES OF PHIS IS STILL IN SYCAM BUT IS DUE TO MOVE TO DRAMAR. CPT JONES WAS TO COME HERE TODAY (TOLD MAJ WAGNER HE WAS ON HIS WAY) BUT NEVER SHOWED. CPT JONES HAD MENTIONED HE WAS HAVING PROBLEMS GETTING THE THU DET'S EQUIP OUT OF COVER (MAY HAVE NOT DIVERTED TRYING TO GET THAT RESOLVED).	
192210	MAJ LOPEZ, DAVID-INC CALLED TO CHECK ON STATUS OF CALL FORWARDED MESSAGE.	TOLD HIM IT WAS IN COMMAND GROUP
192346	CHEER UNIT REPORTED XX HD IN THE AIR AT 1100 HRS, RISING TO XX HD AT 1300 (IN A REPORT SENT TO LTC (PREFICE) (GALLO). THIS IS THE BASIS OF THE TALK STORY THAT CIRCULATED EARLIER THIS AFTERNOON.	EXPLAINED THIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE: THIS SORT OF THING IS "BOUND TO HAPPEN AGAIN.
192300	SOLD ALERT, (TURNED OUT TO BE A BAK)	CANCELED AT 1304
192330	SHIFT CHANGE. OUTSTANDING ACTIONS: -- PHIS COORDINATION. -- GRES TIE-IN WAK COORDINATION -- STRIKE LOT 05 -- TRN PET FOR ANITE, TO BE PICKED UP BY CPT LEWIS, UORTH, SOMETIME TOMORROW.	LINE CLOSED

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191635	1335Z UNCONFIRMED SCUD ALERT FROM SPACECOM	FALSE ALARM 1645 HRS
191710	PASSED MSG TO LTC RICE, USMTH REF: CDE FOR ANCITS. EQUIPMENT DUE-IN DEHRAN ASAP. LTC RICE CALLED BACK 1740 HRS. CONFIRMED THEIR ROLE.	CPT LEWIS, TDY FROM CGLS IS POC
191610	TALKED WITH PETE STOPA, CRDEC ABOUT TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF UK B20 DETECTION ASSETS. HE WAS SHOWN/BRIEFED ON IT IN NOV AND UK WAS VERY CLOAK & DAGGER ABOUT IT THEN -- HE FEELS IT'S JUST THE COUNTRY'S SENSITIVITY TO BW RESEARCH THAT IS CAUSING THIS. IS FAXING FACT SHEET ON THE UK EQUIP.	
191755	CPT FLUME CALLED. WILL BE IN RIYADH TOMORROW, MAY NOT MAKE IT BY 1000HR UK EQUIP DEMO, BUT THAT'S OKAY.	
192120	MAJ WAGNER, ARCENT, SAID CPT JONES OF FMIB IS STILL IN ESKAN BUT IS DUE TO MOVE TO DEHRAN. CPT JONES WAS TO COME HERE TODAY (TOLD MAJ WAGNER HE WAS ON HIS WAY) BUT NEVER SHOWED. CPT JONES HAD MENTIONED HE WAS HAVING PROBLEMS GETTING THE TEU DET'S EQUIP OUT OF DOVER (MAY HAVE GOT DEVERTED TRYING TO GET THAT RESOLVED).	
192210	MAJ LOPEZ, DAMO-SWC CALLED TO CHECK ON STATUS OF CALL FORWARD MESSAGE.	TOLD HIM IT WAS IN COMMAND GROUP
192246	CZECH UNIT REPORTED 2% HD IN THE AIR AT KJMC AT 1100 HRS, RISING TO 3% HD AT 1300 (IN A REPORT SENT TO LTG (PRINCE) KEALID). THIS IS THE GENESIS OF THE FALSE STORY THAT CIRCULATED EARLIER THIS AFTERNOON.	EXPLAINED THIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE. THIS SORT OF THING IS BOUND TO HAPPEN AGAIN.
192300	SCUD ALERT. (TURNED OUT TO BE A SAM)	CANCELED AT 2304
192330	SHIFT CHANGE. OUTSTANDING ACTIONS: -- FMIB COORDINATION. -- HRCWRS TIE-IN W/UK COORDINATION -- ATROPINE LOT #5 -- TRN PKT FOR ANCITS, TO BE PICKED UP BY CPT LEWIS, USMTH, SOMETIME TOMORROW.	LOG CLOSED

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200001	SHIFT CHANGE. MAJ FOGLESON, CPT BERING ASSUME DUTY. OUTSTANDING ACTIONS BROUGHT FORWARD: -- FNIS COORDINATION -- BRIG'S TIE-IN W/AR COORDINATION -- ATROPINE LOT #S -- TRN PET FOR ANCHTS, TO BE PICKED UP BY CPT LEWIS, USMTH, SOMETIME TOMORROW.	LOG OPENED
200030	CEDEC MSG ASKED TO RELAY MESSAGE TO PW SEC DEFENSE: "CAN HTY CLEARED TO DEPART AOR WITH MISSION COMPLETE."	
200025	REPORT FROM JOC MSG THAT TWO PATRIOT BATTERIES ARE OPERATIONAL IN ISRAEL: ONE EACH IN NAIFA AND TEL AVIV.	
200455	JCS WANTED TO KNOW WHAT KIND OF REAR WE HAVE IN THE AOR. CONTACTED COMPONENTS TO INQUIRE CS/CH ONLY THING WE HAVE. ANSWER WOULD TAKE DAYS TO GET BECAUSE OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF UNITS IN AOR. TEAM CHIEF DIRECTOR & MSG DESK AGREED TO ANSWER THE QUESTION BY QUOTING JSCAP THAT CS/CH ONLY THING TO BE USED. ANSWER EXCEPTED	CALLED OFF COMPONENTS.
200634	SFC CLARK CALLED REF. MSG ON BOMBING BDA ON SEC FACILITY	WILL BRIEF LTC S.
200815	NOFF LEVEL FOR ALL COMPONENTS IS NOFF 0	POSTED
200830	1LT O'BRIEN/SOCCENT REPORTED THAT THE SAND SAMPLE FOR BUGGY MC IS PACKAGED AND READY FOR SHIPMENT. IT WILL BE SHIPPED ASAP.	
200945	TURNED IN "BULLETS" FOR CINC'S PREST CONFERENCE TO COL. GALT AS REQUESTED	
200946	1LT O'BRIEN CALLED, CANNOT SHIP SAND BECAUSE OF POSTAL WEIGHT LIMIT	PAST TO CPT S
201034C	PER DISCUSSION WITH LTC TOFT, CENTCOM-AC, AND AS DIRECTED BY CENTCOM LAST NIGHT, THERE WILL NOT BE ANY RECEIVING OR OUTGOING PACKAGED MAIL IN EXCESS OF 7 OUNCES FOR AT LEAST THE NEXT 24 HOURS. INFO RELATED TO SFC WELCH/SOCCENT. HE SAID THEY'LL DO THE MISSION SOONEST.	
201051	CPT JONES ARRIVED TO DISCUSS HIS MISSION. HE HAS BEEN TO COORDINATE WITH COMPONENTS TO INQUIRE THEY ARE AWARE OF REQUIREMENTS AND WILL INQUIRE THEY HAVE WHAT THEY NEED. ADVISED HE SHOULD GET BG LEIDE TO SEND OUT TARGETS TO COMPONENTS. HE WILL DO THIS AND COORDINATE THROUGH US. HE IS ALSO POC FOR THE TECH ESCORT SUPPORT IN AOR. LEFT A COPY OF HIS MISSION DOCUMENTATION.	
201130	SHIFT CHANGE. MAJ JANSEN/CPT STICHELAS ASSUME DUTY. OUTSTANDING ACTIONS BROUGHT FORWARD: -- FNIS COORDINATION -- BRIG'S TIE-IN W/AR COORDINATION -- ATROPINE LOT #S	
201212	SECRET CLINE, CENTAF, CALLED TO GET AN UPDATE ON AIRCRAFT 11. WAS PLEASED TO LEARN HE WOULD GET 6 SYSTEMS. BUD MENTIONED HE WAS HAVING PROBLEMS LOADING AIRCRAFT 1, INFORMED HIM THE TEAM WAS STILL IN-COUNTRY AND HE COULD REACH THEM AT AOR FOR ASSISTANCE.	

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201245	LTC CARTER WILL ASK U.S. ARMY MED SUPPLY COMMAND TO SEND A MESSAGE OUT ON ALL AUTOINJECTOR LOT #S EXPIRED SINCE JUNE THROUGH THE AIG USED FOR THAT TRAFFIC -- WHICH IS THE SYSTEM WE'VE USED FOR YEARS TO TRACK THAT INFO.	
201250	DR. ANDY (UK) CALLED TO SEE WHAT HAD HAPPENED -- IT WAS OBVIOUS WE WERE AT TWO DIFFERENT GATES AT SITABDI AS THIS MORNING AND HAD KISSED EACH OTHER. TOLD HIM WE WERE SATISFIED WITH TECHNICAL DETAILS, NOW WE NEED TO TALK WITH BOON LDR STOKES. STOKES WILL COME HERE TODAY ABOUT 1500.	
201335	CPT LEVIS, USMTH, CAME TO DISCUSS ARMY TRAC REQUIREMENT, PICK UP TWC PACKET, DISCUSS LOGISTICS ISSUES.	BANDED OVER TO JLT (MAJ TERRY)
201500	SFC WELCH CALLED. HAD RECEIVED CH SAMPLING RES FROM PHIS, AND WONDERED WHAT TCU ASSETS WERE IN AIG. EXPLAINED THERE WAS A DET. ATTACHED TO THE PHIS, TO OPERATE UNDER THEIR DIRECTION. ALSO TOLD HIM WE WERE PENDING COORDINATION WITH THE UNIT AND THAT ONE OF THE KEY POINTS HE WANTED TO TIE-IN WERE HIS RECON DETS WITH THE G2/PHIS SAMPLE HANDLING.	
201505	BOON LDR STOKES CALLED -- CAN'T FIND TRANSPORTATION TO GET HERE TODAY, WILL DEFINITELY ENSURE WE CAN GET HERE TOMORROW AFTERNOON.	
201700	CPT PLUME CALLED. HAVING TROUBLE WITH PROCESSING SAMPLES. NEEDS TO GET WITH PHIS AND CPT FRENCH AND GET THE DETAILS WORKED OUT. PLANS ON BEING HERE TOMORROW MORNING (LEAVING DHARAK ABOUT 0430).	
201710	LTC HEARTMAN CALLED. REPORT FROM ARMYT FORWARD (LNO W/MAC): CHECK RECON, BS TO FRENCH, REPORT "DETECTED GAZES" AND THAT HAZARD IS FLOWING DOWN FROM FACTORY/ STORAGE BOPED IN IRAQ. PREDICTABLY, THIS HAS BECOME/IS GOING TO BECOME A PROBLEM.	IMPROVED CSIC, CAT B12, J2. ASKED ARMYT (CPT MAGDALL) FOR MORE DETAILS, ASKED SUCCESS TO SEE WHAT THEY COULD DO TO HELP.
201815	CALLED CPT JONES, S-3 PHIS AND ARRANGED FOR A 1600 MEETING WITH KIM (NORE) TOMORROW TO RAIL DOWN: -- CREW UNIT ATTACHMENT -- SAMPLE FLOW	
201900	CPT MURPHY DROPPED OFF TEXT (AND DISC) OF CSIC PLAN FOR CREW ATTACK/CONTAMINATION RESPONSE AT MEDA. THIS WAS INFO REQUESTED BY LTC SILVERMAIL TO ANSWER A J3 INQUIRY.	
202147	SOLD ALERT. 2 MISSILES LAUNCHED FROM BELTHERN IRAQ, HEADED JUBATL - DHARAK DIRECTION, INITIAL RESULTS: 4 PATRIOTS FIRED, 2 SOLD KILLED IN THE AIR (UNCONFIRMED)	GAVE WARNING ORDER TO HQ CDT
202200	THIRD MISSILE SUSPECTED, VIC DHARAK. 3 PATRIOTS FIRED -- 3 CONFIRMED KILLS (BELIEVE 1 SOLD KILLED TWICE)	FOLLOW-UP: THIRD SOLD KILLED IN THE AIR
202230	ALL CLEAR ISSUED FOR DHARAK AND SITABDI AREAS, IMPACT AT DHARAK ASSESSED AS NE	GAVE ALL CLEAR TO HQ CDT
202240	(ARMED REPORT) SAS AL NIKHAB UNDER ARTY FIRE -- THEY THINK IT'S CHEMICAL.	
202300	SHIFT CHANGE. OUTSTANDING ACTIONS: -- ANSWER J3 CREW ATTACK RESPONSE INQUIRY -- SEE IF CPT FRENCH CAN ATTEND MEETING TOMORROW (DON'T TELL HIM UNTIL ABOUT 1700) -- GET BOON CDR STOKES TO COME OVER BETWEEN 1300 AND 1500	LDC CLOSED

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201700	CPT PLUME CALLED. HAVING TROUBLE WITH PROCESSING SAMPLES. NEEDS TO GET WITH FMIB AND CPT FRENCH AND GET THE DETAILS WORKED OUT. PLANS ON BEING HERE TOMORROW MORNING (LEAVING DHARRAN ABOUT 0430).	
201710	LTC MERRYMAN CALLED. REPORT FROM ARCENT FORWARD (LNO W/NAC): CZECH RECON, DS TO FRENCH, REPORT "DETECTED GA/G8" AND THAT HAZARD IS FLOWING DOWN FROM FACTORY/STORAGE BOMBED IN IRAQ. PREDICTABLY, THIS HAS BECOME/IS GOING TO BECOME A PROBLEM.	INFORMED C3IC, CAT DIR, J2. ASKED ARCENT (CPT WAGDALT) FOR MORE DETAILS. ASKED SOCCENT TO SEE WHAT THEY COULD DO TO HELP.
201815	<p>CALLLED CPT JONES, S-3 FMIB AND ARRANGED FOR A 1600 MEETING WITH HIM (HERE) TOMORROW TO NAIL DOWN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- CHEM UNIT ATTACHMENT -- SAMPLE FLOW 	
201900	CPT MURPHY DROPPED OFF TEXT (AND DISC) OF CCHC PLAN FOR CHEM ATTACK/CONTAMINATION RESPONSE AT MODA. THIS WAS INFO REQUESTED BY LTC SILVERNAIL TO ANSWER A J3 INQUIRY.	
202147	SCUD ALERT. 2 MISSILES LAUNCHED FROM SOUTHERN IRAQ, HEADED JUBAYL - DHARRAN DIRECTION, INITIAL RESULTS: 4 PATRIOTS FIRED, 2 SCUDS KILLED IN THE AIR (UNCONFIRMED)	GAVE WARNING ORDER TO EQ CMDT
202200	THIRD MISSILE SUSPECTED, VIC DHARRAN. 5 PATRIOTS FIRED -- 3 CONFIRMED KILLS (BELIEVE 1 SCUD KILLED TWICE)	FOLLOW-UP: THIRD SCUD KILLED IN THE AIR
202230	ALL CLEAR ISSUED FOR DHARRAN AND RIYADH AREAS. IMPACT AT DHARRAN ASSESSED AS BE	GAVE ALL CLEAR TO HQ CMDT
202240	(ARAMCO REPORT) RAS AL MISHAB UNDER ARTY FIRE -- THEY THINK IT'S CHEMICAL.	
202330	<p>SHIFT CHANGE. OUTSTANDING ACTIONS:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- ANSWER J3 CHEM ATTACK RESPONSE INQUIRY -- SEE IF CPT FRENCH CAN ATTEND MEETING TOMORROW (WON'T NEED HIM UNTIL ABOUT 1700) -- GET SQDN CDR STOKES TO COME OVER BETWEEN 1300 AND 1500 	LOG CLOSED

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INCIDENTS		
TIME	INCIDENT	LOCATION
210001	SHIFT CHANGE-MAJ POOLESON, CPT BERING ASSIGNED BUTT. OUTSTANDING ACTIONS: --ANSWER JS CHEMICAL ATTACK RESPONSE INQUIRY --SEE IF CPT FRENCH CAN ATTEND MEETING 221700. --GET BOOK FOR STORES TO COME OVER BETWEEN 1300 AND 1300	LOC OPENED
210042	BOLD ALERT AREA AT RISK C,D,E LAUNCH 30M7E	
210044	2ND LAUNCH AAR C,D,E	
210045	3RD LAUNCH AAR C,D,E	COL PHILLIPS AND ONE OF HIS STAFF CALLED DURING THIS ALERT & INQUIRED THEN BOTH HE HAD INCIDENTS GOING AND HE HAD NO TIME TO TALK.
210048	4TH LAUNCH AAR C,D,E	
210050	5TH LAUNCH AAR C,D,E FROM ELWATT	
210052	6TH LAUNCH AAR B,C,D,E.. 2 LARGE EXPLOSIONS ESCOM	
210054	SALDI RP REPORT EXPLOSIONS VIC STAFF ANNEX BRIT LMO REPORT ALIBUST. EXPLOSION 2 BLOCKS WEST OF ULAYA REPORTED BY RPS.	
210107C	WEDA FILTER SWITCHED FROM L28 TO L27.	
210108	CONTACTED CENTAF TO ACTIVATE ESCOM TEAMS ULAYA HOPPS (INDOOR, HOPPA OUTDOOR)	DIRECTOR ADVISED CALLS MADE AS REQUIRED.
210108	BLAST BOOK CLOSED PROBLEM GETTING SALDI OIC CPT PANGS TO UNDERSTAND AIRLOCK	
210110	AIRLOCK FUNCTIONING.	
210112	ETC PLASKETT/CCMC-NSC DEPLOYING M-B ALARMS.	
210140	NO CONFIRMATION OF NSC. RADIO PASSED TO CCMC-NSC TEAM AT WEDA WITH OTHER RADIO AT CCMC-TRANSPORTATION. INDIRECT COMM ESTABLISHED BETWEEN CCMC-NSC TEAM AND JOC VIA CCMC-TRANSPORTATION.	
210150	MAJ MATHEIS/ARCENT-NSC CALLED AN "ALL CLEAR" AT ESCOM VILLAGE.	
210210	PER BRITISH LMO(CDR LEIGHTON), OIC CALLED "ALL CLEAR FOR BRIT AREA."	
210215	SPACECOM CALLED A BOLD ALERT. CANCELED WITHIN 3 MINUTES	
210216	MAJ RICHARDSON/CENTAF INDICATED ALL CLEAR FOR CENTAF AREAS. SHE WAS NOT SURE CENTAF HAD OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR RITADH AREA. NEED TO WORK THIS ISSUE. SPECT CLINE CALLED HE IS UNDER THE UNDERSTANDING THAT NO ONE SHOULD CHECK OUTSIDE THEIR COMPARTS AS ASSETS ARE TOO LIMITED TO CHECK A LARGER AREA.	NEED ADEQUATE ESCOM TEAMS TO CHECK CRITICAL ZONES IN THE RITADH AREA. LTC MERTMAN WILL ACCEPT THE RITADH ESCOM RISKING SHE WILL HAVE A MINIMUM OF 2 YEARS PLUS THE ESCOM TEAM AVAILABLE ON CALL AT ALL TIMES
210217	REQUESTED NSC TO ESCOM ULAYA BLAST AREA	

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210340	LAST RIYADH LOCATION (VIC. ULATA) REPORTED BY COMB-SEC TO BE ALL CLEAR. JOC DIRECTOR DECLARED "ALL CLEAR" FOR RIYADH.	
210343	NOTIFIED CPT FANAS HE ADVISED US THAT BOTH FILTER SYSTEMS ARE GOOD ONE IS AT 972 THE OTHER AT 1002 AS TESTED BY MANUFACTURER. HE DOES NOT WANT TO SWITCH FILTER BANDS. HE WOULD LIKE LTC 6 TO CONTACT HIM IN THE MORNING ABOUT USING AIRLOCK. HE SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE EASY TO DO, BUT IT ISN'T.	
210430	TURNED IN SUGGESTED INPUT TO CIRC BRIEF	
210520	1LT O'BRIEN REPORTED THAT 1 ST 160TH AND 5TH SFG REG PERSONNEL HAVE NOT DETECTED NBC AGENTS IN THE VICINITY OF ETOC.	
210521	LTC STONE/JOC-AIR DEFENSE INDICATED THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN AS MANY AS 17 IRAGI ROCKET TRACKS TOWARD RIYADH, AS DETECTED BY THE PATRIOT BATTERIES.	
210524	SOLD ALERT WEST IRAG (UNCONFIRMED)	
210544	SOLD ALERT CANCELED	
210620	PH GAVE LOCATION OF SOLD IMPACT AS APPROX 1 MILE NORTH OF ULATA.	
210630	GEN BELIKAR CAME IN AND REVIEWED PG REQUIREMENT. AS THERE IS NO CHEM USE ANYWHERE WE STILL ARE AT A LOW LEVEL OF THREAT. THERE IS NO NEED TO BEGIN AT THIS TIME. TSP WILL NOT BE COMING IT HAS FAILED PRODUCTION QUALITY TESTING.	
210721	SOLD ALERT WESTERN IRAG (UNCONFIRMED) CANCELED 0720	
210721	ALERT CANCELED	
210838	REG COMING BY AIRBACIS II SAYING THEY ARE BRING A GROUP OF 4+ PEOPLE ADVISED MAJ BEVING DON'T SEND A GROUP WE ALREADY TOLD THEM NOW MANY WE WOULD EXCEPT. I ALSO ADVISED THAT OTHER SYSTEMS SHOULD BE LEAVING THERE AROUND THE 23.	
211145	POSSIBLE SOLD ALERT	
211150	SOLD ALERT CANCELED	
211155	CHANGE OVER COMPLETE. MAJ JARREN/CPT GIBSON/ASST ASSUME DUTIES. OUTSTANDING ACTIONS: ** EMERGENCY ACTION PROCEDURES TO SOLD ALERT/POSSIBLE CHEM ATTACK	
211245	MAJ BEVING, WDA, CALLED RE: DEPLOYMENT OF 810 DET TRAPS. MAJ ARBACIS II FIELDING TEAM. THEY ARE WORKING ON PROVIDING US EVERYTHING WE WANT THE WAY WE WANT IT.	
211430	INQRT CLINE CALLED. WANTED TO KNOW THE PLAN FOR OFF-BASE RECON/DETECTION, WHO IS RESP FOR RAPID RESPONSE TO IMPACT SITES?	
211540	RECEIVED REPORT FROM FRENCH (ND (E) MAJ): FRENCH UNIT DETECTORS NEAR ANNO STORAGE PAC AT ETOC ALERTED, AND DUE TO FREN SOLD ACTIVITY THEY WERE NERVOUS. CHECKS WERE CALLED WHO REPORTED TRACE QUANTITY OF TARMIN, SONAR, AND THERITE (DI) WHICH WAS CAUSED BY FALLOUT FROM BOMBING OF IRAGI CV STORAGE/WEAPON SITES.	BRIEFED LTC 6
211600	MEETING WITH CPT JONES, S-3 FHO... CPT PLUM AND WINDL. COORDINATED DETAILS OF THE CHEM CO (810 DETECTION) ATTACHMENT TO FHO AND CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT.	SEE MFR

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22 January 1991		NBC DESK LOG	
TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION	
220001	MAJ FOGLESON, CPT SERINO ASSUMED DUTY		
220047	AS REQUESTED BY CPT G., C3I TEAM CHIEF WAS CONTACTED ABOUT THE DEATH OF A CZECH CHEMICAL SOLDIER. OTHER TEAM BEING AWARE THAT THE SOLDIER DIED OF NATURAL CAUSES, NEITHER THE TEAM CHIEF, THE US GROUND DESK OFFICER, NOR THE SAUDI GROUND DESK OFFICER HAVE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. US GROUND DESK OFFICER IS PURSUING ADDITIONAL INFO.		
220343	SCUD LAUNCH AAR C.D.E	ERC CALLED	
220344	2ND LAUNCH AAR C.D.E	CHECKED PM	
220351	EXPLOSIONS REPORTED ULAYA AREA AND MODA AREA		
220358	POSSIBLE IMPACT MODA OFFICER'S CLUB ON KING ABDUL AZIZ.	ADVISED TEAM CHIEF HE DOES NOT WANT A TEAM OUT YET.	
220404	TEAM AT ULAYA READY WHEN REQUIRED.	TEAM CHIEF ADVISED	
220412	ADVISED BY SOC DESK ABOUT 50 PEOPLE ON ROOF LOOKING AROUND WITHOUT MOPP.	ADVISED TEAM CHIEF RECOMMENDED HE SEND SECURITY TO CLEAR ROOF.	
220413	DIRECTOR REQUESTED TEAM TO CHECK ULAYA AREA AND MODA OCLUB FOR REPORTED IMPACT.	NOTIFIED CPT MURPHY (ERC)	
220423	CALLED CENTAF TO DETERMINE IF THEY KNEW OF ANY IMPACTS IN THEIR AREA, THEY STATED THEY THINK THERE WAS ONE JUST OFF THE BASE AT THE HOSPITAL, BUT THEY WERE ORDERED BY COL SANDERSON NOT TO DO ANY CHECKS OFF POST IT IS NOT THEIR JOB.		
220432	SCUD ALERT CANCELED.		
220446	ARCENT REPORTS STILL CHECKING CLEAR SO FAR.	DIRECTOR BRIEFED	
220453	ARCENT ADVISED THEY ARE CLEAR STARTING UNMASKING PROCEDURE.		
220508	NEGATIVE NBC AGENT FINDINGS BY CCEC-NBC RECON TEAM. "ALL CLEAR" ANNOUNCED BY JOC DIRECTOR.		

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231620	SFC WELCH (SOCCENT) CALLED TO SEE IF WE COULD HELP HIM WITH HIS LDS PROBLEM HE SURFACED YESTERDAY. HE'S GOT ONE OF HIS 2 REQUIRED (OBTAINED FROM CENTAF) BUT ITS SEATER IS INOP. SGT CLINE HAS NO MORE TO GIVE RIGHT NOW BUT HAS A NUMBER ON ORDER.	
231805	CPT URBAN, FORSCOM, RELAYED A PROBLEM WITH AIRLIFT OF DETECTION UNIT AND EQUIP. CAP ON THE SHORT TONS (S/T) WILL ONLY PERMIT 4 TO 5 TEAMS IN THE 1ST INCREMENT. THEY ARE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE — JUST TOO MANY COMPETING HIGH PRIORITY DEMANDS.	SEE NOTE IN BIO FOLDER.
232055	FOUND A NOTE FROM COL DUNN THAT HE LEFT AT 2045. WE WERE SUPPOSED TO MEET AT 2030. [HE WENT TO HALLWAY DESK AND NOT THE JOC DESK!]	
232100	CENTAF CALLED TO PASS YET ANOTHER CZECH UNIT CHEMICAL REPORT. THEIR PEOPLE IN THE SAME AREA CHECKED IT OUT AND FOUND NOTHING. TOLD THEM TO DISREGARD ANY REPORTS COMING FROM THE CZECHS.	
232200	SCUD ALERT. CANCELED 2212.	
232300	SCUD ALERT. 4 CONFIRMED LAUNCHES. RIYADH AND EAST COAST AT RISK. 4 TOWARDS SAUDI ARABIA, A 5TH CONFIRMED TOWARD ISRAEL. IMPACT 15M N RIYADH — WINDS: N	2301 — HQ CMT NOTIFIED
232345	ALL AREAS REPORTED NO AGENT NO IMPACT REPORT AROUND ULAYA. MAJ JANSEN RECOMMENDED ALL CLEAR. ALL CLEAR DECISION MADE BY DIRECTOR.	
232355	SHIFT CHANGE OVER	LOG CLOSED

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231620	SFC WELCH (SOCCENT) CALLED TO SEE IF WE COULD HELP HIM WITH HIS LDS PROBLEM HE SURFACED YESTERDAY. HE'S GOT ONE OF HIS 2 REQUIRED (OBTAINED FROM CENTAF) BUT ITS HEATER IS INOP. SGT CLINE HAS NO MORE TO GIVE RIGHT NOW BUT HAS A NUMBER ON ORDER.	
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232055	FOUND A NOTE FROM COL DUNN THAT HE LEFT AT 2045. WE WERE SUPPOSED TO MEET AT 2030. [HE WENT TO HALLWAY DESK AND NOT THE JOC DESK!]	
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232200	SCUD ALERT. CANCELED 2212.	
232300	SCUD ALERT. 4 CONFIRMED LAUNCHES. RIYADE AND EAST COAST AT RISK. 4 TOWARDS SAUDI ARABIA, A 5TH CONFIRMED TOWARD ISRAEL. IMPACT 15M N RIYADE -- WINDS: N	2301 -- HQ CDDT NOTIFIED

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26 January 1991		NBC DESK LOG	
TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION	
260001	MAJ FOGLESON, CPT SERINO ASSUMED DUTY	LOG OPENED	
260010	COL. POTTS CALLED WILL BE IN TO SEE MAJ JANSEN AT 1300. WILL CALL FOR A GUIDE WHEN HE GETS TO THE BUILDING.		
260011	RECEIVED ALL CLEAR FROM EOD ON STRIKE SITE. I AM CONCERNED THAT WE ARE CALLING ALL CLEAR PRIOR TO CHECKING IMPACT SITES.	BRIEFED DIRECTOR WAS ADVISED THERE HAS BEEN NO CHEMICAL USE AND HE WILL NOT KEEP PERSONNEL IN MOPP UNTIL ALL IMPACTS CHECKED.	
260035	INFORMED BY BRITISH LNO THAT THERE WAS AN IMPACT ON THE CIVIL AFFAIRS BUILDING ABOUT 3-4 BLOCKS FROM MODA.		
260045	RECEIVED A CALL FROM MSG BLUE HE HAD A QUESTION REF DUST COVERS FOR FILTERS AND HEADS UP ON NEWS REQUEST ON RCA.	ADVISED WE SHOULD NOT TALK ABOUT RCA TO PRESS AT ALL. ADVISED LTC SMITH PAO OF CALL.	
260205	INQUIRY FROM BG NEAL - ORIGINATOR NAVY - ON THE NBC HAZARD FROM MIXING CRUDE OIL WITH MUSTARD, AND ALLOWING THE SOLUTION TO REMAIN AFLOAT EITHER AS IS OR BURNING. CALL MADE TO CRDEC SDO REQUESTING CALL BACK FROM PIE. KEY CONCERNS FOR ADDRESSING WITH CRDEC ARE EFFECTIVE CONCENTRATIONS, ENVIRONMENTAL STABILITY, AND BREATHING HAZARD IF THE SOLUTION IS BURNING. NAVCENT IS REPORTEDLY BEING TASKED TO OBTAIN A SAMPLE FOR ANALYSIS. QUERY PASSED TO CRDEC-PIE/CPT OBERHOLTZER AT 0315 HRS.	BACKGROUND ON WWII OIL INCIDENT REF US SHIP CONTAINING ED SUNK IN ITALY. CREW TOOK DELAYED BURNS THEY WERE MILDER THAN NORMALLY SEEN WITH E. DEATHS RESULTED FROM INHALATION OF VAPORS GOING UNDIAGNOSED DUE TO THE SECRECY OF THE SHIP'S CARGO.	
260210	CONVERSATION WITH MAJ NELSON/PM NBC DEFENSE. SEE CONVERSATION RECORD.		
260330	SCUD LAUNCH AAR C,D,E ONE IMPACT VIC DEAHAN		
260345	SCUD ALERT CANCELED FOR RIYADH		
260500	SCUD ALERT LAUNCH AAR C,D,E CANCELED 0503		

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27 January 1991 NBC DESK LOG		
TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION
270001	MAJ FOGLESON, CPT SERINO ASSUMED DUTY	LOG OPENED
270100	PASSED INFO ON COINCIDENCE OF "CHEM DECON. SITES" AND RIYADH/DHAHRAN SCUD LAUNCH POINTS TO J2/GROUND.	
270130	PER CPT OBERHOLTZER, CRDEC/PIE, SUBJ: OIL-MUSTARD SOLUTION. SOME KEY POINTS: MUSTARD WILL DISSOLVE IN CRUDE OIL; WITH LONG TERM STABILITY OF SOLUTION. MUSTARD VAPOR HAZARD STILL PRESENT WHEN IN SOLUTION. CAN USE CAM TO DETECT MUSTARD VAPOR. DON'T USE M-8 PAPER. BURNING PRODUCES DECOMPOSITION OF MUSTARD AND MORE MUSTARD VAPORS.	
270145	PER CRDEC/PIE, MR RICHARD LOWMAN, AMC CHEM LAR WAS MEDICALLY EVACUATED OUT OF THE AOR FOR CHEST PAINS.	
270150	CPT DAVIS, ARCENT-NBC SAID A MESSAGE IS BEING SENT TO SUBORDINATE UNITS TO ASK IF THEY STILL WANT THE M-41 MASK FIT/VALIDATE SYSTEM. HE THINKS THEY PROBABLY WON'T WANT IT NOW (DUE TO OPERATIONAL SITUATION). PASSED STATUS OF M-41 TO CRDEC/PIE.	
270515	ANBACIS II NBC-2 TEST SENT VIA FAX TO DNA. SCENARIO IS 5 MIG-23 FLOGGERS WITH ED BOMBS TO RIYADH. RECEIVED RETURN PLOT IN UTM COORDINATES VIA FAX FROM DNA AT 0525 HRS; LAT/LONG PLOT OF SAME TO BE FORWARDED.	
270925	COMPLETED TWO ANBACIS II TESTS. THE FIRST WAS 5 MIG-23S WITH ED TO RIYADH. THE SECOND WAS 4 FROGS WITH GB TO HAFAR AL BATHIN. CITIES ARE SUPERIMPOSED ON THE PLOTS.	
271130	SHIFT CHANGE: MAJ JANSEN/CPT GITSCHLAG ASSUME DUTY. ACTIONS BROUGHT FORWARD: -- CINC RCA DECISION PACKET -- RCA/TCM MSG ANSWER TO ARCENT (REFS IN RCA FOLDER) -- EOD INFO MSG TO ARCENT -- GET A HANDLE ON PLUME/MINOR -- BIO DETECT UNIT ATTACHMENT/FIELDING - MSG TO ARCENT DETAILING WHO/WHAT/WHEN/AND HOW - MSG TO COMPONENTS DESCRIBING SYSTEM/HOW THEY INTERFACE W/IT - MSG CLARIFYING SAMPLING	OUT FOR COORD W/CCJ3-O DRAFT -- ADMIN

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31 January 1991 NBC DESK LOG		
TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION
310001	MAJ FOGLESON, CPT SERINO ASSUME DUTY	LOG OPENED
310200	DISCUSSIONS WITH MAJORS SUTTON AND NELSON, PM NBC DEFENSE, APG, MD - SEE CONVERSATION RECORD.	
310215	PER CPT SCHIELE, BG ORTON MAINTAINS THAT BATTLE DRESS OVERGARMENT DOCTRINE IS UNCHANGED (AS OF 30 JAN 91). ALSO, BDOOS IN CPOG WRAPPERS HAVE BDO TIMELINES REGARDLESS OF PACKAGE.	
310225	CALL FROM CPT MURPHY, SUBJ: CIPROFLOXACIN. IS CIPROFLOXACIN A PENICILLIN-BASED DRUG? FILE CHECKED - DATA NOT OBSERVED. ASKED CPT H. TO CHECK WITH THE SURGEON.	
310310	CPT FRENCH/J2 SAID HE HAS MINOR INDICATIONS THAT IRAQ WILL USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE NEXT 24 HOURS; POSSIBLY IN THE NORTHEAST.	
310341	REQUEST FROM PAO TO PROVIDE A SPOKES PERSON FOR A PRESS BACKGROUND BRIEF. LTC SIVERNAIL NEEDS TO CONTACT LTC GALLAGHER 479-1234 X2801.	0735 0845 1056
310731	NEED TO GET A HOLD OF NATICK AND INSURE THAT THE DOCTRINE IS 14 & 6 FOR CPOG AND 22 & 24 EXTENDABLE TO 30 FOR BDO. SMSGT CLINE IS SURE BY THE MSG THAT IS THE PRESENT STATUS AND I AGREE, BUT THE MSG COULD BE READ OTHERWISE.	NEED TO INFORM ALL COMPONENTS UPON DETERMINATION.
310746	SMSGT CLINE WANTS TO KNOW IF HE CAN SEND EXPIRED CPOGS TO CONUS TO USE FOR TRAINING SUITS. ASK LTC WIDEMAN HE IS CHECKING.	NEED TO GET THIS OUT TO COMPONENTS WHEN WE GET AN ANSWER.
310804	COL WYATT J4 ADVISED TO HANDLE LIKE ANY ITEM SEND THEM IN THROUGH SUPPLY SYSTEM. IF CENTAF WANTS TO USE THEM FOR TRAINING OKAY. IF CLEARLY MARKED FOR TRAINING ONLY.	SOCCENT WELCH MARCENT CPL JAMES ARCENT CPT KASSES CENTAF SMSGT CLINE ALL NOTIFIED
310913	CPT FRENCH BROUGHT IN FACT PAPER ON POSSIBLE CHEM USE IN THE NEAR TERM. HE IS STORING IT IN HIS OFFICE FOR US TO READ.	

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1 FEBRUARY 1991		NBC DESK LOG
TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION
010001	MAJ FOGLESON/CPT SERINO ASSUME DUTY.	
010005	DNA COMMUNICATIONS CENTER CONDUCTED A SECURE COMMO TEST.	
010007	CPT MURPHY REPORTED THAT THE CENTCOM SURGEON INDICATED THAT CIPROFLOXACIN IS NOT PENICILLIN-BASED.	
010031	MSG FROM TRANSCOM TO CAT REF CDE ON AIRCRAFT. THEY WANT ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE ON PERSONNEL DEPLOYING WITH CDE.	CALLED CPT SCHIELE. HE WILL ADVISE.
010230	RECEIVED NEWS QUERY FROM PAO TERU TEAM CHIEF, TOLD THEM WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ANSWER MOST OF THE QUESTIONS AND WOULD NOT MEET 0700 DEADLINE. TEAM CHIEF OKAYED NOT MEETING DEADLINE.	
010440	ANBACTS II TEST #5. SCENARIO IS ONE BATTALION VOLLEY 122MM ROCKET ATTACK WITH GB APPROX 25 KM SOUTH OF KUWAIT ELBOW. 15 MINUTE TURN-AROUND FROM DNA.	
010630	RECEIVED AN ANSWER TO NEWS QUERY PREPARED BY THE REAR. WOULD NOT CLEAR IT UNTIL LTC S SEES IT.	
010655	RECEIVED BIO MSG FROM COL GAIN, DISTRIBUTED IT TO J2 AND SG FOR COORDINATION.	
010701	SSG FORD BROUGHT IN LIST OF EXTRA ITEMS. CALL CENTAF THEN SOCCENT. SOCCENT SAYS THEY THINK THEY CAN USE IT ALL. WILL CALL.	
010740	EOD MSG BACK ARCENT NON-CONCURRED BASED ON CAM. CALLED THEM ASKED WHAT METHODS THEY WILL USE TO CONFIRM POSITIVE WITH M256. I WAS TOLD M8 ALARM & PAPER. I ASKED IF THEY HAD M18 KITS AVAILABLE, BEING EOD THEY SHOULD. THEY WILL CALL BACK.	DO HAVE M18A1 KITS AVAILABLE.
010855	LTC HOLLAND REPORTED THAT THE SAUDI (MODA) MFS STILL DO NOT HAVE THE CHEMICAL GEAR PROMISED BY SAUDI NBC. LT LIMELLIN IS DUE-IN TODAY AT 1100HRS. SAUDI CDR ABDULLAH, PER LTC S., WILL GET INVOLVED IF NECESSARY TO MOVE ACTION.	
011100	PER DISCUSSION WITH LT LIMELLIN, 30 SETS OF CHEM SUITS, GLOVES, AND BOOTS WERE PASSED BY HIM TO THE SAUDI (MODA) MP BN O/A 29 JAN; SPECIFICALLY TO A NCO UNDER LTC SHENAFI. INFORMATION PASSED TO LTC HOLLAND.	

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021130	SHIFT CHANGE. CPT GITSCHLAG AT EMBASSY. MAJ JANSEN ON DUTY. ACTIONS BROUGHT FORWARD: -- BIO DETECTION - SYSTEM DESCRIPTION MSG (AWAITING CCSG COORDINATION) - SAMPLING PROTOCOL & DISPOSITION MSG -- BDO ISSUE FOR ARCENT	
021210	CALLED MAJ MCLEAN (JOPES REAR) TO DISCUSS BDO ISSUE. HE ADVISED THAT 130K BDOS ARE ENROUTE FROM KOREA VIA AIR AND THAT THOSE FROM EUCOM ARE ENROUTE BY SEALIFT. ADVISED HIM THAT THEIR ASSESSMENT OF WHAT WAS CRITICAL TO ARCENT WAS NOT THEIR CALL. HE STATED CPT BERRY MADE THE DECISION AND THAT ARCENT HAD NOT INDICATED THE PRIORITY OF BDOS IN THE TPFDL FOR THE SUPPORTING CINCS. ARCENT CAN UTILIZE ITS DAILY ALLOCATION AS IT SEES FIT. HE PROVIDED EUCOM POC (LTC KLOEKE) PH # AV 314-430-7408. WINTEL MSG #s 264, 337, AND 355 PERTAINING TO BDOS FOR ARCENT HAVE BEEN ISSUED SINCE MSG # 224.	ADVISED ARCENT NBC OF RESULTS OF PHONE CON WITE REAR.
021320	COL BALES MET WIFE MAJ JANSEN TO DISCUSS TAMLs.	
021345	BIO SYSTEM DESCRIPTION MSG TAKEN TO SJS FOR CCCS RELEASE.	
021415	CPT GITSCHLAG RETURNED FROM EMBASSY TRG MSN AND REPORTED TRAINING 75 AMCITS. SEVERAL CHILDREN WERE TOO YOUNG TO BE FITTED WITH A MASK. ANOTHER CLASS IS SCHEDULED FOR 040900 FEB 91.	
021645	PILOT REPORTS STRIKING TARGET AT 290055N0474846E RESULTED IN CLOUD ORANGE IN COLOR RISING TO 6000 FT. NO ANS AT CRDEC. PASSED REPORT TO DAMO-SWC (MAJ LOPEZ) AND ASKED, "WHAT COULD CAUSE THIS EFFECT?" HE WILL CALL BACK.	
021700	CLOUD IS MOST LIKELY RED FUMING NITRIC ACID. INFO FROM DA ON-CALL CHEMIST INDICATES THAT NO KNOWN CHEMICAL AGENT IS ORANGE IN COLOR.	INFO PASSED TO SMSGT CLINE CENTAF
021700	REF 1645 ENTRY -- MAJ LOPEZ CALLED BACK: NO KNOWN CHEM AGENTS CAUSE AN ORANGE CLOUD. COULD BE LIQUID FUEL FOR SCUD MISSILE (RED FUMING NITRIC ACID).	
021740	REF: RQST FOR INFO FROM CRDEC. PASSED RQST TO ARCENT FWD (CPT WAGDALT) FOR INFO ON CZECH CML UNIT BIO DET/SAMPLER ("ASP" DET/SAMPLER ON "UAZ469RJK RECON VEH.")	
021945	LT SHEA, CRDEC CALLED WITE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS CPT GITSCHLAG POSED ON SHIPMENT OF 25 CAMS. THEY ARE LEAVING THE UK MONDAY OR TUESDAY, AND SHOULD ARRIVE IN DHAHRAN EARLY NEXT WEEK.	

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04 FEBRUARY 1991 NBC DESK LOG		
TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION
040001	MAJ FOGLESON, CPT SERINO ASSUME DUTY	LOG OPENED
040300	BRIEF TO MAJ(P) SRAY, JOC J2-LNO, SUBJ: POTENTIAL CRITICALITY OF WET SAND. BASED ON INFO PASSED BY J2 AT 032330 TURNOVER, KEY CONCERNS SURFACED TO MAJ SRAY. HE CONCURS, AND HAS BRIEFED J2-GROUND AND J2-IMAGERY.	
040512	BIO MSG TO J3	
040615	LT O'REGAN REPORTS GOOD RESULTS WITH ANBACIS II ON 1:50,000 SCALE PLOTTING WITH DNA.	
040702	ANBACIS II TEST #8. SCENARIO IS 4 SCUDS TO HAFAR AL BATEIN; 2 GB AND 2 HD. GB AND HD SCUD SHOTS HAVE LCT50 OF 0.0KM TRIED 2 GB SCUDS WITH 2M BURST TO SAME LOCATION.	
040851	9TH CHEM CALLED THEY WILL HAVE 2 ADDITIONAL XM2s & 5-10 PM-10, SAMPLERS IN COUNTRY BETWEEN WED-FRI. HAVE REPLACED GENERATORS WITH CML HOMELITES. FORMULATING A PLAN TO COVER AREAS IN SOUTH WHILE MOVING XM21 TEAMS FURTHER NORTH. HOPE THIS FITS GAME PLAN.	
040950	ACCORDING TO STEVE WHITE, MODELER AT DNA, WE'RE GIVING HIM (REALISTIC) SCENARIOS. DEVELOPMENT IS ONGOING.	
041130	SHIFT CHANGE.	
041143	WAGDALT CALLED: C2 UNIT DOES NOT HAVE BIO CAPABILITY NOR ANY SOVIET RECON VEHICLES	
041600	FIXED ANSWER TO CZECH UNIT ASP (BIO DETECTOR) REQUEST TO CRDEC.	
041630	MAJ WAGNER, ARCENT, CALLED WITH POCS FOR TWO ADDITIONAL BIO DETECTION TEAM LOCATIONS. ALSO DECIDED THAT NEXT FOUR TEAMS FIELDED WILL COVER AN NU'Riyah, AND LOG BASES E, A, AND C.	DETAILS IN BIO FOLDER
041745	MAJ DOUG BOONE, CENTCOM COMBAT ANALYSIS, WILL STOP BY TOMORROW MORNING TO MAKE A COPY OF SOME OF THE CHARTS IN FM 3-6.	
042330	SHIFT CHANGE.	

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05 FEBRUARY 1991		NBC DESK LOG
TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION
050001	MAJ FOGLESON, CPT SERINO ASSUMED DUTY	LOG OPENED
050031	J4 GAVE ME A FAX SENT BY 22 SUPCOM, IT SAYS SUITS CAN BE WORN PAST THE WEAR TIME IT NEEDED. AND THE WEAR TIME IS BASED ON 22-30 DAYS CONTINUOUS WEAR.	CALLED 22ND, NATICK, REAR CALLING SCHOOL.
050315	ANBACIS TEST #9. SCENARIO IS 4 SCUDS WITH GB VIA GROUND BURST TO THE WEST OF HAFAR AL BATAIN, UPWIND, ON A NORTH TO SOUTH IMPACT LINE. DNA PROVIDED 4 PLOTS ON 4 PAGES IN 30 MINUTES. WORKING TO PROVIDE 4 PLOTS ON 1 PAGE. THEY'RE BUILDING THE DATA BASE - AND SAVING US TIME - AS WE PROVIDE SCENARIOS. YESTERDAY, ONE SHOT TO THE SAME LOCATION TOOK 2 HOURS. ANBACIS II IS CLEARLY DEVELOPMENTAL.	
050320	RECEIVED XVIII ABN CORPS CHEM UNIT LOCATIONS FAX FROM ARCENT. HAVE ALL CURRENT LOCATIONS EXCEPT 2D CHEM BN. ALL CHEM UNITS ON THE GROUND IN THE AOR.	
050530	MAJ MATHIS CALLED WITH SAMPLING TEAM POCS	REC OF PHONE CON PLACED IN FOLDER
050935	LTC S SENT FAX TO DNA REF ANBACIS II PROBLEMS.	
051050	ARCENT CALLED THEY HAVE A POSITIVE FIELD TEST FOR ANTHRAX AT DEHERAN. THE AREA WAS DOWNWIND OF SHEEP PENS. MEDICS BELIEVE THIS IS A FALSE POS. SAMPLES TAKEN TO LAB FOR TESTING.	
051130	TALKED TO SFC BELL 22ND SUPCOM REF BDO EXTENSION BEYOND 30 DAYS. THEY ADVISED MSG WAS BASED ON "COMMON SENSE AND HAD GOTTEN NOTHING THAT ADVISED THEM IT WAS SAFE. TOLD THEM ABOUT 14 DAY BDO BEING A 22 DAY BDO, AND THAT A MSG WOULD BE OUT STOPPING THE MIRACLE BDO THEORY.	
051130	SHIFT CHANGE.	
051340	RECEIVED A FAX RESPONSE TO LTC. S COMMENTS FROM DNA.	
051405	MAJ JONES, FMIB CALLED WITH FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFO ON POS SAMPLES. LAST NIGHT (041900), THE TEAM AT AL KEOBAR CAME UP WITH A POS SAMPLE FOR ANTHRAX. 2ND SAMPLE SAME LOCATION WAS ALSO POS.	

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051405 (CON'T)	SAMPLES TAKEN WEST OF THE SITE AND UPWIND (NORTH) OF THE SITE WERE NEGATIVE. 3RD SAMPLE AT SITE WAS POSITIVE. ALL SAMPLES WERE TAKEN TO THE NFL -- WILL CALL WITH RESULTS. AGAIN, USE CAUTION DUE TO PROXIMITY TO THE SHEEP PEN. CONTINUOUS MONITORING AT THE SITE SINCE 0800 HAS RESULTED IN NEGATIVE SAMPLES. ALSO DISCUSSED PRIORITY FOR ADDITIONAL LINES GOING IN TO FMIB (HE STILL NEEDS TO MSG REQUEST PRIORITY TO ARGENT G6 B4 WE CAN GET INVOLVED). ALSO -- 18 SOLDIERS AND 6 HUMOVs HAVE ARRIVED IN 2ND INCREMENT. LOOKING FOR SAMPLERS AND REST OF MISSION EQUIP PALLETS. WILL DISCUSS NEXT TEAM LOCATIONS LATER.	43
051420	CW3 LEE, MARCENT ADVISED THAT FOUR FOX VEHICLES ARRIVED ON 04 FEB AND THE FINAL VEHICLE IS DUE IN ON 6 FEB. THE COORD TO BRING THE TWO FOX VEE FOR ARGENT WOULD HAVE CAUSED AN ADDITIONAL DELAY IN MARCENT RECEIVING ITS VEE AND HAS FALLEN THRU.	ARGENT WAS ALREADY AWARE OF THE SITUATION
051645	SFC CLARK ADVISED THAT J2 REAR (CPT LEWIS) BRIEFED THE DCINC THAT IRAQI CORPS COMMANDERS NOW HAVE CHEM RELEASE AUTHORITY. ALSO BRIEFED THAT IRAQI III CORPS CDR TRIED TO OBTAIN CHEM RELEASE USE TO ASSIST IN DISENGAGEMENT AT AL KAFJI. INFO BASED ON SIGINT.	CW2 CATTERA, CCJ2 CONFIRMED BELIEF THAT IRAQI CORPS CDRS HAVE REL AUTH. HE THINKS III CORPS CDR TRIED TO CONTACT CML BN/5TH MECH FOR DECON SPT IF US USED CML SINCE THIS CML BN HAS NO OFF CAP.
051830	ASKED LTC JONES, JCS, TO SEE IF THE CANADIANS WOULD BE WILLING TO GIVE UP ANOTHER 500 CAMS (NOW THAT OUR CONTRACT HA BEEN LET -- THEY WILL BE REPLACED). ALSO, IF OFFERED, WE WILL TAKE ANOTHEER 26 FOXES FROM GERMANY.	
051840	COL REED, DCSOPS, SAID THAT THE OVERGARMENT WEAR LIFE EXTENSION LTR WILL BE RELEASED, BUT OUT OF DCSLOG ALONE. LTG REIMER TALKED W/ LTG YEOSOCK AND LTG Y SAID HE WAS WELL AWARE OF THE SITUATION AND DIDN'T NEED ANY MORE MSG TRAFFIC TO CONFUSE THE ISSUE. COL REED UNDERSTANDS THAT THAT IS FAR FROM TRUE. EXPLAINED OUR FRUSTRATION WITH SUBORDINATE COMMANDS ISSUING SEPARATE (SOME BAD) GUIDANCE IN THE VOID OF OFFICIAL GUIDANCE/CLARIFICATION FROM THE APPROPRIATE SOURCE. HE WILL LET US KNOW IF SOMETHING HAPPENS TO DCSLOG RELEASE.	SEE RECORD OF PHONECON FOR ADDITIONAL INFO FROM KATICK.

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12 FEBRUARY 1991		NBC DESK LOG	
TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION	
120001	MAJ FOGLESON, CPT SERINO ASSUME DUTY	LOG OPENED	
120149	LT O'REGAN CALLED WANTED TO KNOW IF HE COULD GET AIR PACKS FOR OIL WELL FIRE. (NO). IF WE WERE WORRIED ABOUT RPG CHEM WEAPONS. (NO). AND THE C2 TOLD THEM THAT OUR NAAK WAS NO GOOD FOR GF. SUSPECT THEY WANT US TO BUY THEIRS		
120225	SCUD ALERT, 0226 LAUNCH AAR ISRAEL. IMPACT 20NM SE TEL AVTV. STATIC IR ALSO OBSERVED VIC AMMAN.	CANCEL 0236	
120257	UNCONFIRMED SCUD ALERT. POSSIBLE LAUNCH FROM SOUTHERN IRAQ. TEAM CHIEF SAID IT WAS A NON-EVENT. CANCELED AT 120301.		
120812	COL GORDINER ASKED MAJ F TO GET WITH PM TO INSURE THEY HAVE NOT CHANGED THE MOPP POLICY AS HE NOTICED MPs NOT GOING TO MOPPA LAST NIGET. CHECKED WITH MAJ MILLS. HE TALKED TO MP SUPERVISOR AT COMPOUND TO INSURE THEY COMPLY. ALSO DISCUSSED: COL G FELT WE SHOULD THINK ABOUT CHANGING POLICY TO KEEP FROM RUNNING OUT OF SUITS. TRIED TO EXPLAIN ON-GOING PROBLEM WITH SUITS. HE WASN'T INTERESTED.	NOTE FOR EEC: NEED ONLY ONE PERSON MAKING CALLS TO NBC DESK FOR ULAYA. COL G SAYS TOO MANY PEOPLE WANDER IN AND OUT DURING ALERTS TO CALL MURPEY.	
121045	ANBACIS II TEST 12	FORM 2 IN FILE	
121130	SHIFT CHANGE. CPT GITSCHLAG ASSUMES DUTY. ACTIONS BROUGHT FORWARD: NONE		
121520	CALLED SGM EATHAN, FORSCOM, REF FURTHER ATTACHMENT OF 9TH CHEM CO (-) TO FMIB. HE WILL SEE HOW FAR CPT URBAN GOT ON THE ACTION AND THEN CALL BACK LATER TODAY.		
121640	MAJ WAGNER, ARCENT CALLED. WONDERED WHY CPT MURPEY (MASK REPAIR FACILITY) CALLED HIM TO DISCUSS A MARINE CORPS/MARCENT ISSUE. (GOOD QUESTION)		
122110	CW3 JAMES. WANTED TO KNOW IF IM21s (WITH THE BIO TEAMS) WERE GOING TO MOVE. ANS: YES -- THEY ARE TO COVER THE ARCENT FORWARD DETECTION SITES (AS MARCENT HAS THEIR S ALREADY).		
122140	DNA CALLED WITH QUESTIONS ABOUT TEST 12 INPUT. PROVIDED THIS MORNING. WILL CALL BACK AFTER MIDNIGHT TO TALK WITH CPT SERINO.		

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21 FEBRUARY 1991		NBC DESK LOG	
TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION	
210001	MAJ FOGLESON, CPT SERINO ASSUME DUTY	LOG OPENED	
210104	CWO JAMES CALLED REF BIO TEAM. HE NEEDS TO KNOW WHEN TEAM IS NO LONGER UNDER HIS CONTROL.	MAJ J PLEASE CALL	
210250	PER DISCUSSION WITH JOC TEAM CHIEF, COL SPARROW/ARCENT OPS CTR TH CHIEF CALLED, SUBJ: FOX VEHICLE DEPLOYMENT FROM GERMANY. COL SPARROW INDICATED THAT ARCENT HAD A CRITICAL REQUIREMENT FOR FOX; NEEDED THEM FROM GERMANY NOW. CDR CHAPMAN SAID LET CENTCOM KNOW SPECIFICS SOONEST, AND IF ASSISTANCE IS REQUIRED. COL SPARROW WILL CALL BACK.		
210305	PER DISCUSSION WITH SSG POCAIGUE/ARCENT NBC, SUBJ: FOX VEHICLES. THERE ARE 9 VEHICLES IN GERMANY READY FOR SHIPMENT VIA AIR. JOPES HAS PUT THE SHIPMENT ON HOLD. ALSO, THERE ARE 5 EACH 490TH CHEM BN PERSONNEL WITH THE VEHICLES. THESE SOLDIERS DEPLOYED TO GERMANY FROM THE AOR TO GET THE VEHICLES, AND THEN BRING THEM BACK TO THE AOR. NOTE: 490TH CHEMICAL BATTALION SUPPORTS ARCENT SUPCOM. ARCENT SUPCOM IS SCHEDULED TO RECEIVE 6 FOX VEHICLES IN FEBRUARY.		
210315	PER LTC BENNETT/J3 PLANS, SUBJ: FOX. THE PROBLEM WITH SHIPPING FOX IS THAT ARCENT AIRLIFT ALLOCATION IS FILLED FOR THE TIME FRAME OF THEIR REQUEST.		
210316	CPT DAVIS ARCENT NBC ADVISED 2 FOX ARE REPORTEDLY GOING TO BE ISSUED TO THE EGYPTIANS. ASK THEM WHY THEY WERE GIVING UP FOX VEH TO EGYPTIANS. THEY SAY THEY WERE DIRECTED BY HIGHER HQ, BUT DON'T KNOW WHO OR WHY.	ISSUES PENDING: AIRLIFT ALLOCATION OF FOX, AND FOX FOR EGYPTIANS.	
210357	REPORTER POOL STORY IN FROM PAO SUGGESTING IRAQI USE OF CYANIDE FILLED RPGS AGAINST U.S. FORCES. PAO MADE REPLY "TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE THERE HAS BEEN NO CHEM USE".		
210405	CPT DAVIS CALLED 2 FOX VEH ARE BEING TURNED OVER TO THE EGYPTIANS FOR USE DURING BREACHING OPS, THEN THEY WILL RETURN TO ARCENT AS FLOATS.	QUESTIONS STILL NOT ANSWERED: WHO WILL CREW WHO AUTHORIZED RELEASE.	

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22 FEBRUARY 1991		NBC DESK LOG	
TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION	
221113	MARCENT LNO ADVISED 2 LAI BN GOT A POSITIVE H READING ON A CAM ON THE KUWAITI BORDER. THEY SENT A FOX OUT AND COULD FIND NO INDICATION OF AGENT. CENTAF (SMSGT CLINE) ALSO ADVISED THAT THEIR SCI HAD INFO THAT IRAQ HAD INITIATED USE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE (BLISTER AGENT) VIC 285640N/473307E. COL MCCLELLAN ALSO CALLED TO SEE IF WE HAD THIS INFO AND I TOLD HIM WE WERE AWARE OF THE REPORT BUT IT WAS A NON SUBSTANTIATED EVENT.	J2 WENT BACK TO MARCENT AND THEY SAID IT WAS A AN UNSUBSTANTIATED REPORT PROVIDED TO THE WORLD VIA SCI NET AND IS BEING DECONFLICTED.	
221130	SHIFT CHANGE. ACTIONS BROUGHT FORWARD: NONE		
221235	RECEIVED FAX FROM DNA ON TESTS 17 A-F. NEEDED TO RESCALE 17A TO CLEAN IT UP. THEY WILL RESEND THAT PORTION LATER.	NOTE: NO PROB WITH FAX OPERATION	
221510	SCUD ALERT. CANCELLED AT 1512.		
221730	CPT MINOR/1LT CORBETT VISITED MAJ J TO DISCUSS BIO DETECTION TEAM OPERATIONS.		
221820	MODA BIO TEAM REPORTED FOR DUTY		
221855	CALLED MAJ WAGNER, ARCENT, AND TOLD HIM TO CANCEL 3RD INCREMENT OF 9TH CHEM CO -- SIMPLY NOT NEEDED.		
221945	CPT SCHEELE CALLED. HE TALKED WITH MR BOYLE REF EOD OF BIO MUNITIONS -- BOYLE REMEMBERED A MOBILE "DEMIL" DEVICE THAT WAS AN AUTOCLAVE, BUT IS SURE THAT SORT OF THING NO LONGER EXISTS. THIS ISSUE WILL REQUIRE MORE RESEARCH.		
222000	MODA BIO TEAM REPORTED NEG FOR A/B ON SAMPLE #12 TEST (221915). THIS WILL BE ONLY TEST TONIGHT (UNLESS DIRECTED) AS ALL TEAMS ARE GOING TO ONE TEST/NIGHT FOR NEXT FEW DAYS.		
222130	PROVIDED INFORMATION TO 1LT AL LIMELIN ON FILTER AND MASKS PER HIS REQUEST.		
222145	CPT DAVIS, ARCENT, CALLED TO SAY THEY ARE TRYING TO STOP THE 3D INCREMENT OF THE 9TH CHEM CO BUT THEY MAY HAVE ALREADY LEFT. STILL GOING TO TRY THOUGH.		
222330	SHIFT CHANGE. ACTIONS BROUGHT FORWARD: NONE.		

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23 FEBRUARY 1991		NBC DESK LOG	
TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION	
231130	SHIFT CHANGE: MAJ JANSEN . ACTIONS BROUGHT FORWARD: NONE.		
231130	REC'D DRAFT ARCENT MSG, SUBJ: DESERT STORM RESTORATION AND REDEPLOYMENT.		
231212	SSGT MURRAY, LOG BASE BASTOGNE. TEST #13 NEG (221830) FOR BOTH.		
231530	FOLLOWING COORD WITH JS POLICY AND J4/7, LTC S PROVIDED FAX OF HQDA MSG DTG 212250 FEB 91 ADVISING ARCENT OF DEPLOYMENT OF ODCSLOG TEAM TO ADVISE ON REDEPLOYMENT. ADVISED MAJ WAGNER TO CONTACT ODCSLOG TO SEND CHEM EXPERT WITH THIS TEAM TO ANSWER ARCENT ISSUES. ADVISED MAJ W. TO SEND THE ISSUES TO DA DCSOPS AND LET THEM COORD THE RESPONSE REQUIRED TO MEET ARCENT NEEDS. COL WYATT (J4/7) SAYS REDEPLOYMENT IS A COMPONENT ISSUE.	CPT G. TAKE THIS FOR ACTION. CONTACT JS JCS (LTC JONES) AND COL WARD CCJ5 POL/MIL AT GCC BLDG. THESE ISSUES APPLY TO ALL COMPONENTS AND REQUIRE JCS GUIDANCE.	
231800	CPT SCHEELE (REAR) CALLED TO ADVISE THAT JCS JS IS WORKING THE EOD BIO DESTRUCTION ISSUE. HQ DA SAYS THERE IS NO MOBILE EQUIPMENT TO SUPPORT THIS MISSION. TOLD HIM WE NEED FIELD METHOD OF EOD TO USE.	CPT S. WILL PUSH JCS JS FOR ANSWER	
231805	REC'D CCJ5-POLICY, MSG, SUBJECT: CDR'S GUIDANCE FOR DISPOSITION OF CAPTURED C/B MUNITIONS, FOR COORD.	BUCK SLIP FOR CCJ3 CONCURRENCE IN TO COL GAIN AT 1835 HOURS.	
231830	BIO DETECTION TM RPT'D FOR DUTY. THEY ARE GOING TO TAKE FOUR SAMPLES EACH NIGHT (1830, 2130, 0130, AND 0430). REQUESTED AN INVENTORY OF TICKET TESTS.		
231900	LT CORBERT CALLED. 115TH MP CO REPORTED A NUMBER OF DEAD ANIMALS (30-35 GOATS) NEAR INTERSECTION OF MSRs HUGO AND CADILLAC. TEAM AT BASTOGNE CLOSEST -- THEIR SPONSOR (CPT FRENCH) CALLED IT IN. ACTUALLY 2 SITES: TR425008 vic TEAJ AND QR664498 vic QARYAT-AL-ULYA.	TRIED TO GET TO SGT MURRAY TO CONFIRM, THEY WERE GOING TO CHECK IT OUT (03-512-0249). BUT CAN'T GET THRU ON THE CELLULAR PHONE	
231950	SCUD LAUNCH. AAR -- ISRAEL. IMPACT APPROX 10-15 KM SE OF TEL AVIV	ALL CLEAR	
232200	GAVE HEADS UP TO JCS JS (CDR ROBERTS) ON ISSUES RELATED TO RESTORATION AND REDEPLOYMENT (REF 231530 ENTRY ABOVE).	SEE CONV RECORD	
232300	REC'D REQUEST FROM PAO TO PROVIDE NBC "OFFICIAL" TO DESCRIBE FUNCTION OF MASK AND SUIT FOR INTERVIEW AT 240400	ANS THRU TM CAT DIR, "NO"	

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24 FEBRUARY 1991 NBC DESK LOG		
TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION
241230	CPT MINOR CALLED. 513TH MI BDE SENT OUT THE FALSE REPORT OF CONFIRMED ANTHRAX USE AT LOG BASE ALPHA. BIO TEAM AT LOG BASE ALPHA HAD A POSSIBLE POSITIVE FROM THEIR FIELD DETECTOR TICKET TEST OF THEIR 240300C SAMPLE. ALL INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE SAMPLE WILL BE NEGATIVE (TURBID SAMPLE -- SAND PARTICLE INTERFERENCE, AND SUBSEQ. NEG AT THAT SITE). SAMPLE IS BEING CULTURED AT THE LAB TO CONFIRM PRESUMPTIVE NEGATIVE.. THE DEAD ANIMAL SIGHTING AT 231900C CONFOUNDED THE FALSE BW USE REPORT. THE NEAREST MIO TEAM AT LOG BASE EASTONE REPORTED NEG FIELD TEST RESULTS FOR BOTH A/B.	SPOTREP CALLED COMPONENTS AND NFL ASKING THEM TO HELP KILL THIS ONE.
241300	CWO STEVENS CALLED TO GIVE US A HEADS UP. HE HAS THREE UNCONFIRMED NBC-1 CHEMICAL REPORTS THAT ARE BEING TREATED AS SUSPECT. TWO IN MARCENT SECTOR (ONE FOR BLISTER AND ONE FOR NERVE), EACH FORWARDED BY FOX RECON TMS, BUT WITHOUT EXPLOSIONS OR INCOMING ARTY, ETC. THE RECON TMS ARE CHALLENGING THEIR OWN REPORTS. MARINES ARE CONTINUING OPERATIONS WITHOUT MISSING A BEAT -- THEY GET ALARMS AND JUST KEEP. THE THIRD REPORT IS FOR AN U/I CHEM AGENT IN EPAC SECTOR (1ST BN/10TH BDE) -- AGAIN, NO OTHER INDICATIONS TO SUPPORT ACTUAL USE	SPOTREP
241400	MG SCHARTZ, CJIC, ADVISED EPAC REPORT WAS FALSE. ONE MAN PUT ON A MASK AT A BREACH SITE AND THOSE BEHIND DID THE SAME AND REPORTED CHEM USE.	SPOTREP
241410	ARGENT PASSED REQUESTED WEATHER INFO. IT LOOKS LIKE PREDICTED (NOT ACTUAL) AND WAS FOR 0900	
241415	SSG FORD, CMC, CALLED TO GET SAUDI POC FOR OUTSIDE DECON OPS AT MODA. SAUDI POC WILL BE IDENTIFIED VIA PHONE TO C4J3-1 AT 250900 FEB. SSG FORD IS TO BE ADVISED (J-3212).	
241500	SAUDI SECURITY OFFICE REQUESTED ON THE CAN THEY JUST RECEIVED. COORDINATED THROUGH CMC.	SGT HENDERSON PROVIDED ING
241520	J2 DESK PROVIDED SIGINT REPORT THAT IRAQI 18TH INF DIV TRIED TO CONTACT A U/I CHEM CDR AT 1000Z. CHEM CDR PROB AT ECHELON ABOVE DIV.	INFO TO COL GAIN.
241715	ETC 8 ADVISED DNA OF ALL MLRS IN IRAQI SYSTEM BY NAME/# AND MM SIZE. TOLD DNA TO CONTACT DIA FOR PAYLOAD ASSESSMENT. ALL MLRS ASSESSED TO BE CHEMICAL CAPABLE. ASKED FOR UPDATE OF SYSTEMS NOW IN DNA DATA MATRIX.	200 AND 300 MM ARE NOT EQUAL TO 122 MM NOW IN DATA BASE AS DEFAULT.

24C

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24B

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24 FEBRUARY 1991 NBC DESK LOG		
TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION
241720	KEN BOYD, CDEEC, CALLED TO ADVISE THAT THEY ARE PUTTING OUT A MSG TODAY TO ADDRESS THE EXPIRED M256 KIT QUESTION POSED BY VII CORPS. THEY ARE REVIEWING TEST DATA TO SEE WHICH TEST COMPONENT DRIVES THE EXPIRATION (HOPEFULLY IT'S LEVISITE); BUT AS IT STANDS THEY FEAR THEY MAY NOT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ANY RELIABLE EXTENTION GUIDANCE. HE REQUESTED WE PASS THIS TO ARCENT (CPT BLACK) AND DON STEWART (AMC LAR, 03-899-2596).	PASSED TO SGT BOYER, ARCENT AT 1755. LEFT MSG FOR MR. STEWART AT 1945.
241730	RECEIVED UPDATED MATRIX FROM DMA.	
241740	DR. ANDY SHUTTLEWORTH, UK (CDE--PORTON, DOWN), CALLED REQUESTING A TIME HE COULD COME BY AND TALK WITH MAJ J. ARRANGED FOR 2100 THIS EVENING	
241830	BIO DETECTION TEAM ARRIVED AT MODA.	
241915	TALKED WITH MAJ BURDICK, TAML AT KMC. CULTURE IS NOW 12HRS AND DOESN'T SHOW ANYTHING (STILL GOING TO RUN IT THRU TO IT'S 24HR CONCLUSION BUT IF IT HAD BEEN ANTHRAX WE SHOULD HAVE SEEN SOMETHING WITHIN 6-8HRS). ALSO TALKED WITH LCDR BURANS, NPL, WHO HAS BEEN HELPING BURDICK WITH PROCEDURES. BURDICK HAS BEEN DOING ALL SORTS OF DAMAGE CONTROL ON THE STORY -- WANTS US TO GET AHOLD OF A MAJ NEGRO AND A LT CARBONE (RAC 3?) TO GET THEM OUT OF THE RUMOR PROPAGATION BUSINESS. ARCENT 62	24C
242125	SCUD LAUNCH REPORTED BY SPACECOM FROM S IRAQ AREA AT RISK RIYADH, KING FHAD, DEAFERAN. CONFIRMED ONE FOR RIYADH. TWO PATRIOTS FIRED, ONE MISFIRE, ONE PROB KILL. EVENT TERMINATED (SPACECOM) 2138RS. IMPACT LOCATED APPROX 3-5 MILES N OF ULAYA	ALL CLEAR DECLARED AT <u>2145C</u>
242130	MET WITH DR. SHUTTLEWORTH AND MAJ MIKE DIXON, CDE. THEY HAD QUESTIONS ON THE ANTHRAX REPORT, ASSURED THEM IT WAS NEG AND KILLED (IN US CHANNELS) HOURS AGO. THE WHOLE EVENT REAFFIRMED THE NEED FOR AN NBCRS TIE-IN AND MAJ DIXON SAID HE'D GET SOMEONE HERE TOMORROW AT 1600 TO MAKE THAT HAPPEN. JUST AS THEY SAID, THEY'VE SAT ON THE REPORT (NOT FORWARDED ANYWHERE), DR. SALES CAME OUT OF THE WAR ROOM SAYING IT HAD GOTTEN BACK TO 10 DOWNING STREET AND TO THE CINC THROUGH GEN POWELL. STORY IS COMPLICATED AS 6 UK SOLDIERS WHO SHARE THE SAME TENT CAME DOWN W/ FLU-LIKE SYMPTOMS. WE'VE OFFERED UK A FULL SEROLOGICAL WORK-UP AT 966TH (ESKAN).	WAITING ON UK TO CALL SAYING THEY'LL TAKE US UP ON LAB OFFER. IF SO -- THE PLAN IS TO HAVE UK BRING IT HERE AND HAVE BIO TEAM TRANSPORT IT TO 966TH.

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24 FEBRUARY 1991 NBC DESK LOG

TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION
242218	CPT OBERHOLTZER CALLED TO SAY THEY'VE FAXED M256 KIT EXT. INFO TO ANCCOM (WHO'LL PUT OUT THE ADVISORY). BASICALLY, DON'T RECOMMEND EXTENSION PAST EXP. DATE. USE OF EXP. KITS IS UP TO LOCAL CDR'S IN SWA ONLY -- BE ADVISED SURVAILLENCE TESTING IN 1988 ON KITS NEAR EXP. DATE SHOWED POSSIBLE FALSE (+) FOR GB. RESULTS FOR ED ARE ADEQUATE, AND OTHER AGENTS WEREN'T TESTED. THIS IS FOR M256 (NOT M256A1 -- WHICH HASN'T HAD ANY NEAR EXP. DATE TESTING DONE ON IT)	
242330	SHIFT CHANGE. ACTIONS BROUGHT FORWARD: POSSIBLE REQ FOR BIO TEAM TO TAKE BLOOD SAMPLES TO 996TH MED LAB.	

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25 FEBRUARY 1991 NBC DESK LOG		
TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION
250001	MAJ FOGLESON, CPT SERINO ASSUME DUTY	LOG OPEN
250013	BRIT LNO REPORTED A LIVE WARHEAD AT THE UNIV SCUD SITE. 74TH BOD REPORTS THEY ARE ON THE SCENE AND WILL REPORT ONCE THEY KNOW MORE.	SEE COMBAT CAMERA PHOTOS TITLED "DUD SCUD..." IN READ FILE.
250019	MAJ BORNE RETURNED NBC OPS SUM FOR REWRITE, WANT IT IN ABBREVIATED FORM.	RETURNED 0102
250025	COL SALES REPORTED 6 UK BLOOD SAMPLES ARE ON THE WAY TO LAB. CCSG WILL REPORT AS SOON AS TESTING COMPLETE.	
240149	CPT DAVIS ARCENT CALLED, THEY HAVE 10,000 M256 KITS IN BOUND. THEY THINK THEY WILL BE HERE IN 3-5 DAYS.	
250153	CPT SMITH 74TH BOD CALLED WARHEAD SECURE, IT WAS HE.	
250425	REPORT FROM COL SALES, SUBJ: BRITISH PATIENTS. INITIAL LAB RESULTS ARE NEGATIVE. SEE ITEM 250013.	
25429	SPACECOM REPORTS SCUD LAUNCH FROM WESTERN IRAQ. AREA AT RISK IS ISRAEL. SPACECOM TERMINATED EVENT AT 250437	
250540	SSG COATES CALLED IN THE MODA BIO REPORT: 20 1840 - 1925 NEG 21 2130 - 2215 NEG 22 0100 - 0145 NEG 23 0430 - 0515 NEG REPORTED AN AIR RAID SIREN GOING OFF. CONTACTED C31. NO AIR RAID, WILL CHECK TO SEE WHAT SIREN IS.	PASSED TO SSG WILSON FXIB, 0548
250603	SSG FORD BROUGHT IN HHC NBC REACTION PLAN FOR OUR INFO.	
250628	SCUD ALERT W. IRAQ, LAUNCH AAR ISRAEL. THIS WAS THE SECOND ATTEMPT TO HIT THE NUCLEAR FACILITY AT DIMONA.	TERMINATED 0636
250933	RECEIVED A FAX FROM LTC MERRYMAN REY REDEPLOYMENT PROBLEMS. SHE CAN'T GET IT SIGNED WOULD LIKE US TO WORK IT.	O.K. <i>[initials]</i> SEE 251040 <i>[initials]</i>

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25 FEBRUARY 1991		NBC DESK LOG	
TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION	
250940	CALL FROM MSG BLUE, SUBJ: CHEM/BIO ISSUES. HE PASSED ON DTG OF 513TH MSG ON BIO INCIDENT AT LOGBASE ALPHA, WHICH IS ON HAND. HE ALSO MENTIONED HAVING PROBLEMS GETTING INFO ON FIELD DISPOSAL SYSTEMS. SUGGESTED HE CONTACT EPA AND CDC IF PINE BLUFF IS UNABLE TO SUPPORT.		
250945	PASSED ULN AND AIRLIFT MISSION DATA FOR INCOMING FOX VEHICLES TO SSG BOYER, ARCENT/NBC.		
250930	LTC S INITIATED SAUDI ENGINEER POC AND SSG FORD INITIAL COORD FOR DECON/BLDG ENTRY PROCEDURES. SAUDI POC WILL BRIEF HIS BOSS ON RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES AND PROVIDE GUIDANCE/REQUIREMENTS TO SECURITY FORCES. SSG FORD WILL WORK WITH SAUDIS TO ID SAUDI PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS AND PROVIDE TRAINING.		
251015	COL BELIHAR CAME BY WITH A QUESTION ABOUT SEED GRAIN VS FEED GRAIN SACKS NEAR THE DEAD SHEEP. REMINDED HIM OF THE FEED SACKS THAT WERE SEEN BEFORE.		
251040	CONTACTED DAMO-SWC-AOC (LTC REISENWEAVER) TO GET ANSWERS TO ARCENT'S QUESTIONS. HE TOOK QUESTIONS WILL GIVE US ANSWERS AND INFO ARCENT. IT MAY TAKE A FEW DAYS.	PASSED TO ARCENT 1056	
251130	SHIFT CHANGE, MAJ J/CPT G ASSUME DUTIES. ACTIONS BROUGHT FORWARD: - RESTORATION/REDEF ISSUES		
251300	LTC WADE, CCSG, STOPPED BY TO DISCUSS FEED GRAIN VS SEED GRAIN. WANTED TO ENSURE THAT IF DEAD ANIMALS ARE OBSERVED AROUND GRAIN BAGS, AS REPORTED BY 513TH MI MSG, THE BAGS BE EXAMINED. FREQUENTLY, SEED GRAIN (TREATED WITH NUMEROUS CHEMICALS) IS USED FOR FEED GRAIN, KILLING LIVESTOCK. A COMMON PROB IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES.	DOD. 251300 - 25	
251400	PROVIDED CENTAF (MSGT CLINE) SAMPLING PROCEDURES CONDUCTED ICM FALSE BIO REPORT SO THAT HE COULD ASSIST IN GETTING THE CENTAF REPORT RETRACTED.		
251530	MAJ WAGNER CALLED: FIRST 4 OF LAST 9 FOX ARRIVED (TO GO TO XVIII CORPS (3D ACR/ 24TH ID) NEXT FIVE DUE IN TODAY. (THREE TO XVIII ABN CORPS (43D ACR), 2 ORF @ KMC) EGYPTIAN FOX SUPPORT NOT DEAD, BUT MAY BE OBE.	FOUR / FIVE	

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25 FEBRUARY 1991		NBC DESK LOG	
TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION	
251600	LTC JONES, JCS-J5, CALLED REF ARCENT RESTORATION-REDEPLOYMENT QUESTIONS. HE IS WORKING ISSUE, HAS QUESTIONS, WILL COORD WITH DAMO-SWC ACTION OFFICER ON SPECIFICS, WILL WATCH FOR OUR MSG.		
251740	COL MCCLELLAN CALLED. HE REC'D OUR FAX REF FHE, HAD NOT READ IT YET. SAID HE WILL CALL BACK ON 26 FEB AFTER REVIEWING IT.		
251745	KEN BOYD (CRDEC) ADVISED THAT M256 KIT SHOULD BE EXTENDED ONLY UNTIL M256A1 IS IN AOR. IF A POSITIVE FOR "G" IS OBTAINED WITH A M256 TICKET, CONFIRM WITH ANOTHER M256 TICKET FROM A DIFFERENT LOT #, OR WITH M8 OR CAM. MSG TO FOLLOW.	ADVISED ARCENT NBC (SGM GROESVNER)	
251800	BIO TM ARRIVED AT MODA.		
251952	REC'D REPORT FROM NSA OF CHEM ATTACK ON "1ST ARMORED/ARMY DIVISION". TURNED OUT TO BE ALARM ON A FOX WENT OFF IN 1ST MAR DIV, WAS RPT'D BY RADIO!	25B ✓	
252041	CWO JAMES CALLED -- CHEM RPT IN 1ST MARDIV WAS VERIFIED NEG.	25B ✓	
252035	SCUD ALERT, AAR KMC, SECOND LAUNCH, AAR, BAHRAIN/DOHA NOTE: SPACECOM REPORTS ONE LAUNCH.	TERMINATED AT 2100 -- SPACECOM CALLING IT AN "UNCONFIRMED LAUNCH"	
252100	APPARENTLY, DEBRIS FROM THE SCUD LAUNCH (SEE 252035 ABOVE) HIT A WAREHOUSE IN DHAHRAN WHERE SOLDIERS ARE BILLETED AND THERE ARE UPWARDS OF 100 CASUALTIES (12 KIA, MAY BE UP TO 40)		
252300	SSG COATES CALLED, HAS SUSPECT SAMPLE FOR "A", SECOND TEST SHOWED NEG, TAKING TO LAB FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS	3 Ticket Tests on Sample 1 unady (+); 2 (-) 2nd Sample taken immediately after first (-)	
252330	SHIFT CHANGE. ACTIONS BROUGHT FORWARD: -- BIO TEAM SAMPLE FOLLOW-UP -- RESTOR/REDEPL MSG DRAFT FOR LTC REVIEW	250 See 260127	

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CONFIDENTIAL on _____
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declassified by 032 C31 MIMC

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26 FEBRUARY 1991		NBC DESK LOG	
TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION	
260001	MAJ FOGLESON, CPT SERINO ASSUME DUTY	OPENED LOG	
260120	COL BAILES ADVISED THE SIX BLOOD TESTS MAJ J ASKED ABOUT EARLIER (NOT LOGGED) WERE THE SAME SIX BRITS REPORTED YESTERDAY.		
260127	LAB CALLED INITIAL TESTS ON BIO SAMPLE NEGATIVE, WILL CALL WITH CULTURE RESULTS.	LOG ITEM 252300	
260129	SCUD LAUNCH, S. IRAQ AAR RIYADH, DEHRAN, EAST COAST. PM REP NOT PRESENT, COL KLIMP ADVISED ME THAT PM NOTIFICATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE. HHC (CPT MURPHY) CONFIRMED WARNING SOUNDED AT COMPOUND. PROJ IMPACT OFF COAST OF DOHA.	ALL CLEAR RIYADH 0139.	
260150	SGT BOGGS (MODA BIO TEAM) CALLED THEY HAVE 2 NEW (A) POSITIVE TESTS, ADVISED THEM TO TAKE THEM TO THE LAB.		
260210	CALL FROM 1LT O'REGAN, SUBJ: CAM. 3DSFG IS TRYING TO SECURE 14 CAMS ASAP. AS UNDERSTOOD, ADDITIONAL CAMS GOING TO ARGENT TO FILL SIGNIFICANT SHORTFALL (NUMBERS AND \$ FILL PROVIDED SO 1LT O'REGAN COULD EXPLAIN TO HIS BOSS). SUGGESTED 3DSFG GET CAMS FROM FT. BRAGG, AS THIS WOULD PROVIDE THE MOST RAPID MEANS OF FILL.		
260301	SSG COATES CALLED, HE JUST RETURNED FROM THE LAB. HE READ TWO TESTS THAT WERE REPORTED TO BE (A) POS AND SAYS THEY ARE NOT POS READINGS. TEST SAMPLE IS BROWN.	SEE ITEM 260150	
260357	LT OREGAN CALLED. SOCCENT PERSONNEL WITH THE MARINES ARE REPORTING ANOTHER CHEM AGENT POS. I CALLED CW3 JAMES. HE IS GETTING REPORTS OF POS FOR LEWISITE FROM THE FOX IN PASSIVE MODE. WHEN THEY PROGRAMMED THE MASS SPEC TO LOOK FOR L ONLY, IT DOES NOT FIND IT. ANALYSIS OF THE AIR SHOWS HIGH LEVELS OF PETROL PRODUCTS. ALSO SOME CAMS ARE SHOWING A 4 BAR READING ON H MODE, MASS SPEC AND M256 SHOW NO AGENT PRESENT.	WOULD BE INTERESTING TO SEE IF PREVIOUS MARCENT SUSPECT POS REPORTS WERE WITH FOX IN PASSIVE MODE.	

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27 FEBRUARY 1991		NBC DESK LOG
TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION
271130	SHIFT CHANGE. MAJ J/CPT G ASSUME DUTIES. ACTIONS BROUGHT FORWARD: NONE.	
271335	CW3 LEE (MARCENT REAR) ADVISED THAT THEY WISH TO DETACH THE BIO TEAM AT JUBAYL ON 28 FEB. REQUEST WE ADVISE WHERE WE WANT IT. LTC S ASKED HIM TO TRY TO VERIFY 2D MARDIV REPORT OF CAPTURED CHEM WEAPONS.	
271415	TOLD CW3 LEE THAT HE COULD MOVE THE 2ND TM TO MARCENT MAIN WITH THE EOD TM THAT JUST WENT FORWARD, OR KEEP THEM RIGHT WHERE THEY ARE AT FOR THE NEXT 2-3 DAYS AS THEY'RE PROBABLY GOING TO BE CALLED FORWARD AS SOON AS FOLKS START GOING IN TO DESTROY CAPTURED ENEMY MUNITIONS.	
271545	MSG BLUE CALLED. LTC HILLIARD, JCS JS, CALLED WITH QUESTIONS ABOUT CINCENT MSG, 241200Z, SUBJ: CDR'S GUIDANCE FOR DISPOSITION OF CAPTURED CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MUNITIONS. HE WANTED TO KNOW WHO WROTE IT -- DID SOMEONE IN JS DO IT THEMSELVES, AND IS IT ASKING FOR HELP. ANS: JS WAS OPR BUT STAFFED IT (CCJ3-X INCL), AND IT IS GUIDANCE/DIRECTION FOR COMPONENTS, INFO TO JCS.	
271745	NOTIFIED DAMO-SWC, REF: MSG ON NBC ISSUES FOR RESTORATION/REDEPLOYMENT, LET HIM KNOW MSG WON'T BE RELEASED.	
271800	CALLED LTC JONES, JCS-J5, REF: RESTORATION NBC ISSUES -- NOTIFIED HIM MSG IS ON HOLD. ALSO, REF: EOD OF NBC AGENTS AND MUNITIONS, THEY FEEL DESTRUCTION OF SMALL QUANTITIES USING FIELD METHOD IS OK. "BULK" (NOT DEFINED) DESTRUCTION IS NOT APPROVED BECAUSE IT MAY HAVE GREAT INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS. MORE GUIDANCE TO FOLLOW. FOR THE TIME BEING, BULK MUST BE SECURED AND AWAIT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.	
271905	LTC S CALLED COL MCCLELLAN WHO ADVISED THAT HE CONCURS WITH PROPOSED CCJ3-X INPUT TO THE MISSION.	1ST END GIVEN TO CCJ3-PC BY LTC S.
272330	SHIFT CHANGE. ACTIONS BROUGHT FORWARD: NONE	

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 Declassified by OED 471 414110

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28 FEBRUARY 1991

NBC DESK LOG

TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION
281730	COL PHILLIP (DNA) CALLED TO FIND OUT IF THERE WAS ANY WAY THEY COULD ASSIST US FURTHER. THEY WILL MAINTAIN 24 HOUR WATCH THRU 3 MAR 91. ANBACIS EQUIPMENT WILL NEED TO BE RETURNED TO DNA. DNA WILL PUT OUT LETTER ADVISING OF THIS AND PROCEDURES TO SEND THE EQUIPMENT TO DNA.	
281740	CW3 LEE (MARGENT) CALLED TO INFORM US THAT THE BIO TEAM AT HIS LOCATION IS RETURNING TO IT'S CO HQ AT AL KHOBAR TOMORROW.	
281845	LTC RICK JENKINS (CCJ2) IS HIGHLY INTERESTED IN EXPLOITATION OF THE SUSPECTED CHEM AND BIO BUNKERS IN THE OCCUPIED PORTION OF IRAQ. ADVISED HIM TO IDENTIFY HIS REQUIREMENTS TO 513TH MI BDE, AS THEY HAVE THE MISSION AND ALREADY HAVE SOME ASSIGNED TASKS (I.E., CHEM ROUNDS FOR EXPLOITATION)	IF A BIO TEAM IS REQ'D, 513TH MI HAS MADE PLANS TO KEEP THE 5 XM2/ XM21 TMS FOR THIS MISSION.
281924	CW3 LEE (MARGENT) CALLED AGAIN. WANTED TO KNOW WHAT TO DO WITH ANBACIS II EQUIPMENT. PASSED HIM INFO FROM 1730 hrs MSG FROM DNA.	
281930	CWO JAMES CALLED. 1ST MARDIV HAS COME ACROSS AN AMMO BUNKER COMPLEX (QT75393910) WITH SUSPECTED CHEMICAL MUNITIONS. THE FOX (CCMS) HAS COME UP WITH INDICATIONS OF SMALL CONC OF SULFUR MUSTARD AFTER NUMEROUS TESTS. ALL POSSIBLE INTERFERENCES WITH PETROLEUM PRODUCTS RULED OUT. THEY ARE OUTSIDE THE BUNKER NOW, NO ONE HAS GONE IN. THEY'VE MOVED THEIR BOD PEOPLE UP, BUT WON'T DO ANYTHING UNTIL THE MORNING. AREA IS CORDONED OFF, ALL THEIR PEOPLE IN THE AREA HAVE BEEN WARNED.	SPOT REP SUBMITTED TO CAT DIR (COL KLIMP), AND XO. INFORMED C3IC TH CH (LTC FISCHER. J2 RESEARCHING FILES FOR PREVIOUS REPORTS OF THIS SITE.
282155	MAJ CHAPMAN, XVIII ABN CORPS, G2, CALL REP: SUSPECTED OIL MINES IN KUWAIT CITY. HE SAID HE SAW A REPORT FROM SOCCENT, WHICH ICHBED A MARGENT REPORT OF CHEM FILLED MINES, GRAY W/YELLOW STRIPE.	MARGENT SAID, "THEY'VE GOT IT WRONG." NO SUCH REPORT FROM MARGENT
282215	MAJ JONES, THIS S3, CALLED. WANTS TO ENSURE HE'S CALLED IF MARGENT BOD CONFIRMS FINDING CHEM MUNITIONS OR AGENTS IN BUNKER (1930 ENTRY) SO THIS CAN EXPLOIT AND TAKE SAMPLES BEFORE DESTRUCTION.	NOTIFIED MARGENT, CWO JAMES
282255	CPT ROSE, CCJ2 REPORTED THEY HAD A REPORT ON SUSPECTED CHEM STORAGE SITE (SAME LOC AS ABOVE) DATED 30 OCT 90. WILL HAVE ORIGINATOR RESEND REPORT, CONFIRM IF IT IS THE SAME, AND THEN SEND TO MARGENT.	WILL TAKE 4-8 HOURS TO COMPLETE
282330	SHIFT CHANGE. ACTIONS BROUGHT FORWARD: NONE	

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	THE DECK LOG	DATE
011930	CWO JAMES CALLED BACK. THE SUSPECT BUNKER WAS CHECKED OUT TELEPHONICALLY -- NO CHEMICAL-NUTRITION FOUND. HE IS PROBABLY RETURNING TO QUANTICO TOMORROW. ASKED HIM TO HAVE NEWS TAPES, LOG BOOKS, ETC. PASSED TO FM NBC DEFENSE SYSTEMS (CPT MARSHALL).	
012045	CPT DAVIS, ARGENT, CALLED -- WANTED TO KNOW IF ANYTHING HAD BEEN FOUND AT SUSPECTED CHEM-NUTRITION BUNKER IN MARCENT SECTOR. ASKED HIM-IF-CHECKED-GOT-NEGATIVE. RECORDED HIM WE WERE STILL TRACKING THE ONE REPORTED EARLIER TODAY IN 18TH ABC SECTOR. HE SAID HE'D TRY TO GET AN UPDATE AND LET US KNOW (DID KNOW THAT THE CHEM OFF AND FOX MADE IT TO THE SITE). HE ALSO WANTED TO PASS ON AN IMPROBABLE STORY THAT WAS OUT THERE OF A POSSIBLE CHEM CASUALTY. (IN CASE WE GET IN MIND OF IT) APPARENTLY A SOLDIER FROM JAD/VII CORPS THREW A THERMITE GRENADE INTO A BMP -- THERE WAS A SECONDARY EXPLOSION, HE SAID HE SMELT GARLIC AND WAS OVERCOME BY GAS. (ARGENT THINKS IT WAS PROBABLY EXPLODING BATTERY) HE'S IN CRITICAL CONDITION.	
012110	CPT CHERKOWSKI CALLED (03-857-1303). FM WANTS TO KNOW IF GENTCOX WANTS OPERATORS FOR IN-BOARD CANS TO BE TRAINED BY FM PERSONNEL.	
012230	SHIFT CHANGE. ACTIONS BROUGHT FORWARD: -- SUSPECT CHEM BUNKER IN 18TH ABC SECTOR -- TRAINING FOR CANS OPERATORS	

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TIME	INCIDENT	AGENCY
031130	SHIFT CHANGE. ACTIONS BROUGHT FORWARD: -- POSSIBLE CHEM CASUALTY	
031230	MAJ KUBEN FROM DMR CALLED. PAIRED A BUNKER FOOTPRINT FROM PREVIOUS RUN. DISCUSSED NEED TO GET THIS PREDICTION FROM D2PC VS WHAT SMA HAS UPLOADED -- HE'LL WORK ON THAT. ADVISED (AS WE ALREADY KNOW) THAT THERE IS NO DATA ON DISPERSION/TRANSPORT ETC. OF L OR RQ, BUT HE'D GET SOMEONE TO MAKE SOME SORT OF COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT W/ WHAT WE DO HAVE DATA (HEARD PLOTS) FOR.	
031420	LTC ADAMS, JAD CHEK OFF, CALLED TO SAY A SAMPLE FROM BUNKER SITE WHERE THE POSSIBLE CHEM CASUALTY OCCURRED WAS HANDED OVER TO TECH INTELL. HE WAS IN THE PROCESS OF PROVIDING ADDITIONAL DETAILS WHEN WE WERE CUT OFF.	
031450	PASSED INFO RECEIVED FROM LTC ADAMS TO ARCENT AND ASKED THEM TO GET THE DETAILS THROUGH VII CORPS.	
031500	SGM GROSEVOR, ARCENT, CALLED BACK WITH INFO FROM VII CORPS NBC (CPT CLARK) THAT THEY HAD IDENTIFIED THE BUNKER IN QUESTION AND THE FOX IDENTIFIED NEAR BY. WAITING ON MCL (MS) TAPE TO CONFIRM.	
031515	LTC MADE (CCSG) ADVISED THAT COL DUNT HAS CONTINUED THAT THE SOLDIER OF THE 3D AB'DOES HAVE BLISTERS, CHARACTERISTIC OF N' (MUSTARD) CHEMICAL AGENT, ON HIS UPPER AND LOWER LEFT ARM. INJURY IS RELATIVELY MINOR AND SOLDIER HAS BEEN RETURNED TO DUTY. A URINE SAMPLE HAS BEEN TAKEN IN ORDER TO CONFIRM AGENT TYPE THROUGH THIOGLYCOL ANALYSIS. HE ALSO REPORTED THAT HE HAS HEARD A RUMOR OF ONE FEMALE SOLDIER, NOW IN KUWAIT CITY, WHO MAY HAVE "SIGNS & SYMPTOMS OF CHEM AGENT POISONING". NOT SURE WHAT THIS MEANS AND HE WILL CHECK THIS OUT.	UPDATE OF SPOT REPORT PROVIDED TO TEAM CHIEF AND COL GAIN.
031810	ARCENT (SGM GROSEVOR) ADVISED THAT CHEM CASUALTY SUSPECTED ON AFTERNOON OF 28 FEB. SOLDIER NOTICED REDDENING OF SKIN ON 2 MAR AND SMALL BLISTERS ON 3 MAR. -- HE WENT TO THE MEDIC ON AFTERNOON OF 2 MAR. REPORTED TO ARCENT ON 3 MAR.	
031820	COL BELIHAR (CCSG) PROVIDED INFO FROM THE INFO CCSG REC'D ON THE CHEM CASUALTY INCIDENT. EXPOSURE WAS CLASSIFIED AS MILD BUT A LATENT PERIOD OF 8 HOURS DOES NOT COMPARE WITH ARCENT REPORT THAT INCIDENT OCCURRED ON 28 FEB.	

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MARCH 1991		REC'Desk
TIME	INCIDENT	ACTION
121258	CONTACTED SGT WILLIAMS ARMY C-12 SCRD. HE CAN GET FLIGHTS OUT TO EDWALT CITY ON 16 MAR. MUST CALL AND CONFIRM ON 15TH. (KY 9-7804-345).	
121300	AOC (LTC NITSON) RETURNED CALL. LTC'S ADVISED HIM OF ISSUES/QUESTIONS OF ITEM 121220. ASKED HIM TO CONTACT AUTHORITY POC TO DETERMINE: CAN A CONVENTIONAL BOUND CAUSE RADIOACTIVITY WHEN IT STRIKES A M2/M3 BRADLET? DID IRAQ HAVE ANY DEPLETED URANIUM TYPE BOUNDS? WHAT ARE CHARACTERISTIC READINGS OF U.S. DU RDS AFTER HITTING A TARGET? WHAT TYPE/SIZE DU RDS DOES U.S. HAVE AND ON WHAT SYSTEMS?	
121330	CMS CATERA ADVISED THAT COL RICHIE (CGJ2 POC) STATED THAT IRAQ HAS NEVER ASSESSED TO HAVE ANY DU TYPE RDS.	
121350	MAJ (P) BIRCH, I MET REPORTED A LARGE IRAQI AMMO CACHE WAS DISCOVERED.	SEE CONVERSATION RECORD
121620	CMS LETZ CALLED MARCHET HAS LOCATED A SUSPECTED CHEM LAND MINE FILLING SITE AT Q7781349. THIS FOX-GOT-A-POSTIVE-FOX-OF AND-CA. THEY FOUND CONTAINERS THAT LOOK LIKE AIR TANKS AND MINE CRATES. EOD ADVISED THE MINES CAN BE FILLED WITH HE OR CHEM. THE AREA HAS BEEN ROTTED OFF AND SECURED. I ADVISED THEM TO CALL BIRCH HIS AND GET A SAMPLING TEAM INTO THE AREA.	
121940	CPT NAHIER, ARCENT G3 WBC, CALLED TO REPORT POSSIBLE CHEMICAL BOUNDS IN 1ST RD AREA. THEY HAVE COME ACROSS 18 BOUNDS FROM QU300730 TO QU47219, SOME OF THE BOUND BOUNDS HAVE 3 RED BANDS (AND JORDANIAN MARKINGS). THE REPORT WAS FORWARDED AT 121740C. THEY'VE ARRANGED FOR EOD AND NBC RECON TO CHECK IT OUT. DETAILS TO FOLLOW WHEN THEY GET THEM.	ARCENT G3 DOESN'T THINK THIS WILL TURN OUT TO BE CHEM BOUNDS.
121942	RECEIVED A SHORT SUSPENSE TO PROVIDE 1-2 NACTO LESSONS LEARNED TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF. SUSPENSE TO JOC XO/TEAM CHIEF IS 130400C.	TO TM CHIEF AT 2332C
121945	DNA TRIED TO FAX A FOUR PAGE DOCUMENT THAT ADDRESSES TURN-IN OF AMRACIS II EQUIPMENT. GOT PRE-EMPTED BEFORE FOURTH PAGE GOT THROUGH.	
122330	SHIFT CHANGE.	

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EXHIBIT 4

**NBC desk logs - analysis of the gaps and the
“Log Extracts - Biological Defense” document**

8/13/97

Gaps vs. Extracts

Span & Gaps List Number	GAPS (as published on GULF LINK)	Original Gap Duration (as published on GULF LINK)	Extract Entries Found by DoDIG Investigators
1	180530 - 182400 JAN 91	18 HOURS, 30 MINUTES	18 JAN 91 (2 ENTRIES) 19 JAN 91 (2 ENTRIES) 22 JAN 91 (4 ENTRIES)
2	230000 - 231620 JAN 91	16 HOURS, 20 MINUTES	23 JAN 91 (1 ENTRY)
3	24 JAN 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	24 JAN 91 (8 ENTRIES)
	25 JAN 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	25 JAN 91 (5 ENTRIES)
4	260500 - 262400 JAN 91	19 HOURS	26 JAN 91 (4 ENTRIES)
5	271130 - 272400 JAN 91	12 HOURS, 30 MINUTES	27 JAN 91 (2 ENTRIES)
6	28 JAN 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	28 JAN 91 (15 ENTRIES)
	29 JAN 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	29 JAN 91 (4 ENTRIES)
	30 JAN 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	30 JAN 91 (3 ENTRIES)
7	310913 - 312400 JAN 91	14 HOURS, 47 MINUTES	31 JAN 91 (2 ENTRIES)
8	011100 - 012400 FEB 91	13 HOURS	(NO ENTRIES FOUND)
9	020000 - 021130 FEB 91	11 HOURS, 30 MINUTES	2 FEB 91 (1 ENTRY)
10	03 FEB 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	3 FEB 91 (5 ENTRIES)
11	051840 - 052400 FEB 91	5 HOURS, 20 MINUTES	5 FEB 91 (3 ENTRIES)
12	06 FEB 91	144 HOURS [6 DAYS]	6 FEB 91 (7 ENTRIES)
	07 FEB 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	(NO ENTRIES FOUND)
	08 FEB 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	8 FEB 91 (3 ENTRIES)
	09 FEB 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	9 FEB 91 (5 ENTRIES)
	10 FEB 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	10 FEB 91 (3 ENTRIES)
	11 FEB 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	11 FEB 91 (2 ENTRIES)
13	13 FEB 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	13 FEB 91 (4 ENTRIES)
	14 FEB 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	14 FEB 91 (5 ENTRIES)
	15 FEB 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	15 FEB 91 (8 ENTRIES)
	16 FEB 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	16 FEB 91 (5 ENTRIES)
	17 FEB 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	17 FEB 91 (9 ENTRIES)
	18 FEB 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	18 FEB 91 (13 ENTRIES)
	19 FEB 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	19 FEB 91 (4 ENTRIES)
	20 FEB 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	20 FEB 91 (5 ENTRIES)
14	210405 - 212400 FEB 91	19 HOURS, 55 MINUTES	21 FEB 91 (6 ENTRIES)
15	220000 - 221113 FEB 91	11 HOURS, 13 MINUTES	22 FEB 91 (1 ENTRY)
16	230000 - 231130 FEB 91	11 HOURS, 30 MINUTES	23 FEB 91 (4 ENTRIES)
17	240000 - 241230 FEB 91	12 HOURS, 30 MINUTES	24 FEB 91 (5 ENTRIES)
18	260357 - 262400 FEB 91	20 HOURS, 3 MINUTES	26 FEB 91 (4 ENTRIES)
19	270000 - 271130 FEB 91	11 HOURS, 30 MINUTES	27 FEB 91 (2 ENTRIES)
20	280000 - 281730 FEB 91	17 HOURS, 30 MINUTES	28 FEB 91 (2 ENTRIES)
21	010000 - 011930 MAR 91	19 HOURS, 30 MINUTES	1 MAR 91 (1 ENTRY)
22	2 MAR 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	2 MAR 91 (1 ENTRY)
23	030000 - 031130 MAR 91	11 HOURS, 30 MINUTES	(NO ENTRIES FOUND)
24	031820 - 032400 MAR 91	5 HOURS, 40 MINUTES	3 MAR 91 (1 ENTRY)
25	04 MAR 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	(NO ENTRIES FOUND)
	05 MAR 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	5 MAR 91 (1 ENTRY)
	06 MAR 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	(NO ENTRIES FOUND)
	07 MAR 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	(NO ENTRIES FOUND)
	08 MAR 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	(NO ENTRIES FOUND)
	09 MAR 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	9 MAR 91 (2 ENTRIES)
	10 MAR 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	(NO ENTRIES FOUND)
	11 MAR 91	24 HOURS [1 DAY]	11 MAR 91 (1 ENTRY)
26	120000 - 121258 MAR 91	12 HOURS, 58 MINUTES	(NO ENTRIES FOUND)

EXHIBIT 5

**Secretary of Defense memorandum,
dated March 2, 1991**



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

2 MAR 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMPTROLLER
GENERAL COUNSEL
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Historical Record of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm is a prominent part of American and world history. It is important that we preserve the historical record of this experience and that we derive from it lessons that can be applied in planning and implementing our national defense in the future.

Programs to collect the documents and information that will be needed to record the history of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and to facilitate the preparation of studies and analyses of policies, plans, operations, technology, and logistics have been initiated in the Military Services and the Joint Staff.

To the same end, all elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Defense agencies and field activities should take steps immediately to organize the collection and preservation of documents pertinent to their activities in connection with the war. The benefits to be derived from this documentation of our experience may be invaluable.

The Director of Administration and Management may issue such instructions as may be necessary to implement this memorandum.

27637

EXHIBIT 6

**CENTCOM J1 staff memorandum,
dated July 2, 1991**



UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33608-7001

2 JUL 1991

CCJ1

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTORS AND CHIEFS OF SPECIAL STAFF

SUBJECT: Disposition of DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM Records

1. This memorandum is intended to ensure all directorates and special staff offices are aware of procedures for filing record information pertaining to Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Excerpts from HQ US Air Force, SAF/AAIA Ltr, dated 17 Apr 91 apply:

a. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) asks that records coming back from the Gulf theater be kept separate from those records accumulated in your current office areas. Please do this!

b. Keep records (stateside) pertaining to DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM you collected in your current office areas as a separate collection from the rest of your records.

c. Also, keep the records coming from the Gulf separate from your other DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM records (stateside).

d. When you retire any of these records, annotate in item 6 of the SFs 135 that "THESE RECORDS PERTAIN TO DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (indicate if collected in office (stateside) or collected from the Gulf)" as applicable.

e. Files will be maintained in offices of record until scheduled for shipment to National Records Center.

2. Additionally, even though some records are normally disposable, as a collection on the war, they may be considered permanent. The lessons learned, with appropriate background papers, may be very valuable during another such operation. If you have any such collections, put them under table 55-6, rule 3.

3. In the very near future, a separate letter outlining special information from NARA will be forth coming. A revision of AFR 12-50, volume II, Disposition of Air Force Records will be published in late 91.

[REDACTED]

Colonel, USAF
Director, Manpower, Personnel
and Administration